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Education, Crime, and Neighborhood. Neighborhood Effects. Early work sought to measure education and crime as neighborhood effects. IDEA. We could measure the impacts (and possibly the benefits) of improved education or safer neighborhoods.
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Neighborhood Effects • Early work sought to measure education and crime as neighborhood effects. • IDEA. We could measure the impacts (and possibly the benefits) of improved education or safer neighborhoods. P = a + biSi + cjEducj + dkCrimek where Si refers to structural characteristics; EDUCj to Educational characteristics; CRIMEk to Crime characteristics.
Shorthand P = a + biSi + cjEducj + dkCrimek P = a + b1s1 + b2s2 + ... + c1Educ1 + c1Educ1 + … + d1Crime1 + d2Crime2 + … • Presumably, the cj and dk tell us something about impacts of good schools and safe neighborhoods.
Neighborhood Effects P = a + biSi + cjEducj + dkCrimek • Dubin and Goodman (1982) had 21 educational characteristics, and 12 crime characteristics. • They were able to “reduce” these into:
5 educational components Test scores (Stud. Perf.) Change in test score Teacher quality Change in Stud. Achieve. Test Staff Experience Neighborhood Effects • 3 crime components • Violent crime • Property crime • “Shopping center” crime • All of them mattered.
Neighborhood Effects • Dubin/Goodman Coefficients, for Baltimore City (mean value = $34,650). • 1 unit in test scores $2253 in house price, about 7%. • For crime: • 1 unit in property crime $795 . • 1 unit in violent crime $3143 . • 1 unit in shopping center crime $3721
Victimization Crime rate per 100,000
Victimization • Violence low income victims • Property crime higher income victims • Central city residents are more likely to be victims. • Blacks are more likely to be victimized.
Costs of Crime • Direct Real Costs • Death, injuries • Must calculate dollar values for injuries • Must impute costs for death • Direct Transfer Costs • Theft, fraud • These are transfers because wealth is being transfered rather than destroyed.
Costs of Crime • Indirect Real Costs • Prevention costs. If we didn’t have robberies, we wouldn’t need to put locks on our homes. • Criminal justice costs. If we didn’t have crimes, our criminal justice/public safety system (police, courts, firefighters) would be much smaller.
Crime as a Rational Activity • Premise: Expected benefits exceed expected costs. • Return to crime exceeds return to other plausible occupations. • First, expected benefits. Expected Loot: E (L) = prob of success * Value of Loot So, if prob. of success is 0.6, and loot is $1200, expected loot is: E (L) = 0.6 * 1200 = 720
Crime as a Rational Activity • Next, expected costs. Assume one year sentence if caught. • Simplest model looks at costs as the probability of going to prison for one year, and the costs of being in prison. • Expected prob. of going to prison is • Prob of getting caught * • Prob of getting sentenced. • EXCEL Expected Cost: E (L) = Probc * Probs* Cost So, if Probc is 0.3, and Probs is 0.2, and foregone wages are $3,000, then expected costs are: 0.3 * 0.2 * 3000 = 0.06* 3000 = $180
Who Commits Crimes? • Some people are skillful. They have low probabilities of getting caught and convicted. Expected loot may be high; expected costs are low. • Some have low opportunity costs. • Some don’t like society much so they’re not too averse to doing crimes.
How many burglaries are committed? Depends on return. Depends on aversion to crime. Supply Curve for Burglary S (more aversion) S (some aversion) Net Return S (no aversion) # of burglaries
Why Did Crime Drop in the 1990s? % Reduction
Why Did Crime Fall in 1990s? • Strong Economy. There were more jobs and higher wages, causing a 2% reduction in property crime. • Demographics. A decrease in the share of population in the crime-prone years of 16-24. • Police Techniques. Including community policing and more aggressive control of public nuisances. • Increase in Police. Increase of about 14%, at a cost of $8.5 billion per year. • Decrease in Crack. • Legalized Abortion (1974). It appears that crime rates are higher among children born to reluctant parents.