Hans Romkema Conflict & Transition Consultancies

1. Opportunities and Constraints for the Disarmament & Repatriationof the FDLR, FNL and ADF/NALUin the DRC Hans Romkema Conflict & Transition Consultancies For the Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program (MDRP)

2. Scope • Objectives • Methodology • Overview of AGs • D&R To Date • Opportunities • Constraints • Recommendations • Impact of fighting in North Kivu

3. Objectives of this Study • Goal: provide recommendations to ‘enhance the success of the D&R process for foreign AGs in the DRC’ • Key-objective: To analyse ‘the opportunities and constraints faced by male and female foreign combatants and their dependents in the DRC seeking to disarm and repatriate to their countries of origin’

4. Methodology

5. Estimated numbers of COFS in DRC

8. Overview of the FDLR Today • FDLR is concentrated in the North and South Kivu provinces • FDLR objectives • Human rights abuses • Parallel authority • Control over resources and trade • Internal control structures • Internal conflicts/divisions

9. D&R To Date • The number of FDLR combatants decreased from more than 20,000 (1999) to about 7,000 (2007) • Disarmament and repatriation have been progressing slowly since 2002 • Voluntary repatriation is reaching its limits (e.g., MONUC SRSG Swing recently acknowledged the potential need for military intervention) • There is a widespread acknowledgement that the COFS problem needs to be resolved • On the Rwandan side, returning COFS and their dependents receive demobilization and reintegration support through the RDRP

10. D&R Military Operations to Date • Past RPA/RDF/RCD (1998-2001) operations weakened the FDLR considerably • Recent military operations (FARDC and MONUC) had little D&R impact • MONUC engaged the FDLR under the mandate to ‘protect the population’ only, and this did not advance D&R • FARDC was not sufficiently equipped, trained and supported • The operations were isolated events, not based on a larger overall strategy related to D&R

11. Opportunities for D&R Today • Majority of FDLR combatants in favour of D&R • FDLR Rome Declaration (March 2005) • Internal Divisions • Better cooperation among regional states • ICGLR Security Pact, Tripartite Plus Joint Commission • Elected government in DRC • RDRP in place • Planned FDLR leadership meeting in eastern DRC next week

12. Constraints for D&R Today • FDLR command structures extreme (200 – 300 leaders hold many ‘hostage’) • FDLR control structures powerful • GoDRC lacks policy, strategy and institutional arrangements to tackle D&R of foreign AGs systematically • FARDC military weakness • MONUC D&R mandate constraints (‘voluntary only’) and execution uneven • Too few D&R opportunities, especially in remote areas • Limited action against political leadership operating largely from Europe and North America • Fighting in North Kivu

13. FDLR Presence Around Mwenga June 2006

14. Recommendations on FDLR D&R Way Forward First, try once more a non-violent solution • Point of entry: Rome Declaration (March 2005) • Coordinated pressure from GoDRC, region and IC • ‘Last chance’ meeting GoRDC-FDLR • If FDLR responds favourably give them limited time • An obstacle could be the 200-300 men who are unlikely to accept any solution • If (parts of) the FDLR decide(s) to be cooperative, countries of the region and IC need to provide timely and effective support to D&R and other aspects of the operation

15. Recommendations to GoDRC • Make it clear that it will no longer tolerate the FDLR on its territory • Develop its own D&R policy and strategy, and establish institutional arrangements for planning, coordination and implementation • Mandate the FARDC, PNC and the local administration to receive, protect and facilitate the (voluntary and non-voluntary) D&R of COFS • Terminate collaboration between Congolese individuals / local armed groups and FDLR • Secure regional political and military support if necessary

16. Recommendations to GoR • Reaffirm at high levels the commitment of GoR to encourage and facilitate the return and reintegration of Rwandese COFS • E.g., making it clear that younger COFS cannot have been involved in the genocide • RDRC needs to continue its current demobilization and reintegration activities • Enhance cross-border sensitization with a focus on information sharing on: • Active involvement of relatives and friends of COFS • Overall (economic) situation in Rwanda, Gacaca and reintegration package • Share information on RDRP with relevant GoDRC officials • Further strengthen regional collaboration (on COFS and with GoDRC in particular) • Consider options for addressing the obstacle of 200-300 FDLR leaders

17. Recommendations to MONUC • Improve the D&R field approach and increase its presence in the field • Remote deployments, flexible and timely repatriation, transit sites, etc. • Share D&R experiences with the GoDRC and help it to develop its own D&R capacity • Support a D&R lessons-learned exercise • Continue efforts to strengthen FARDC

18. Recommendations to MDRP Partnership • Continue to provide technical and financial support to the national demobilization and reintegration programs in the Great Lakes region so that COFS can be received • Enhance support activities to D&R of foreign armed groups • Strategy development and capacity-building in the DRC if requested • Facilitation of confidence-building, coordination and planning among relevant countries • Support efforts to strengthen FARDC

19. Recommendations to the International Community • UNSC should review mandate of MONUC regarding ‘voluntary only’ D&R approach for foreign AGs • Inhibit political and fund-raising activity as well as travel of FDLR political leaders (in Africa, Europe and N. America). Make it clear that will not tolerate presence. • Systematically pursue and prosecute the war criminals and those who have committed crimes against humanity • Participate in the reflection on options for 200-300 FDLR leaders • Support the development of a D&R capacity in the DRC and support strengthening of FARDC • Strengthen support to regional collaboration initiatives • Encourage greater cooperation among governments, MDRP and relevant UN agencies (e.g., UNHCR, MONUC, UNICEF, etc.)

20. Military Dimensions • Intensify military pressure on FDLR to increase willingness to accept voluntary D&R • If credible, may in itself be sufficient to “crack” FDLR leadership control • If voluntary D&R fails within a few months military operations should start • Target disabling and dismantling FDLR command and control and splitting leaders from rank & file • Focus on D&R of maximum number, with option of forcible D&R • Take measures to protect civilian population • If necessary, reinforcements from AU, Tri-Partite, bilateral, etc. should be considered

21. Fighting in North Kivu • As long as the fighting goes on, D&R in that province cannot be effective • Government should look for a negotiated solution • It cannot afford to loose (and it might) • Nkunda and his men may have chosen the wrong attitude and line of action but some of their concerns are legitimate • International community should help finding a negotiated solution • Why are there no (apparent) attempts?

22. Questions & discussion