Real and Perceived Risks: The Cognitive Science Perspective

1. Real and Perceived Risks:The Cognitive Science Perspective Topics: Theories of Risk The Cognitive Science Perspective

2. Relevant Theories • We will be focusing on several distinct theoretical approaches to risk this semester: • Cognitive science • Risk society • Governmentality • A cultural approach • Edgework • Our goal is to be able to describe: • The basic features/arguments of each theory • Similarities and differences across the theories • Examples to illustrate the basic features, similarities, and differences of the theories • Limitations of the theories

3. Relevant Theories • There are many ways to compare these theories, two are (see Lupton 1999): • Realist/objective vs. relativist/subjective views of risk • Realist/objective – risks are real, we can calculate the probability of negative events and try to manage them • Relativist/subjective – risks are socially constructed; the reality of risk isn’t the critical issue, it is instead the perception of risk and how risk is used that matter most • Macro vs. micro focus • Macro – focus is on society/community/group/culture • Micro – focus is on the individual

4. Cognitive Science • The general paradox: • We are safer now than at any other point in history (according to experts and objective statistics/data; e.g., on disease, life expectancy, etc.) • Despite this, we face new risks from new technologies • We react to these new risks with fear and we are more afraid now than we have ever been • Our fears don’t match with ‘the reality’ of risks • We are less afraid of bigger risks (e.g., car accidents, accidents in the home) • We are more afraid of lesser risks (e.g., nuclear power)

5. Cognitive Science • Recognizing this gap between ‘reality’ and ‘perceptions’, researchers have focuses on: • Better understanding the gap between the 1) scientific, industrial, governmental community and 2) the general public • How to better communicate with/educate the public about risk (which is now more critical and distrustful)

6. Cognitive Science • The cognitive science perspective takes a realist/objective view of risk • “Risk is the idea that something might happen, usually something bad” (Ropeik and Gray 2002: 4) • Four components of risk (from Ropeik and Gray 2002: 4) • Probability – calculating the chances of a certain outcome; objective and subjective probabilities are used; this is done in the name of quantitative science • Consequences – severity of the outcome • Hazard – the outcome must be hazardous to be a risk • Exposure – if something is hazardous, but we are not exposed to it then it is not a risk • It also has a micro focus – the focus in on laypeople’s perceptions

7. “Perceptions of Risk” – Paul Slovic Important concepts from the Slovic reading: • Risk assessment and risk perceptions • Factors (Dread Risk and Unknown Risk), also: • Voluntariness • Controllability • Possible benefits • Signal potential and higher order impacts

8. “Perceptions of Risk” - Paul Slovic • Experts assess risk based on objective facts, such as death rates • Laypeople, by contrast, have developed ‘heuristics’ or ‘mental strategies’ to make sense of what is a threat • These differences lead to the gap between ‘risk assessments’ and ‘risk perceptions’ • Biases that shape people’s perceptions: • Difficulty understanding probabilities • Media coverage – our knowledge is filtered through the media, which focuses on mishaps and threats (it sensationalizes them) • Misleading personal experiences • Anxiety in life • Also, new evidence doesn’t always lead people to change their opinions (i.e., when they have strong, existing views)

9. “Perceptions of Risk” – Paul Slovic • The Factors: • Dread risk • Unknown risk • Other important components: • Voluntariness and equity • Controllability of • Benefits of technology/activity

10. “Perceptions of Risk” – Paul Slovic • Higher order impacts and signal potential • The impacts/consequences of an accident can be direct and/or indirect • Direct – immediate victims • Indirect – anyone/anything else not an immediate victim • Higher order impacts – the extent to which an accident/unfortunate event has effects beyond direct harm to the immediate victims • Indirect costs (monetary and non monetary) to • the group responsible • to other groups in the same industry • to other groups in other industries • E.g., Increased regulation, increased construction and operation costs, reduced operation, greater public opposition, reliance on other energy sources, hostile view toward new technology, loss in credibility • Examples • Three Mile Island example • BP spill in the gulf • Signal potential • the signal potential of an event and its social impact is related to where a risk fits into the two-factor structure • this determines the extent of higher order impacts

11. A more recent summary (from Ropeik and Gray 2002: 16-17) • People are more afraid of: • New risks, ones they are not familiar with – e.g., West Nile virus • Human-made risks (vs. natural risks) – e.g., radiation from nuclear power and cell phones vs. the sun • Imposed risks – e.g., asbestos vs. first-hand smoke • Risks with fewer benefits – e.g., people like San Francisco, so they live there despite earthquakes • Risks that kill in awful ways – e.g., killed by shark vs. heart disease • Risks they can’t control – e.g., flying on commercial jet vs. driving one’s self • Risks from places, people, corporations, governments they don’t trust – e.g., would you choose to drink glass of clear liquid from chemical company or Oprah? • Risks that we are more aware of – e.g., terrorism in 2001 • Risks when uncertainty is high – which explains why we fear new technology • Risks to children compared to risks to themselves • Risks that can directly affect us personally

12. Critiques • The problems, according to Arnoldi, are • the belief that risk perceptions are irrational • People’s perceptions are almost dismissed as the goal is to better educate them and to eradicate the misperceptions • science is limited and the cognitive science perspective gives too much power to experts • they haven’t examined larger social and cultural forces that shape risk perceptions

13. The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA (1996)

14. The Book: • Rachel Carson Prize (1998) – For a book length work of social or political relevance in the area of science and technology studies • Robert K. Merton Award – The award is given annually in recognition of an outstanding book on science, knowledge, and technology • Nominated for the National Book Award and the Pulitzer Prize (for achievements in newspaper and online journalism, literature and musical composition) • Vaughan is also the 2006 winner of the ASA’s Public Understanding of Sociology Award because she has had exceptional influence as a public intellectual for the past several decades • Vaughan testified before the Columbia Accident Investigation Board in 2003 and worked with the board to write a chapter on social causes of the Columbia disaster • This is not light reading – don’t expect to skim it quickly • The focus in chapter 3 is on the ‘native’ view of risk perceptions related to the o rings on the space shuttle’s solid rocket boosters • The critical concept is the normalization of deviance • The chapter briefly discusses the nature of risk related to space travel and the shuttle program • The chapter focuses on the structure of NASA as well as its parts suppliers (and the built-in conflict) • It also focuses on details of risk assessment related to the o rings – in the day to day events within and external to NASA well before the 1986 disaster • I would suggest that you read it in stages; don’t read for detail, but you should be able to write a summary of the chapter’s main ideas (in about 2-3 paragraphs)

15. References • Lupton, Deborah. 1999. Risk. London: Routledge. • Ropeik, David and George Gray. 2002. Risk: A Practical Guide for Deciding What’s Really Safe and What’s Really Dangerous in the World Around You. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.