The multifactorial nature of theory of mind: A structural modelling study

1. The multifactorial nature of theory of mind:A structural modelling study Larry Cashion Rachel Dryer Michael Kiernan School of Social Sciences & Liberal Studies Charles Sturt University Bathurst NSW Australia Presented at the 14th Australasian Human Development Association Biennial Conference Perth Western Australia July 2005

2. Presentation Plan • Theory of Mind and Classification • Current research study method • Age, gender, and the multifactorial nature of theory of mind • Conclusions and implications

3. Theory of Mind • The ability to attribute mental states, such as thoughts, beliefs, intentions, desires, and feelings, to others and oneself • The ability to perform social and laboratory tasks requiring theory of mind has also been called mentalising and mindreading

4. Classification in Theory of Mind • First-order theory of mind • Second-order theory of mind • Higher-order or advanced theory of mind

5. First-Order Theory of Mind • Unexpected locations • “Where will X look for the object?” • Unexpected contents • “What does X think is in the box?” • Appearance-reality • “What is this object really?”

6. Second-Order Theory of Mind • Ice-Cream Van • “Where will X look for Y?” • Unexpected locations • “Where does Y think X will look for the object?”

7. Higher-Order Theory of Mind • Understanding mental states in motivating actions • “Does X mean what she says?” • “Why did Y do that?” • Reading complex mental states • “What is X thinking or feeling?”

8. Theory of Mind Modularity • Theory of Mind Module (ToMM) • Leslie (1987; Leslie & Roth, 1993) • ToMM neurologically separate from other cognitive and brain systems • Minimalist modularity • Baron-Cohen (1999) • Sub-modules of eye direction detection, intentionality detector, shared attention mechanism

9. False belief & Theory of Mind • False belief unrepresentative of theory of mind in general • Bloom & German (2000) • False belief as a highly complex cognitive function • Bloom & German (2000)

10. Competing Theory of Mind Models • 3-factors • 1st-, 2nd- & higher-order ToM • Common use in literature • 2-factors • False belief tasks & other tasks • Bloom & German • 1-factor • Theory of mind module • Leslie

11. Method I • Participants • 216 school-aged children • Recruited from State Schools in NSW & Victoria • Years 1, 3, and 5 • Screened using a modified version of the Social Communication Profile (Coggins & Olswang, 2001) • 2 children eliminated from sample prior to testing • No adverse incidents • Ethics approval from CSU, and NSW & Victorian Departments of Education

12. Method II • First-order tests • Sally-Anne Task (unexpected locations) • Smarties Task (unexpected contents) • Second-order tests • Ice-Cream Van Task • Second-Order Sally-Anne Task • Higher-order tests • Strange Stories Test • Faux Pas Test • Eyes Test – Children’s Version

13. Methodological Issues • Memory prompts • No memory prompts or hints were provided to participants • Justification questions • Often absent from previous first- and second-order ToM research • Makes lower-order tasks more consistent with higher-order tasks • Ensures understanding, not just recognition

14. Hypotheses • Significant group differences • Older children will perform better than younger children • Significant gender differences • Females superior to males • 3-factor model superior • Better fit than 1- and 2-factor models

15. Data Analysis • Categorical data • Chi-square (χ2) • Continuous data • ANOVA + Tukey HSD • Structural Modelling • Mplus confirmatory factor analysis

16. Results I Task Year 1 Year 3 Year 5 Sally-Anne Interpretation 72.9 90.1 89.3 Justification 65.7 83.1 89.3 Smarties Interpretation 87.1 94.4 100.0 Justification 71.4 87.3 98.7 Ice-Cream Van Interpretation 27.9 42.3 52.0 Justification 17.6 38.0 50.7 Sally-Anne 2nd-Order Interpretation 69.6 81.7 96.0 Justification 31.9 57.7 85.3

17. Results II Task Year 1 Year 3 Year 5 Strange Stories (/8) Interpretation 4.70 5.25 6.05 Justification 2.29 3.25 4.09 Faux Pas (/10) Total 5.55 7.11 8.29 Eyes Test (/28) Total 15.02 16.90 18.77

18. Results III No gender differences for any task

19. Results IV Model χ2p df CFI TLI WRMR No correlated terms 3-factor 18.60 .069 11 0.975 0.951 .546 2-factor 23.42 .037 13 0.965 0.944 .634 1-factor 24.67 .038 14 0.946 0.946 .655 Sally-Anne Tasks correlated 3-factor 6.56 .766 10 1.000 1.024 .328 2-factor 20.60 .057 13 0.971 0.950 .593 1-factor 20.36 .087 13 0.975 0.960 .596 N = 216; all models use WLSM estimation & Santorra-Bentler scaled χ2

20. Smarties e1 .88 1st Order ToM .23 Sally-Anne (1st-order) e2 .59 .65 .34 .37 Sally-Anne (2nd-order) e3 .83 .32 2nd Order ToM .76 Ice-Cream Van e4 .48 .77 .81 .56 Strange Stories e5 .66 Higher Order ToM .58 Faux Pas e6 .65 .71 .54 Eyes e7

21. Summary of Results • Hypothesis 1 – age group differences supported • For all theory of mind tasks • Hypothesis 2 – gender differences not supported • For all theory of mind tasks • Hypothesis 3 – 3-factor model significant superiority supported

22. Implications I • Support for the multifactorial nature of theory of mind • Fits with current theory and use of ToM • Challenge to ‘male brain’ theory of Baron-Cohen • No gender differences detected • No interaction effects • Possible that gender effects were not evident because of prepubescent sample – but still fails to fit theory

23. Implications II • Challenge to current orthodoxy in theory of mind research • Assumptions of age – ability development of theory of mind were not supported • Knowledge that ‘something’ is going on is different from understanding what that ‘something’ is • Instruction sets and ‘memory prompts’ affect the ecological validity of ToM tasks and artificially inflate passing rates

24. Where Now? • Further examination of ‘memory prompts’ and instruction sets • Further research into the multifactorial nature of theory of mind using a larger array of tasks • Using the 3-factor model to examine the relationship with executive functioning

25. Contact Details Larry Cashion larry@cashion.net