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Samuel Bowles University of Siena Santa Fe Institute. Research Topics. Niche construction and the evolution of social institutions Parochial altruism and its evolution Governing a cooperative species. Networking.
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Research Topics • Niche construction and the evolution of social institutions • Parochial altruism and its evolution • Governing a cooperative species
Networking SFI will seek to support networking among partners through ‘at large’ pre- and post- doctoral visits and shorter term recurrent visits by senior scientists associated with the TECT grant.
Parochial Altruism and its Evolution • Many animals recognize group membership and condition their behavior on it, favoring insiders and inflicting lethal costs on outsiders. • Insider bias supports within group cooperation, but impedes mutually beneficial exchange with outsiders. • Hypothesis: parochial altruism evolved because groups in which the behavior was prevalent had a survival advantage in periods of inter-group conflict.
Niche Construction andthe Evolution of Social Institutions • Pleistocene humans developed such reproductive leveling behaviors as information- and food-sharing, and monogamous mating systems. These involved property-rights systems that reduced intra-group conflict. • Human socialization institutions biased developmental processes towards group beneficial cooperative behaviors. • Hypothesis: under late Pleistocene and early Holocene conditions, these group level institutional niches could have co-evolved with individual social preferences through inter-demic selection in the face of military and environmental challenges.
Governing a Cooperative Species • An understanding of human capacities for cooperation may contribute to the design of more effective public policies, high performance firms and other institutions. • Policies and institutions that are designed to work well if individuals are entirely self-regarding will not generally be successful when a significant fraction of the population is other-regarding. • We will use behavioral experiments and models of complex social interactions to explore our hypothesis that policies designed to mobilize self-interest for the public good may crowd out social preferences, resulting in inferior outcomes.
Related papers • Bowles, Samuel. 2006. "Group competition, reproductive leveling and the evolution of human altruism." Science, 314, predicts South African migrant workers' remittances to their families." Nature, 434:17. • Bowles, Samuel, Jung-Kyoo Choi, and Astrid Hopfensitz. 2003. "The coevolution of individual behaviors and group level institutions." Journal of Theoretical Biology, 223:2, pp. 135-47. • Bowles, Samuel and Herbert Gintis. 2004. "The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in a heterogeneous population." Theoretical Population Biology, 65, pp. 17-28. • Bowles, Samuel and Herbert Gintis. 2004. "Persistent Parochialism: The Dynamics of Trust and Exclusion in Networks." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 55. • Bowles, Samuel. 2000. "Economic Institutions as Ecological Niches." Behavior and Brain Sciences, 23:1