Interconnection in the Developing World: Mongolia , Kenya , Bangladesh

1. Interconnection in the Developing World:Mongolia, Kenya, Bangladesh Andrew McLaughlin iLaw @ Harvard Law School 4 July 2002

2. Background: Internet in Africa • Of the 770 million people in Africa: • 1 in 13 have a TV (50m) • 1 in 40 have a fixed line (20m) • 1 in 40 have a GSM line (20m) • 1 in 130 have a PC (5.9m) • 1 in 150 use the Internet (5.5m) • 1 in 400 have pay-TV (2m) • All 54 countries have Internet connectivity in their capitals • Total dial-up subscribers: 1.3 million • North Africa: 280,000 • South Africa: 750,000 • Other 49 countries: 300,000 • Total international bandwidth: over 1 Gigabyte incoming; 800 Mbps outgoing [Source: APC]

3. Competition in African Internet Services • Total number of public ISPs: 575 • (Excluding South Africa, where the market has consolidated into 3 major players with 90% of the market and 75 small players with the remainder.) • Countries with: • Only 1 active ISP: 20 • Only Ethiopia and Mauritius have monopoly ISP as national policy (I.e, private companies barred from reselling Internet services) • But it’s effectively true across the sub-Saharan region • 5 or more active ISPs: 14 • 10 or more active ISPs: 7 (Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania and Togo) • Bandwidth • International links of 2 Mbps or more: 23 countries • International links of 5 Mbps or more: 10 countries (Botswana, Egypt, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia and Zimbabwe)

4. Source: Mike Jensen (APC)

5. Source: Mike Jensen (APC)

6. Barriers to Internet Deployment • Irregular electricity supplies • Tax regimes • Often treat info. tech. as luxury items • Competition/liberalization/monopoly • Cost of connectivity

7. IXP = Internet Exchange Point • A physical network infrastructure (layer 2), operated by a single entity to facilitate the exchange of Internet traffic between 3 or more ISPs. • Neutrality • Typically, the IXP owns and operates the switching platforms used to interconnect the various users/subscribers. • Shared switch fabric, where users arrange peering via bi-lateral agreements and then establish BGP4 sessions between routers to exchange routes and traffic • Advantages: Lower Costs and Better Quality of Service • Not technically complicated; challenge is in human dynamics

8. Cost Advantages • International links entail both upstream and downstream packet traffic (and costs) • In telephony world, costs of calls are shared 50/50-ish between telcos • In Internet world, costs depend on peering vs. transit agreements. • Developing country ISPs must sign transit, not peering, agreements, and must pay 100% of both outbound and inbound packet traffic. • Compare: US to Kenya vs. Kenya to US

9. Footnote: Transit vs. Peering • Peering = bilateral business & technical arrangement • 2 providers agree to accept traffic from one another and from one another’s customers (and their customers’ customers) • No obligation to carry traffic to 3d parties • No cash payments involved (more like barter); no settlement • Transit = bilateral business & technical arrangement • Transit provider carries traffic to 3d parties or from 3d parties to customer (end point) • Most transit agreements: transit provider will carry traffic to/from its other customers AND to/from every destination on the Internet • Defined price for access to entire Internet

10. Transit & Peering Choices • ISP must either • Exchange traffic directly with other ISPs (peering), or • Pay a larger ISP to do it (transit) • Most ISPs do both: • Exchange as much traffic as possible with peers, AND • Pay for the portion that can’t be exchanged via peers • ISP goal: Minimize transit to minimize costs

11. The Politics of Transit • The larger ISPs that sell transit to developing countries are nearly US-, European-, or Japanese-owned • Any country that does not host a well-functioning IXP is: (a) Needlessly exporting capital, and (b) Effectively subsidizing Internet in the developed world. • Developing country payments for transit are not small

12. Service advantages • Most developing country ISPs use satellite circuits for international connections to upstream ISPs • No fiber optic connections available • Satellite connections introduce latency • International exchange of domestic traffic via satellite requires at least 2 satellite hops

13. In a digital network… • Closer is cheaper • Closer is faster • Closer is more efficient • Or: Localization of packet traffic – keeping the physical path traversed by packets as short as possible – produces measurable improvements in service cost, performance, and efficiency

14. Developing Country w/ no IXP • Each ISP has its own international connection to the global Internet • Satellite or fiber • Even domestic traffic has to flow over international links before being routed back to another local ISP • (By the way, it’s no longer true that all Internet routes lead to the US) • This is needlessly expensive, and limits services (crummier response times) • Without a domestic IXP, it’s actually better to host online content and services offshore

15. The Content Angle • Without significant local traffic interchange, there’s little incentive to host (or even author) local Internet content • Result: Few domestic content sources for developing world Internet users • And continued reliance on US-generated content, with US-generated advertising, from US companies pushing US products

16. Phony IXPs • Dominant transit provider provides local exchange points in one or two major cities • IXP is used purely as a marketing term by a commercial transit provider, but is no more than a router offering BGP4 peering, with local transit and/or transit to the international Internet

17. The Case of Mongolia • January 2001: ISPs meet in Ulaanbaatar • Consensus: We need domestic IXP • All ISPs connecting via satellite, with over a half second latency for every packet in each direction • April 2001: Mongolia Internet Exchange launched with three members • March 2002: 6th member joins MIX • Latency for domestic traffic drops from 650 to less than 10 milliseconds • Government role: none

18. The Case of Kenya • No IXP on African continent between Cairo and Johannesburg • KIXP organized by TESPOK, launched in November 2000 • December 2000: CCK orders KIXP closed on complaint from Telkom Kenya

19. Kenya: Background • Telkom Kenya has statutory monopoly over fixed network infrastructure (local, national, international, leased lines) • ISP services open to competition, but ISPs rely on Telkom Kenya for underlying infrastructure • Until KIXP, all Internet traffic in Kenya exchanged internationally • Roughly 30% of upstream traffic is actually to a local destination [TESPOK]

20. KIXP • Reduced latency from average of 1200-2000 milliseconds (via satellite) to 60-80 milliseconds • Reduced costs: • 64 kbit/s circuit: US $200 (domestic) vs. $3375 (int’l) • 512 kbit/s circuit: US $650 (domestic) vs. $9546 (int’l) [Source: TESPOK]

21. Kenya: Endgame • Kenyan ISPs argued that KIXP is closed user group, which would be legal under Kenyan Telecommunications Act • Also: Local exchange of domestic traffic does not contravene Telkom Kenya’s international monopoly, as all international trafic would continue to flow over its international links • October 2001: CCK grants license, with request that ISPs partner with Telkom Kenya • February 2002: No decision from incumbent, so ISPs decide to re-launch KIXP

22. The Case of Bangladesh • No IXP • Why not? BTTB (Bangladesh Telegraph and Telephone Board) says: “No funding available from government.” • Even though IXP would save BTTB money, lower costs for users, improve levels of service • As government-sanctioned monopoly, BTTB needs regulator approval (and budgeting) for new services • Traceroute from one Bangladeshi ISP to another shows traffic travelling via Hong Kong, the U.S., and Canada, with 2 satellite hops • Most Bangladeshi sites hosted in the U.S.

23. So… • The goal is clear: Domestic Internet traffic exchange in developing countries • The advantages are clear: Cost & Quality • What are the obstacles? • Or: Why isn’t everyone leaping with frolicksome joy onto the IXP bandwagon?

24. Obstacle 1: Resistance by Government/Regulator • Law sez: “You will connect to the Internet through the monopoly telecom!” • Dependence on telecom revenue for national budget • Telecom influence with regulatory authority • Regulator cluelessness • Statutory or other licensing requirements • Ordinary corruption

25. Obstacle 2: Resistance by Monopoly Telecom • Monopoly telecom likes monopoly rents • Sole provider of international leased lines • Fears effective competition • Politically powerful

26. Obstacle 3: Resistance by competing ISPs • Fear of making life cheaper for (or even subsidizing) competitors • Fear that “interconnection” means stealing of customers • Fear that IXPs are complicated • “American/European IXPs have sophisticated switches, powerful routers, large expenses, huge complexity” • Equipment vendors sometimes promote this feeling by pushing big, complex equipment

27. Legal/Regulatory Considerations • Subsidize formation of IXP? • May be needed to catalyze facility • But: Artificial subsidies may discourage formation of additional, competing IXP facilities with different price structures, different features, different exchange policies • Neutral management of IXP is key • By agreed neutral (university or academic institute), or ISP association • Government should promote IXPs in general, rather than specially subsidize a particular (government-run) IXP • Good rule of thumb: Government should withdraw from involvement within 18 months • Tax incentives or exemptions? • Generally not needed, if IXP is incorporated as cooperatively-owned or self-owned non-profit entity • Protection from take-over by for-profit entity?

28. Beware: The Chokehold Maneuver • Problem: If there is a dominant ISP in the market, it may participate in the IXP, but severely under-provision its link to the IXP  The Thin Pipe Stratagem • Result: Competitors’ customers encounter slow connections to dominant’s customers • Understandably, they fault the competitor ISP for the poor connection, not the incumbent (“I don’t care who’s to blame; I just want a fast connection”) • Strong incentive to switch to dominant ISP • Cause for regulation? • If so, how? • Compare: Mandatory Multi-Lateral Peering Agreements (MMLPA) • Bad idea • Creates disincentive to large ISPs to interconnect • Removes incentive to keep technical operation in top condition

29. Bottom line: Enable Cooperation • IXPs rise with cooperation; fall without it • Governments need to ensure legal/regulatory environment supports cooperation and investment • ISPs are a suspicious lot • Will be highly sensitive to the danger that its IXP investment actually benefits competitors • Government must ensure that its laws and licensing regime (if any) allows ISPs to create a neutral, co-operative, commonly-owned and –managed, non-profit entity that is protected from acquisition by dominant ISP or telecom operator • Alternative option: Independent neutral like university

30. Current IXP Efforts in Africa • Egypt (3 ISPs now interconnecting) • Uganda • Advanced stage of development • Licensed by UCC (very supportive) • Should launch this month or next • http://uixp.co.ug • Mozambique (set to launch) • Tanzania • Ghana (maybe) • Nigeria • Rwanda

31. Some Other Key Policy Areas • Tax treatment of Internet equipment and services • Telephone tariffs • Local call charges for Internet, regardless of distance to POP • Special area code • 18 countries so far • In Seychelles, 50% lower tariff for Internet calls • Liberalization of international links • Two-way satellite-based Internet services using very small aperture terminals (VSAT) to connect directly the US or Europe have been quickly adopted where ever regulations allow (DR Congo, Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia) • Result: ISPs that are not dependent on the monopoly telecom operator for their international bandwidth. • Pricing: $700-$900 for two-way KU-band VSAT equipment providing 'better than dialup' speeds (i.e 56Kbps outgoing and 200-400Kbps incoming).

32. The Feedback Loop: Andrew McLaughlin <am@pobox.com> Acknowledgments: Baasansuren Burmaa (DataCom Mongolia), Mike Jensen (APC),Brian Longwe (TESPOK), Charles Musisi (Uganda Online), Sam Paltridge (OECD), Philip Smith (Cisco), and Bill Woodcock (Packet Clearing House) My thanks to these individuals for their helpful documents and presentations; any errors in the presentation are mine.