Politics of Global Governance Liliana B. Andonova Graduate Institute-Geneva October, 2009

1. Politics of Global Governance Liliana B. Andonova Graduate Institute-Geneva October, 2009 Please do not distribute without permission; comments welcome to: Liliana.andonova@graduate.insitute.ch

2. Outline • Globalization and governance challenges • International cooperation and institutions • Intergovernmental institutions • Pluralization of international politics • New governance mechanisms • Public-private partnerships • Case studies

3. Part I: Globalization and Governance Challenges

4. Globalization • A process of increased interconnectedness across multi-continental distances and across arenas of policy making • Dimensions of globalism • Economic • Environmental • Military • Social • Cultural

5. Challenges for Policy-Making • Transboundary spillover effects: rapid and far reaching • Issue complexity • Systems management • Overlapping issues • Conflicting principles (equity, efficiency, intrinsic rights) • Interdependence of responses

6. Transboundary Spillover: H1N1 Swine Flu Outbreak http://healthmap.org/en

7. Issue Complexity: Variation in the Earth Surface Temperature

8. Climate System Complexity: Radiative Forcing

9. Temp increase 1.4-5.8C Sea level rise of 0.09-0.88m Variable impacts across regions and societies Climate projections by the IPCC

10. ComplexityGlobal Warming and Food Security

11. Providing Global Public Good • Public goods have two main characteristics: • Non-rivalry: when the consumption of the good by one person does not detract from its availability for others • Non-excludability: additional users cannot be excluded from accessing or using the good. • “Pure” public goods rare (sunshine, moonlight, national security)

12. Examples of global public goods • Climate stability • Global public health conditions/communicable disease control • Financial stability • International peace • Policy coordination • The moonlight • The warming rays of the sun

13. Social construction of public goods • Notions of “publicness” and “privateness” can change. • Goods may be in the public domain , because: • They are technically non-excludable (air) • They were made public by design (education, health) • They are being neglected or poorly understood ‘public bads’

14. Challenge to Providing GPGs • Economic theory suggest that public goods will be underprovided • For each user the marginal cost of contributing to the creation of GPGs is larger than the marginal benefit • Strong incentives to ‘free ride’ in the provision of public goods

15. Providing public goods at the domestic level • The nation state and the provision of PGs • Political action to reveal preference for the types of goods that should be provided in the public domain • Taxation • Financing of public goods • Example: • Keynesian welfare policies in industrialized countries after WWII • Investment in education and human capital by the East Asian tigers • In many domestic contexts, however, public goods still under-provided: weak institutions, lack of resources, globalization provide additional strain

16. Global Governance Paradox • The world need more coordination and governance to address challenges of globalization • Existing policies often underperform: • Financial crises • Malaria; HIV/AIDS, other diseases persist • Access to clean water inadequate • Climate change and vulnerability unaddressed • Yet states and publics fear and resist the delegation of more authority to international institutions

17. Possible Solution? • Strengthen intergovernmental institutions? • Establish new and diverse mechanisms of governance? • Greater focus by multiple actors on the provision of Global Public Goods?

18. Part II. The Politics of International Cooperation and Institutions

19. Theories of International Cooperation • Realism: focus on power and interest • Cooperation transient • Institutions reflect the constellation of power -> epiphenomenal • Hegemonic stability theory

20. Theories of International Cooperation • Institutionalism: • Power & interests matter • Institutional regimes play a key role in facilitating cooperation • International regimes: “…implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” (Krasner: 1983)

21. Institutional Theories of Cooperation • Build on insights of new economics of organization (Coase 1988; Williamson 1985; North 1990) • Emphasis on the role of institutions in facilitating political cooperation (Keohane 1984; Ostrom 1990) • Reduce transaction cost • Facilitate information exchange/credibility • Credible commitments • Issue linkages • Reciprocity • Facilitate monitoring • Common norms, social capital

22. The Prisoners’ Dilemma Player 1 Player 2

23. Theories of International Cooperation • Constructivism: • Global system as a community of states • The role of norm, ideas, and discourse in constructing state identity and behaviour • The role of epistemic communities and advocacy organizations in diffusing knowledge and norms

24. Pluralization of World Politics • New actors: growth in NGOs, transnational corporations and chains, private foundations, transnational networks • International Organizations – actors in their own right, with a degree of autonomy • Diversification of cooperation mechanisms and policy instruments • Greater use of market mechanisms • Network-based transnational governance • Private authority • Public-private partnerships • Greater focus on results: • Rise in monitoring, including rating of government performance • Greater use of targeting (see MDGs) • Focus on specific GPGs by multilateral organizations such as the WB, UNDP, WHO, etc.

25. Rise of NGOs and moral authority

26. Rise NGO Led Governance

27. Rise of corporate actors, self-regulation and CSR

28. Global Governance • Governance “occurs on a global scale through both the co-ordination of states and the activities of a vast array of rule systems that exercise authority in the pursuit of goals and that function outside normal national jurisdictions.” (Rosenau 2000, 167) • Mechanisms of global governance: • Intergovernmental treaties, laws, organizations • Transnational network governance: “when networks operating in the transnational sphere authoritatively steer constituents towards public goals” (Andonova, Betsill, Bulkeley 2009, 56)

29. Climate Governance: Historical Trends

30. Public-Private Partnerships in the Multilateral System

31. Partnerships as Institutional Innovations • Old multilateralism • “Multilateralism can be defined as the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements of by means of institutions” (Keohane, 1990) • New multilateralism • Public-private partnerships can be defined as coordination of practices and agreements between state and non-state actors that establish a set of norms, rules, practices, or implementation procedures that apply to multiple levels of governance

33. Triangle of Partnership Entrepreneurship External Pressure (NGO, public, political) External Opportunities (Business, NGO, experts, funding) Agency Entrepreneurship

34. Political factors facilitating PPPs • Pressures : NGOs, public opinion, budgetary crises, political principals • IOs more vulnerable to public opinion pressure than governments • Opportunities: new sources of financing, expertise, management, lower cost of communication, organizations • IOs attractive counterparts for institutional experimentation because of perceived moral authority, legitimacy, neutrality

35. Collective action advantages of PPPs • Small groups of actors • Common values more likely • Social incentives and pressure more likely to influence behaviour (free-riding less likely) • Fragmentation of complex issues • Greater overlap between public and private benefits • Lower costs of entry in and exit from collective agreement

36. Implication for Partnership Patterns • Uneven distribution across issue domains, within organizations, and across time • Technical, expertise-dependent, pluralistic issue domains more likely to open for partnerships • Technical units within organizations most likely to seek innovation through partnerships • Organizational resistance to mainstreaming • Critical juncture events (summits, leadership change, new IOs): can increase pressures and opportunities for partnerships • Mimicking and diffusion across organizations likely • “Niches” of partnerships governance

37. Case Studies

38. Case 1: United Nations Fund for International Partnerships (UNFIP)

39. UNFIP History • UN budgetary crisis 1997 • Ted Turner pledge a $1 billion gift to support UN causes • UN Foundation set up to administer the gift • Former Secretary-General K. Annan established UNFIP to facilitate partnerships between UN agencies and non-state actors, supported by the UN Foundation

40. UNFIP Partnerships Across UN Agencies Source: www.un.org/unfip/, accessed December 2005

41. UNFIP Partners

42. UNFIP partnership patterns by policy arenas

43. Clustering of environmental PPPs

44. The San Cristobal Wind Power Project • Facilitated through UNFIP • Partners • Eolica San Cristobal S.A. – EOLICSA • American Electric Power • RWE • E8 • UN Foundation • UNDP • Government of Equador • The Galapagos National Park Service • May of San Cristobal

45. San Cristobal Partnership Objectives • Replace San Cristobal’s diesel generation system with a renewable energy • Reduce dependency on diesel fuel • Reduce oil spills, local air emissions • Contribute to protection of biodiversity • Diffusion of operational, technical, environmental and financial knowledge necessary to operate a fleet of wind turbines on a sustained basis

46. Implementation • Project completed in 2008 • Total budget of US$ 6300000 • 2.4 MW wind farm, can account for up to 50% of annual electricity consumption • Hybrid wind-diesel systems developed • Technical support by e7 • Conservation programs, local capacity • Government target for fossil fuel free Galapagos by 2017/

47. PPP Case 2: Amazon Regional Protected Areas

48. Amazon Regional Protected Areas (ARPA) • President Fernando Henrique Cardoso's: 1998 pledge to protect at least 10% of Brazil's Amazon forests • ARPA: Launched at Johannesburg Summit 2002 • Brazil-World Bank agreement signed April 2003 • Partners: • Brazilian government: US$18.1m. • WWF-Brazil: US$11.5m • WB and GEF: US$30m. Over 4 years

49. ARPA Scope • Triple the amount of Amazon forest under protection to 500,000 sq. km. Equivalent of 12% of total forest • Includes sample of all 23 Amazonian eco-regions • Will include both ecological reserves and extractive reserves • Design management plans, surveillance, research

50. ARPA Implementation • Objectives for Phase I (2002-2008) for the creation of strict nature reserves, new sustainable use reserves, and consolidation of neglected ‘paper parks’ exceeded • Expansion of protected areas in the Amazon and creation of buffer zones to sustain gains • Focus on sustained financing of the project