1 / 47

RFID/USN Security Issues

RFID/USN Security Issues. 2009/7/14 신승목 Cryptography & Information Security Lab. Ubiquitous world. 1. RFID 개론 및 보안 이슈. 2. USN 개론 및 보안 이슈. 3. 3. Quiz. 4. 4. Contents. Advent of Ubiquitous society. Transition to Ubiquitous society. RFID/USN concept.

paniz
Download Presentation

RFID/USN Security Issues

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. RFID/USNSecurity Issues 2009/7/14 신승목 Cryptography & Information Security Lab

  2. Ubiquitous world 1 RFID 개론 및 보안 이슈 2 USN 개론 및 보안 이슈 3 3 Quiz 4 4 Contents KAIST-ICC

  3. Advent of Ubiquitous society KAIST-ICC

  4. Transition to Ubiquitous society KAIST-ICC

  5. RFID/USN concept • RFID/USN 기술은 다양한 장소에서 태그나 센서 노드를 이용하여 인간/사물 등의 환경 정보를 인식하고 취합 및 처리하여 인간이 좀 더 편리하게 IT 서비스를 이용할 수 있게 해준다. @ MIC/Korea 2007 KAIST-ICC

  6. Introduction to RFID KAIST-ICC

  7. What it RFID? • Radio Frequency IDentication (RFID) is a method of remotely identifying objects using transponders (tags) queried through a radio frequency channel. T8 T1 T2 Tn Reader T3 T6 T4 T5 T7 Backend Database KAIST-ICC

  8. RFID - overview RFID Barcode A typical RFID tag Data A multi-tier system: RFID tag, reader and backend server An infrastructure to build ubiquitous society KAIST-ICC

  9. RFID readers (1/2) • Fixed-Type Readers • Mobile Readers KAIST-ICC

  10. RFID readers (2/2) • Typical Structure of RFID Reader Digital Signal Processor (DSP) Network Processor PowerSupply 13.56MHz Radio 915MHz Radio KAIST-ICC

  11. RFID Tag • Classification by Power • Classification by Frequency • Low-frequency (LF: 125 ~ 134.2 KHz and 140 ~ 148.5 KHz) • High-frequency (HF: 13.56 MHz) • Ultra-high-frequency (UHF: 868 ~ 928 MHz) KAIST-ICC

  12. Electronic Product Code (EPC) • 296 = 79,228,162,514,264,337,593,543,950,336 • 96 bits can uniquely label all products for the next 1,000 years. KAIST-ICC

  13. EPC classification (1/2) • Class-1: Identity Tags (normative): • Passive Tags • An electronic product code (EPC) identifier • A Tag identifier (TID) • A 'kill' function that permanently disables the Tag • Optional password-protected access control • Optional user memory KAIST-ICC

  14. EPC classification (2/2) • Higher-class Tags (informative) • Class-2: Higher-Functionality Passive Tags • An extended TID (Tag ID) • Extended user memory • Authenticated access control • Class-3: Semi-Passive Tags • An integral power source • Integrated sensing circuitry • Class-4: Active Tags (i.e., sensor node) • Tag-to-Tag communications • Active communications • ad-hoc networking capabilities KAIST-ICC

  15. RFID system applications (1/3) • Libraries • Supply chain management KAIST-ICC

  16. RFID system applications (2/3) • Airline Baggage @ JFK Airport KAIST-ICC

  17. RFID system applications (3/3) • Passports • Transport payments • Anti-counterfeiting • Whitepapers in 2006 (by Auto-ID Labs.) • Access control • Animal tracking, etc. KAIST-ICC

  18. RFID security issues KAIST-ICC

  19. Security and Privacy in RFID • Privacy invasion: • Information leakage of user’s belongings without awareness of a user • Static ID is subject to tracking such as behavior tracking • Lack of authentication: • Malicious reading (skimming): • Captured information aids duplicating genuine tags. • Denial-of-Service(DOS) due to deployment of cloned tags • Risks • Eavesdropping between T & R • DB Desynchronization B & R • Impersonation, spoofing • Replay attack / Active Query • Data loss (DoS, Message hijacking) • Forgery (Decoy Tag, etc.) • Physical (Hardware) attack KAIST-ICC

  20. Security Requirements in RFID Systems • Confidentiality • Indistinguishability • Anti-cloning • Availability • Forward security KAIST-ICC

  21. Weak Implementations (1/2) • In January 2005, researchers at John Hopkins University and the RSA Lab announced a successful attack on the Texas Instruments DST RFID by guessing its 40-bit key using brute-force. • The DST RFID was used in Ford immobilizers and ExxonMobil SpeedPass. KAIST-ICC

  22. Weak Implementations (2/2) - Video • Cracking TI (Texas Instrument) DST (Digital Signature Transponder) chip TI DST Cracking the key in a DST tag Buying gas using the DST simulator Sniffing a DST tag in a victim's pocket KAIST-ICC

  23. Security Challenge • The narrow cost requirements of low-cost RFID systems make low-cost tags extremely resource-scarce environments, far below the requirements for any public-key and symmetric-key cryptographic systems. • EPC tags: $0.05, 250 – 1000 gates • AES: 20,000 – 30,000 gates KAIST-ICC

  24. Introduction to USN KAIST-ICC

  25. Sensor & Sensor Network • What is a Sensor? • A device that produces a measurable response to a change in a physical or chemical condition, e.g. temperature, ground composition, etc. • Sensor Networks • A large number of low-cost, low-power, multifunctional, and small sensor nodes • They benefit from advances in 3 technologies • digital circuitry • wireless communication • silicon micro-machining KAIST-ICC

  26. Sensing Networking Computation Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) • New technologies have reduced the cost, size, and power of micro-sensors and wireless interfaces. Circulatory Net EnvironmentalMonitoring Structural KAIST-ICC

  27. WSN - Properties • Compose of a large number of sensor nodes • Densely deployed inside(near) the phenomenon • Low energy consumption • Relocation or recharge is impossible • Self-organizing network (infrastructureless) • Random deployment : manual configuration is unfeasible KAIST-ICC

  28. Applications: U-farm KAIST-ICC

  29. Applications: Weather sensing Fire Detection KAIST-ICC

  30. Applications: Fire Detection CulturalProperty Asset Management using USN Bush Fire Detection KAIST-ICC

  31. Applications: Battle Field KAIST-ICC

  32. 센서노드(교량) CCD 카메라 중계기 파고센서노드(2개소) Applications: Disaster Detection • 법정하천(2개소) • 센서노드 : 15개 • 중계기 : 7개 • 카메라 : 2개 소하천(7개소) 센서노드 : 4 개 중계기 : 2개 카메라 : 2개 죽암천 평리천 현포천 태하천 내수전천 저동2리천 서달천 저동천 구암천 도동사천 남서천 도동항 사동천 남양천 옥천천 통구미천 위험내천(6개소) 센서노드 : 11개 중계기 : 6개 KAIST-ICC

  33. Communication Architecture Sensor nodes can be data originators and data routers KAIST-ICC

  34. Node Hardware In-node processing Wireless communication with neighboring nodes Event detection Acoustic, seismic, magnetic, etc. interface Electro-magnetic interface sensors radio CPU battery Limited-battery supply KAIST-ICC

  35. Examples of Sensor Nodes KAIST-ICC

  36. USN security issues KAIST-ICC

  37. Why should we consider the Security? (1/2) • Providing confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the communications and computations • Sensor networks are vulnerable to security attacks due to the broadcast nature of transmission • Sensor nodes can be physically captured or destroyed KAIST-ICC

  38. Why should we consider the Security? (2/2) • Since the system is able control house infrastructure • e.g., gas, water control etc • If the adversary attacks house infra system • House infrastructure can be a serious harm to human • e.g., Open gas valve, overheat the micro-wave KAIST-ICC

  39. Security Threats of Each Application * Yee Wei Law and Havinga, P.J.M., “How to Secure a Wireless Sensor Network”, 2005 KAIST-ICC

  40. Design of New Security Solution Must Be Required! Constraints of WSN KAIST-ICC

  41. Security Requirements for WSN • Data Confidentiality (Eavesdropping) • Don’t leak sensor readings • Solution: Encryption • Data Authentication (inject / alter Attack) • data was really from claimed sender • Solution: MAC • Data Integrity (inject / alter Attack) • Received data is not altered in the mid-way • Solution: data authentication KAIST-ICC

  42. = sensor node Attacks on WSN • Typical attacks on WSN are: • Sybil attack • Wormholes • HELLO flood attacks • Notations = adversary = base station * D. Wagner, “Security for Sensor Networks: Cryptography and Beyond”, SASN 2003 KAIST-ICC

  43. HELLO flood attack • Inferring a node is a neighbor (i.e. within radio range) after receiving a broadcast packet from them may be ill-conceived. An adversary with a powerful transmitter could easily reach every node in the network. * D. Wagner, “Security for Sensor Networks: Cryptography and Beyond”, SASN 2003 KAIST-ICC

  44. Sybil attack • An adversary may present multiple identities to other nodes. The Sybil attack can disrupt geographic and multipath routing protocols by “being in more than one place at once” and reducing diversity. * D. Wagner, “Security for Sensor Networks: Cryptography and Beyond”, SASN 2003 KAIST-ICC

  45. Wormholes • Tunnel packets from one part of the network and replay them in a different part. * D. Wagner, “Security for Sensor Networks: Cryptography and Beyond”, SASN 2003 KAIST-ICC

  46. Conclusion • RFID/USNs are essential technology for up-coming Ubiquitous world • If the system is not designed with security in mind • This technology would harm human life • Security should be considered from the design of entire Ubiquitous system KAIST-ICC

  47. Thank You !

More Related