Implications of Militarisation of Space

1. Implications of Militarisation of Space Dr. Raji Rajagopalan Distinguished Fellow and head, Nuclear & Space Policy Initiative Observer Research Foundation www.orfonline.org rpr@orfonline.org; rajeswarirajagopalan@gmail.com http://securitystrategyrajagopalan.blogspot.com/

2. Changing Asian Strategic Order • Asian strategic order in flux - changing regional and global military balance; growing trend of militarisation (weaponisation); securitisation of political issues means greater emphasis on hard power; signs of arms race, incl. in OS • Other spacefaring powers re-examining their options, strategies, capabilities – assigning a greater security role to their space assets • Major factors • Changing military balance incl. in OS • Declining US power (relative) • N Korea - Possible future Japanese reactions • Internal factors - but different for each power • Consequences difficult to predict • Competition to pick up including potential arms race in OS

3. Space Security Challenges • Advanced military space programmes, growing counter-space capabilities • No weapons in outer space yet; ground-based assets significant threat • Increasing space debris, risking civilian assets • Larger than 10 cm more than 21,000; bet 1 and 10 cm approx. 500,000; smaller than 1 cm exceeds 100 mn • Civil space cooperation and possible diversion for mil space programmes – NK, Iran • Close to 80 active players • Proliferation of small satellites – mini, micro and nano satellites • Large number of state and non-state players; difficulty of detection of small sats • Satellites must for well-coordinated and synchronised tactical capability, integrating weapon systems, missile, radars and sensors, unmanned vehicles, electronics and communication networks, aerial capabilities, logistics and support systems, and defence forces in a vast geographical area • State of the outer space regime - Lack of consensus among major powers

4. Deterrence • In the absence of successful multilateral efforts, states will be forced to rely on deterrence • Deterrence effects will cascade: if one state relies on deterrence, others will be forced to also • Consequence will be negative for all • Will lead to increasing suspicions that will make cooperation difficult • Deterrence model not yet policy for any state re. space, so possible to prevent it • Necessary too, before states proceed down this path

5. Strategic Stability • Strategic stability: maintenance of predictable and non-escalatory relations between states • Common strategic understanding between states – absence of it makes stability fragile and questionable • Thus not just absence of war, but absence of fear of even escalation, even if relations otherwise are poor • Suggests some level of confidence in all states that no one would gain unilateral advantage • But emerging trends in space security could affect strategic stability • Moving from militarisation to early signs of weaponisation

6. ASATs • Development of ASATs, co-orbital satellites or any weapon that might disrupt or destroy space system (orbital, link or terrestrial elements) • ASAT missiles putting low earth and geosynchronous orbits at risk • Co-orbital ASAT weapons • Missile defense interceptors that might be used as direct ascent ASATs • Ground-based high-energy lasers • Examples: Chinese trio satellites - Shiyan-7, Chuangxin-3 and Shijian-15; Roaming Dragon; Russian Kosmos 2499; US X-37B pilotless space drones

7. Impact of ASATs • Potential to disrupt strategic stability and step up the possibility of war • Arms race instability • Benign environment for two decades but beginning to change from 2007 • Technological sophistication of new ASATs; leading to possible ASAT arms race • Crisis instability • Use of ASATs or lasers to disrupt communications could complicate the command & control dynamics; also reduces the possibility for crisis control mechanisms to play out • Loss of surveillance satellites would have similar impact • Could undermine crisis management and exacerbate the potential for escalation

8. Strategic Stability –Challenges • Establishing clear linkages between space and strategic stability difficult • Emergence of a large number of actors – no major technologies in space but new actors bringing out the salience of some of the old technologies including counter-space technologies • US and Soviets several ASAT tests until early 1980s • Changed circumstances in which states find greater incentives/ willingness to develop and potentially use offensive counter-space cap make the situation more precarious • Greater reliance on space for mil ops as against earlier emphasis for strategic ops • Not in a vacuum – global power transition and shifting Asian balance of power including military balance

9. Space Weapons • Technologies with peaceful applications – such as satellite inspection, refueling and repair (on-orbit satellite servicing) or technologies to clean up space junk – can also be used • Office of the US Director of National Intelligence, 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community: “We assess that, if a future conflict were to occur involving Russia or China, either country would justify attacks against US and allied satellites as necessary to offset any perceived US military advantage derived from military, civil or commercial space system.” • Dual use nature of space assets add to the complexities • Not just dual use assets but launches with multiple payloads make it complex

13. Why Act Now? • Growth trends • More states mean overcrowded space • More regional space agencies? • Private sector participation • Why proliferation? • Supply side: • Growing prosperity = greater resources for space programs • Industrial/technology spread = space tech spreads • Demand side: • Competitive pressures

14. SSA – Critical if one has to be in this business • Better awareness about the OS environment and how it impacts on our activities in OS • Three essential components: Tracking of objects in space; Monitoring space weather; Characterization of space objects – these can help avoid collisions (debris, solar) • Close to 80 states and non-state entities operate more than 2000 sats; operate in an environment that contains estimated 500,000 pieces of space debris that damage or destroy these sats thru’ collision • Solar storms and explosions of charged particles damaging sats or even power grids on Earth • Characterisation of objects gives the ability to understand the behaviour of OS objects - electromagnetic signals and emissions, radar and optical imaging can provide clues as to their function and capabilities. • Helps in predicting threats by developing a catalogue of OS objects and detecting new events • No. of mega constellations to be launched in LEO, OS crowding even more challenging; Univ. of Southampton - mega constellations will increase the risk of collision by as much as 50 percent

16. Spacebook created by AGI: http://apps.agi.com/SatelliteViewer/

17. Counter-space capabilities • Existed in the past but the conditions today quite different • Greater willingness to develop and use such capabilities • Kinetic capabilities, in which there is physical destruction of a space object, difficult to hide • Electronic and cyber-attacks not so easy to detect; they can be developed and deployed or even used without others being aware or certain about who is doing it • OOS and RPO not new– more than 50 years of experience with human spaceflight, but increasing robotic interface automation, new challenges – also, more countries/industries engaged in testing RPO cap. • Change in orientation • Cold War, OS utilisation primarily for strategic operations, like strategic intelligence gathering, nuclear attack early warning and executing arms control agreements • Today far more pertinent role in conventional military operations bc operational and tactical benefits • Offensive or defensive counter-space ops today impact not just security but social and economic, and across continents due to large-scale civilian dependency on space-based applications • OS so vital to both civilian and military ops reflects the danger of inadvertent escalation and conflict, if there is, for instance, a disruption or denial of service during a period of heightened tensions, even if the incident was a natural incident or due to mechanical failure

18. Counter-space; Contd. • Mil ops becoming extremely net-centric one - shorter timeframes, high tech environment - integration of space assets absolutely critical • Operation Desert Storm & Iraqi Freedom demonstrated the ‘force-multiplier’ nature • Supports activities including Space-based intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), positioning navigation and timing (PNT), satellite communications (SATCOM), information gathering, weather, environment and terrain observation • Can have a multiplier effect in terms of gaining greater sense of predictability of the operating environment, reduce uncertainty, facilitate better command decisions (due to better awareness) • The very benefits a vulnerability as well – China has been investing to find the US’ Achilles heel for instance – the heavily networked US mil ops

21. China’s ASAT Tests

25. Challenges for the future • No effective governance mechanisms • OST does not cover a range of new threats • Rule-making not easy because of new and numerous actors • Recent efforts failure for lack of clarity • Space weapon; defensive use of space • GGE, PPWT • Geopolitics playing into writing future rules of the road

26. What must be done? • No defence against ASAT as yet, nor any arms control measures or even TCBMs to address ASATs and other counter-space capabilities • Ways to control – global governance norms - legal, norms, GGEs, CoC • Strengthen SSA capabilities • Building better redundancy, hardening of space capabilities, enhance the security of back ups • Make clear and public red lines and escalatory thresholds • Cross the speed bump re. global governance • Strengthen efforts at developing norms of responsible behaviour and legal instruments – not a choice but all must be promoted

27. Specific TCBMs • Space Traffic Management Measures • Pre-launch notifications • Notification measures for ballistic missile and space launches (HCoC) • Standards for small-sats to ensure tracking • Space Situational Awareness (SSA) data exchange • “No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space” pledge • Solemn but unilateral pledge • With no clear definition on space weapon, important to focus on intentions – no attack on each other’s assets or not to have an arms race in outer space (be it thru’ placement of weapons or ground-based)

28. Specific tcbms, Contd. • ASAT test guidelines/ intentional orbital breakups rules • The UNIDIR proposal – no debris, low debris, notification • Not the First to Act beyond the scope of Article 51 • Exercising the right to self-defense on an imminent threat, before the attack has occurred – dangerous trend • Many developing countries see this as particularly troubling because they see this clause as further opening the door to conflict in space and a pretext to weaponize their capabilities