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Charlotte ACC Lunch-N-Learn Roundtable Presents The “Subprime Crisis” and Housing Slowdown: 2008 Forecast and the Search For Solutions. Donald C. Lampe Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC Charlotte, NC (704)350-6398 dlampe@wcsr.com January 22, 2007. SUBPRIME CRISIS?.
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Charlotte ACC Lunch-N-Learn RoundtablePresentsThe “Subprime Crisis” and Housing Slowdown: 2008 Forecast and the Search For Solutions Donald C. Lampe Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC Charlotte, NC (704)350-6398 dlampe@wcsr.com January 22, 2007
SUBPRIME CRISIS? • Just what do we mean? • How did it happen? • Who are the players? • What is unique about it? • What is the state of play now? • What will happen in the future?
WHAT IS THE SUBPRIME CRISIS? • Shorthand for contraction in availability of residential mortgage credit, particularly for less-than-creditworthy borrowers • Not just consumers, but business related to home mortgage credit, including homebuilders • Revaluation of mortgage-related assets (incl. derivatives) by banks, investment banks, hedge funds, others
WHAT IS THE SUBPRIME CRISIS? - cont’d • Stricter underwriting practices, meaning fewer loans will be made to consumers, others • As < credit for refinancing, consumers squeezed financially, not just on mortgage loans • Centered on “subprime” market – performance on prime/conventional market still good by historic measures
Definition of Subprime? • No true legal definition, more of term of art based on “channel” of lending • Higher-cost credit made available to borrowers with impaired or “thin” credit or other unique circumstances • Made possible by credit scoring, automation and secondary markets • Traditionally came from finance companies and FHA (banks)
GROWTH IN SUBPRIME • Subprime loans 20% of market in 2006, up from 9% in 2003 • Over $1 Trillion outstanding • Facilitated by 2’ndary market – funded thru private label or non-agency securitizations (RMBS) • GSE’s – Fannie, Freddie, FHLB’s - not primary drivers
SUBPRIME GROWTH:DISINTERMEDIATION • Secondary market “fed” by (mostly) non-bank originators • Mortgage broker → wholesale lender → aggregator/investment bank → securitization trust → bondholders • Wholesale lenders funded by warehouse lines of credit (inventory financing) • Each step: legal recourse
THE “PIPELINE” • Became “clogged” in 2007 – began with rating agency downgrades in early 2007 • Actually, running in reverse, w/ repurchase and repo demands back up the chain • Many of wholesale originators either bankrupt or out of business • Subprime loans (funding) much harder to get – private securitizations have ceased
CHARACTERISTICS OF SUBPRIME “BOOM” • Post 9/11/01 low interest rates and product innovation • Capital from Wall Street – “irrational exuberance” and financial engineering • Underwriting standards relaxed as means of expanding market share • “Risk layering” and failure of risk assessment
RISK LAYERING • At loan level, lower credit scores (subprime) combined with high LTV, no doc/low doc, ARM’s • ARM products, such as 2/28’s and POA’s, broadly offered to subprime borrowers • Loans made available for “dot com” type speculation by (small) investors • Wall Street incapable of pricing to the risk
FINANCIAL ENGINEERING • Mortgage assets grew at incredible pace, and Wall Street found new ways to offer “piece of the action” to investors • Investment banks captured fee income at many stages • Derivatives and derivatives of derivatives • Many of the “sophisticated” products based on same models
ASSUMPTIONS PRIOR TO “MELTDOWN” • Risk-based pricing of subprime loans and of financial instruments backed by loans • Continued low-rate environment and home price appreciation continue to rise • Borrowers would be able to refinance or sell their way out • “Healthy economy” and continued demand worldwide for RMBS and related assets
WHERE ARE WE NOW? • Early 2008, haven’t hit “bottom” yet • Financial institutions still struggling with valuation of assets • Full extent of potential losses not known, particularly counterparty risk in credit default swaps ($41 Trillion) • “Worldwide liquidity crisis” keyed to realization that market overheated
WHERE ARE WE NOW? - cont’d • Downgrades continuing • Defaults and foreclosures are climbing still • Media “feeding frenzy” and the search for blame • Reaching the “third phase” of any economic cycle, i.e. (1) Boom, (2) Bust, (3) Recrimination
WHERE ARE WE NOW? - cont’d • Home price appreciation has become depreciation in many markets • Increasing inventory of unsold homes – the “pocket” phenomenon • Non-bank originators continuing to shut down or be sold • Congress has not done much (yet)
WHAT CAN WE EXPECT? • Legislation – Federal & State • Regulation – Federal Banking Agencies • Market-Based Solutions – e.g., HOPENOW; private companies (Countrywide) • The “numerator problem” driving policy decisions
FEDERAL LEGISLATION 2008 • Comprehensive “reform” bills from US Congress– Frank bill; Dodd bill • Regulation of underwriting, loan terms, loan originators – “won’t let this happen again” • “Something for everyone,” esp. Frank bill • Tax; bankruptcy “cramdown”; FHA reform
FEDERAL LEGISLATION 2008 - cont’d • “Jawboning” on loan modifications, foreclosures – Rep. Frank, others • Expect more hearings on the Hill • Economic stimulus package may contain mortgage-related relief • Election year politics may make a difference – stay tuned
FEDERAL REGULATION • OTS unfair and deceptive trade practices proposal • Federal Reserve Board proposed amendments to Regulation Z • Increased attention to “asset quality” in exams, particularly state banking regulators
STATE LEGISLATION • NC: enactment of 6 bills in 2007 – will see how that plays out – more remedies, more lawsuits, emphasis on loan servicing • May still see “foreclosure reform” in NC • Field wide open in SC, GA – likely see comprehensive bills in SC, foreclosure-related bills in GA • Enormous amount of state activity in ‘08
MARKET-BASED SOLUTIONS • “Teaser freezer” implementation through HOPENOW • Loan modification and workout programs being implemented by industry participants • Emerging community-based assistance programs (banks may be expected to help) • Will large employers become involved?
QUESTIONS? • Donald C. Lampe • Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC • Charlotte, NC • (704)350-6398 • dlampe@wcsr.com