Ukraine from Elections to Elections: building political culture through conflict.

1. Ukraine from Elections to Elections: building political culture through conflict. CERES – P. Jacyk Program for the Study of Ukraine University of Toronto, Ontario, Canada October 15, 2007 Mychailo Wynnyckyj Ph.D. Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Ukraine Dep’t of Sociology & Kyiv-Mohyla Business School

2. Summary abstract • Mass participant values matter less to stability than elite consensus on their own rule framework • Ukraine’s elite is currently deciding “who/how will decide?”. • Other questions (e.g. language, land ownership, NATO, subsidies for newborns, etc.) are noise • How do we interpret “Rule of Law”? (Article 8) • Elite consensus-building is a strategic activity not a tactical one – actions based on pursuit of tactical interests lead to a breakdown in strategic (institutional) consensus. • Constitutional Court & Central Election Commission composition • Precedent of 150 deputies resigning from Rada

3. Stability depends more on elites • Stable democratic political systems require a participant polity (Almond & Verba’s Civic Culture) • Prior to 2004, Ukraine’s prospects looked grim (Miller, Reissinger, Hesli) • After Orange Revolution, civic culture seemed to have “arrived”… • Stability requires elite consensus as to the institutional framework for contestation between competing interests; rule framework must engender compliance, and be considered legitimate (Przeworkski, Higley, Lane). • Post-Orange period: building a rule-framework • Tension between tactical positioning and strategic intent

4. Community System Policy Stages of elite consensus: 3 questions • Who are we? • Consensus as to the definition of our community (nation?) • Formal markers (symbols, language, capital, flag, anthem) • How do we make decisions? Who decides? • Rules of the game of politics • Mechanisms of power and conflict resolution • How will we live? What is legitimate/revolutionary? • Field of policy contestation, wealth distribution • Model of state’s role in the economy

5. Consensus building – starting point • 26.03.06 – Parliamentary elections. • Party of Regions 32.14% • Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc 22.29% • Our Ukraine 13.95% • Socialist Party 5.69% • Communist Party 3.66% • 03.04.06 – Yushchenko article in the Wall Street Journal calling for a “Pact of National Unity” to be signed by all parliamentary parties • 25.04.06 – Luhansk obl-rada passes a resolution that proclaims Russian as a “regional language” (worthy of protection under the European Regional Language Charter)

6. “Blindfaith” in strategic consensus • 26.04.06 – Official election results published (5 days after announcement) – new Rada must gather within 30 days & coalition must be formed 30 days after that. • 11.07.06 – After 80 days of coalition talks between Our Ukraine and BYuT, the Verkhovna Rada elects Oleksander Moroz as Speaker; Socialists switch sides, and officially sign “Anti-Crisis Coalition” agreement with the Party of Regions and the CPU. • 03.08.06 – After a month of negotiations between Our Ukraine and the “Anti-Crisis Coalition”, the “Universal of National Unity” is signed by the leaders of all Parliamentary parties except BYuT. Yushchenko officially proposes the candidacy of Yanukovych for the post of Prime Minister and negotiations continue on full inclusion of Our Ukraine into the coalition.

7. Yushchenko – Consensus-builder • 2005 – period of Yushchenko recovery from poisoning • 2006 – attempt to build consensual rule framework peaks with “Universal” • One language, NATO & EU, energy security • Economic reform – especially land privatization • Things fall apart… • 14.09.06 – Yanukovych in Brussels: Ukraine is not ready to join NATO. • 21.09.06 – The Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers rejects 7 Presidential Decrees as invalid in what became known as the “Countersigning scandal”. • 19.10.06 – A rayon-level court rules compulsory dubbing of films into Ukrainian to be illegal – no appeals from the Yanukovych government. • During subsequent months, meetings between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko become more frequent: tactical alliance between the two leaders

8. Tactical interests destroy consensus-building strategy • 20.03.07 – A. Kinakh and the Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs defect from Our Ukraine to the coalition; Kinakh appointed Minister of the Economy; Yushchenko’s Foreign Affairs Ministry candidate Ohryzko not confirmed by Parliament; Lutsenko’s apartment raided by police; Deputy Chechetov (Regions) declares that the Coalition will have 300 deputies soon. • 23.03.07 – Kovtunenko and a group of BYuT deputies defect from the opposition to join the Coalition • 02.04.07 – Presidential Decree dissolving Parliament and calling pre-term elections for May 27 signed. The Cabinet of Ministers and Parliament both call an emergency late night session – both reject the decree as “illegal” (“ne zakonniy” and refuse to obey it.

9. Article 8 of the Constitution (“verkhovenstvo prava”): “rule of statute” vs. “rule of right” • Decree 1 (May 27 elections): • Article 90 not mentioned • Basis is Article 8 – “rights of voters hijacked” says the “garant” • Decree 2: (June 24 elections): • Article 82 justification – 30 days after Kovtunenko defection which made the Coalition illegitimate • Realism (protection of “rights”) – election impossible: deadlock in CEC • Decree 3: (elections in 120 days): • Justification based on “agreement between parties” – no legal basis • Decree 4: (September 30 elections): • Ideal “legal” justification – Article 82 and 90 requirements fulfilled

10. Wanted: Consensus on Strategy! • Tactical political battles are constructive only if there exists agreement on the strategic “rules of the game”. • Formal rules require codification – adoption of laws (constitutional amendments) requires consensus • During the Sept 30 elections, 3 differing visions of Ukraine’s political & economic development were elaborated (though not necessarily articulated): • Our Ukraine: Rule-based politics and economy • ByUT: State-led (personified leader) transformation • Party of Regions: Big-Business-State cooperation Comparative Models: Japan/Taiwan Singapore South Korea

11. While the politicians decide on rules… • The economy is growing! (no thanks to politicians) • Ukraine is currently 29th world largest economy (not including up to 50% of GDP that is in the shadow) • 8-10% GDP growth forecast for next 3 years • Inflation jumped in Aug/Sept 2006 to 13% • 10% of Ukrainian families have bought a NEW car during the past 3 years • 300 thousand new cars sold in 2005, 400 thousand in 2006 • 2007 forecast – over 550 thousand • Dominance of newly created (entrepreneurial) businesses over former state sector – reduction of “state-capture” • Ukraine is becoming an innovation based economy • Software outsourcing & specialized/custom manufacturing

12. Key immediate question for Ukraine:“Who will make decisions and how?” • Verkhovna Rada VI – will the session open? • Precedent of 150 deputies (Article 82 vs. 90) • Constitutional Court must decide but cannot • New Constitution? • Power ministries – Min. of Interior (Pres vs. PM) • Power in the regions – appointment of governors • Balance of powers problem • Parliament, Cabinet of Ministers, and President (where judiciary?) • Cabinet of Ministers Law & “imperative mandate” • Coalition building with an eye towards the 2009 Pres election: • Our Ukraine – Regions coalition (247) benefits Tymoshenko • BYuT- Our Ukraine (228 seats) (with Lytvyn 248) - benefits Yanukovych • Broad coalition (max. 403, but realistically 300) benefits Yushchenko Sept 30 election results: Regions: 34.37% (175 seats) BYuT: 30.71% (156 seats) OU – PSD: 14.15% (72 seats) Communist: 5.39% (27 seats) Lytvyn: 3.96% (20 seats)

13. Looking beyond Sept 30: • Ukraine can become “Taiwan”, “Singapore” or “South Korea” • NB: From an economic standpoint, all three models look pretty good! • Personally, I find the “Taiwan” model most attractive: • State & FIG’s cooperate in resource sector (state-capture & oligarchy) • SME’s flourish in shadow economy with little interference or aid from state • Politics becomes de-personalized (though not necessarily “democratic”) • To make it happen: Akhmetov, Tymoshenko, and Yushchenko must agree to think strategically rather than tactically (collect 300 seats from split parties). • If the “ideal scenario” does not occur, Ukraine is likely to mimic the “fruitful instability” (Aslund) of the Baltics with governments changing yearly. • Institutional consensus requires political maturity (de-personalized political leadership, strategic vision) – a scarce commodity among Ukraine’s elites.