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Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models. Dan Veeneman dan@decodesystems.com www.decodesystems.com/blackhat/bh-1.ppt. Focus of this talk. Overview of available commercial technologies Skipping 802.11 U.S.-centric Terrestrial networks Additional information in second briefing.
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Wireless OverviewProtocols and Threat Models Dan Veeneman dan@decodesystems.com www.decodesystems.com/blackhat/bh-1.ppt
Focus of this talk • Overview of available commercial technologies • Skipping 802.11 • U.S.-centric • Terrestrial networks • Additional information in second briefing Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
Wireless OverviewProtocols and Threat Models • Radio Frequency Basics • Mobile telephony • Cellular Digital Packet Data (CDPD) • Nextel • Private data networks • Two-way paging • Bluetooth • 3G Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
Why Wireless • Immediate communication, mobile user • Two-way, interactive • Broadcast • Convenience • Bandwidth limitations • Roaming (no fixed location) Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
Market Requirements • Reliable • Low-cost • Easy to use • Secure • Pervasive • Interoperable Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
Wireless Security Requirements • Trust Model • access control • authenticate users to access particular resources • link privacy • encryption • link integrity • message authentication • prevent denial of service • (limit bandwidth hogs) Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
Radio Frequency • Federal Communications Commission • FM Radio: 88 to 108 MHz • Cellular telephones: 800 and 1900 MHz • Two-way pagers: 900 MHz • Industrial, Scientific and Medical (ISM): 2.402 to 2.480 GHz Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
Radio Wave • Frequency • Wavelength • Amplitude • Modulation • Amplitude • Frequency • Phase • FSK • PSK Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
Generic Wireless Architecture • Mobile terminal • Airlink • Radio base station • Intraconnect links • Network control • Interconnect links • External Networks • Public Switched Telephone Network • Internet Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
Common Airlink Problems • Variable link quality • Multi-path (signal reflections) • Shadowing (terrain/structure blockage) • Interference • Other users • EMI • Attenuation • Distance • Antenna orientation/polarization Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
Multipath • Multiple paths to receiver • Each path has slightly different time delay Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
Interference Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
Error Detection/Correction • Parity Codes • Parity bits + Data bits = Expected code word • Cyclic Redundancy Check • Chunk of data + Polynomial residue • Block Codes • Chunk of data + Redundant Data • Convolutional Codes • Data stream fed through LFSR • Code rate, constraint length • Concatenated Codes Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
Terrestrial Networks • Voice primary • Cellular and PCS • Nextel • Data primary • private packet • paging Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
Cellular • Analog • Digital - TDMA • Digital - CDMA • Digital - GSM Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
System Comparison Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
Cellular Frequency Reuse • Seven frequency sets • Geographic distance between sets allows the same frequencies to be reused Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
Cellular-based • Mobile Telephone Switching Office (MTSO) • Controls multiple base stations • Interfaces to PSTN • Mobile is handed off from one base station to another Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
Advanced Mobile Phone System • “1G” • Analog voice • 50 MHz, 832 channels • Mobile transmit: 824 MHz to 849 MHz • Base transmit: 869 to 894 MHz • 21 control channels • Designed in 1970’s Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
Cellular Telephone startup • Mobile telephone scans for strongest control channel • Listens to overhead messages on forward link • Sends registration message • Electronic Serial Number (ESN) • Mobile Identification Number (MIN) • Waits for paging message Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
AMPS weaknesses • Interception is easy (but now illegal) • Spoofing (“cloned” phones) • Call hijacking • Tracking Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
Locating Mobiles • GPS • Time Difference of Arrival • Angle of Arrival • Multipath Fingerprinting Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
TDOA Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
AOA Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
Cellular Digital Packet Data • Packet data sent on idle voice channels • Voice takes priority • AT&T • “OmniSky” service • Verizon • IP-based interfaces • 150,000 customers • Many police car installs Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
CDPD Coverage Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
CDPD Elements • M-ES: Mobile End System • CDPD modem • MDBS: Mobile Data Base Station • RF interface • MD-IS: Mobile Data Intermediate System • Mobile Home Function (MHF) • Mobile Serving Function (MSF) • IS: Intermediate System • Router, IP/CNIP • F-ES: Fixed End Station Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
CDPD Roaming • Packets to M-ES go to MHF MD-IS first • Forwarded to MSF MD-IS • Packets from M-ES can route directly to F-ES Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
CDPD Airlink • GMSK modulation • 19.2 kbps raw data rate • FEC • Reed-Solomon 63, 47 block code • 47 info symbols (six-bit symbols, 282 bits), 16 parity symbols, 63 total symbols • Correct up to 8 six-bit symbols Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
CDPD MAC • Continuous forward link from MDBS • Mobiles listen to forward link busy/idle • Possible reverse channel collisions • Mobile checks forward link for decode success • Header, User Data, Trailer (Frame Check) • Flag, address, control fields in header • Selective ARQ Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
CDPD Link Establishment • M-ES known to serving MD-IS Terminal Equipment Identifier (TEI), 6 to 27 bits • M-ES sends TEI Request with 48-bit Equipment ID • MD-IS issues TEI Assign with assigned TEI • TEI lifetime of 4 hours, can be exhausted Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
CDPD Registration • End System Hello (ESH) message • Network Equipment Identifier (usually 32-bit IP address) • Registration Counter (to filter duplicates) • Credentials • Authentication Random Number (ARN, 64 bits) • Authentication Sequence Number (ASN, 16 bits) • Shared history (incremented by 1 after each TEI assignment) • ESH sent from M-ES to MDBS encrypted • ASN and ARN are both 0 at initial configuration • ARN occasionally changed • Network maintains two most-recent Credentials • (in case of loss of update synchronization) Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
CDPD Registration • MD-IS sends Redirect Request (RDR) to MHF • Requests MHF send all future packets to it • MHF checks M-ES Credentials • MHF returns Redirect Confirmation to MSF • MSF returns Hello Confirmation (ISC) to M-ES Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
CDPD Attacks • IP-accessible Intermediate Systems (routers) • Attacks from outside, other providers • BGP4, OSPF, buffer overflow, etc • Only the airlink is encrypted • Use unauthenticated RDR messages to grab traffic • Brute force Credentials via repeated RDR • Jam reverse link transmissions • Disrupt M-ES reception • Busy-out the reverse link (attempt saturation) • Place an analog call via CDPD cellsite • CDPD “ZAP” command to silence bad modems Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
Cellemetry • Use spare capacity in the cellular control channel • A few bytes • Telemetry • Vending machines • Maintenance data Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
Digital AMPS • Answer to capacity issues • AT&T Wireless • IS-136 • 800 MHz cellular and 1900 MHz PCS • Time Division Multiple Access • Six timeslots • One call gets two timeslots Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
Time Division Multiple Access • Mobiles take turns transmitting • Base transmits continuously Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
Code Division Multiple Access • Competitor to D-AMPS • IS-95 • Sprint PCS, Verizon • Pilot + 63 other “channels” • Walsh Codes • Requires that all users in a cell be time-synchronized to maintain orthogonality • Near/Far problem, power control Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
Frequency Hopping • Transmissions “hop” • Pseudo-random sequence • Transmitter and receiver must synchronize • 2.4 GHz ISM • at least 75 frequencies • duration < 400 ms Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
Direct Sequence • Each data bit replaced with sequence of “chips” • Bandwidth increases • Power density decreases • Signals appear as noise • LPI/LPD, anti-jam • GPS, IS-95 • Chip pattern comes from Pseudo-random Noise (PN) code • Transmitter and receiver must synchronize Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
Correlation Example DATA: 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 PN: 1010 0110 0100 1111 0001 0100 1001 0100 0101 0001 0100 1011 SPREAD: 1010 1001 0100 1111 1110 0100 1001 1011 1010 0001 1011 0100 (four chips per bit) First data bit 1 becomes 4 chips, 1010 Next data bit 0 comes 4 chips, 1001 (inverted 0110) Correlation with PN Code synchronized SPREAD: 1010 1001 0100 1111 1110 0100 1001 1011 1010 0001 1011 0100 PN: 1010 0110 0100 1111 0001 0100 1001 0100 0101 0001 0100 1011 XOR: 0000 1111 0000 0000 1111 0000 0000 1111 1111 0000 1111 1111 Correlation with PN Code not synchronized (one chip off) SPREAD: 1010 1001 0100 1111 1110 0100 1001 1011 1010 0001 1011 0100 PN: 0100 1100 1001 1110 0010 1001 0010 1000 1010 0010 1001 0110 XOR: 1110 0101 1101 0001 1100 1101 1011 0011 0000 0011 0010 0010 Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
Problems with CDMA • Cell sites “breathe” • Combined noise of all reverse links can exceed cell site limit • Airlink different but network suffers same weaknesses as D-AMPS • Must license from Qualcomm Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
Global System for Mobiles • European design from the 1980s • VoiceStream, Cingular, AT&T transitioning • Short Message Service • 200 kHz channels • Eight timeslots • 270 kbps aggregate data rate • Separates equipment identity from user identity • Subscriber Information Module Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
International Mobile station Equipment Identity • Type Approval Code (TAC) is issued by a central authority • Final Assembly Code (FAC) identifies the place of manufacture • Serial Number (SNR) assigned by the manufacturer • Spare (SP) is reserved, usually zero. Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
International Mobile Subscriber Identity • Mobile Country Code (MCC) identifies the country in which the customer is subscribed. • (United States is 310) • Mobile Network Code (MNC) identifies the GSM network to which the user is subscribed, also known as the home network. • (VoiceStream is 26) • Mobile Subscriber Identification Number (MSIN) identifies the user within the network. Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
GSM Speech • 20 millisecond sample of speech • Digitized from codec (13 kbps) • Channel coding (22.8 kbps) • Interleaving • Encrypting • Burst formatting (33.8 kbps) • Modulation (270 kbps) Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
GSM has weak crypto • Security by Obscurity • Algorithms never officially released • All of them leaked or reverse-engineered • A3/A8 in SIM • A5 in hardware • A5 (privacy algorithm) deliberately weakened • A8 feeds it weakened keys • Weaker algorithm (A5/2) for export Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
Short Message Service • 20 billion SMS messages per month from 553 million GSM subscribers • Carried in GSM logical data channel • Increasing applications • Youth market (Instant Messenger) • eBay outbidding • Remote monitoring • TDMA and CDMA have similar • “Tacked on” Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models
Some SMS Issues • Early pre-pay phones had free SMS due to lack of billing system integration • SMS Identity spoofing • Faked “caller-ID” data • SMS viruses • Crash certain phones • Badly-formatted binary messages Wireless Overview Protocols and Threat Models