1 / 26

Semi-plenary session: “Role of the state in reduction/amplification of inequality”

Semi-plenary session: “Role of the state in reduction/amplification of inequality” State retrenchments and class dynamics: the “new” middle class under strain. L ouis Chauvel Pr at Sciences-Po University Paris and Institut Universitaire de France Site : http://louis.chauvel.free.fr

plato-olsen
Download Presentation

Semi-plenary session: “Role of the state in reduction/amplification of inequality”

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Semi-plenary session: “Role of the state in reduction/amplification of inequality” • State retrenchments and class dynamics: the “new” middle class under strain • Louis ChauvelPr at Sciences-Po University Paris and Institut Universitaire de France • Site : http://louis.chauvel.free.fr • chauvel@sciences-po.fr

  2. Maastricht treaty European constitutional referendum treaty referendum Change 20 September 1992 29 may 2005 Professionals & managers 66 67 1 Self employed 49 53 4 S emi prof. and lower mana gers 55 46 - 9 Routine white collars 47 37 - 10 Blue collar workers 43 30 - 13 • Explaining (some of) the French problem(s)?Political instability, extreme right wing candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen qualification for the 2nd turn of presidential elections April 21 2002, rejection of the European Treaty May 29 2005, anti-globalisation movements, populist streams, xenophobia, fears, … « Yes » at two European referendums in France by socio-occupational group (%) Diff = 23% Diff = 37% Tot = 51% Tot = 46% Source : My own computation of CEVIPOF 1995 microdata and CSA postelectoral survey 2005.

  3. Plan • Europe as a middle-class exception in the world • Objective degree of inequality and class consciousness: paradoxical dynamics • The middle class dynamics and welfare state retrenchments • Conclusion: post-affluent societies and the middle class(es)

  4. 1. The social specificity of Europe in the world • An affluent and relatively equal club • Europe as a strong middle class (“median class”) • Complex evolutions during the last 20 years…

  5. 60 Lesotho Brazil Inequality (Gini coeff) Bolivia Paraguay Panama Ecuador Honduras Colombia Chile Data 2000 Guatemala 55 (World Income Inequality Database) Nicaragua El Salvador Latin America Gambia Philippines 50 Mexico Peru Costa Rica Georgia y = -5,6712Ln(x) + 88,851 Dom.Rep. Venezuela R 2 = 0,3085 Thailand Ghana Cote d`Ivoire Jamaica 45 Malaysia Cameroon Guyana Iran Cambodia Sri Lanka Russia Moldova Liberal and Mediterranean countr. Kyrgyz R. Tunisia China Tajikistan 40 Turkey Morocco Mauritania Estonia Korea R. Egypt U.S. Portugal India Israel 35 Ukraine Lithuania U.K. Spain Bulgaria Azerbaijan Italy Latvia Greece Japan Macedonia Croatia Corporatist countr. Bangladesh Indonesia Ireland Kazakhstan Australia Taiwan Canada 30 Switzerland Pakistan Hungary France Poland Nordic countries Romania Belgium Germany Belarus Austria Luxembourg Czech R. Netherlands 25 Sweden Denmark Slovenia Norway Transitional Eastern Europe Slovak Rep. Finland Development (per capita GDP PPP) 20 (Penn World Tables Database) 1000 10000 100000

  6. Income The strobiloid representation of income distribution Higher income class = rich 200 Median income class =« middle class » 100 median income 50 Lower income class = poor

  7. Comparisons of national strobiloids : national median Brazil : Median disposable income per year per capita : 6.900 $PPP/an Gini coef.: 59.8 % Median class = 44 % US : Median disposable income per year per capita : 32.000 $PPP/an Gini coef.: 34.5 % Median class = 58 % Sweden : Median disposable income per year per capita : 23.000 $PPP/an Gini coef.: 25.2 % Median class = 84 % Median national income

  8. Comparisons of national strobiloids : PPP exchange rate Brazil : Median disposable income per year per capita : 6.900 $PPP/an Gini coef.: 59.8 % Median class = 44 % US : Median disposable income per year per capita : 32.000 $PPP/an Gini coef.: 34.5 % Median class = 58 % Sweden : Median disposable income per year per capita : 23.000 $PPP/an Gini coef.: 25.2 % Median class = 84 %

  9. 60 Lesotho Brazil Inequality (Gini coeff) Bolivia Paraguay Panama Ecuador Honduras Colombia Chile Data 2000 Guatemala 55 Nicaragua El Salvador Gambia Philippines 50 Mexico Peru Costa Rica Georgia y = -5,6712Ln(x) + 88,851 Dom.Rep. Venezuela R 2 = 0,3085 Thailand Ghana Cote d`Ivoire Jamaica 45 Malaysia Cameroon Guyana Iran Cambodia Sri Lanka Russia Moldova Kyrgyz R. Tunisia China Tajikistan 40 Turkey Morocco Mauritania Estonia Korea R. Egypt U.S. Portugal India Israel 35 Ukraine Lithuania U.K. Spain Bulgaria Azerbaijan Italy Latvia Greece Japan Macedonia Croatia Bangladesh Indonesia Ireland Kazakhstan Australia Taiwan Canada 30 Switzerland Pakistan Hungary France Poland Romania Belgium Germany Belarus Austria Luxembourg Czech R. Netherlands 25 Sweden Denmark Slovenia Norway Slovak Rep. Finland Development (per capita GDP PPP) 20 1000 10000 100000

  10. 45 Inequality (Gini coeff) Malaysia y = -16,122x + 101,38 Russia R 2 = 0,3387 Data 2000 Tunisia 40 Turkey Korea R U.S. Portugal 35 Israel U.K. Spain Italy Greece Ireland Japan Australia Canada 30 Taiwan Hungary France Poland Switzerland. Romania Belgium Germany Austria Czech R. Sweden Norway 25 Slovenia Denmark Slovak Rep. Finland Netherlands Development log10(per capita GDP PPP) 20 3,6 3,7 3,8 3,9 4 4,1 4,2 4,3 4,4 4,5 4,6

  11. 45 Costa Rica Mexico Inequality (Gini coeff) Malaysia Russia Tunisia From early 1980’ to 2000 Venezuela Tunisia 40 Turkey Korea, Republic of Korea, Republic of U.S. Greece Portugal Portugal 35 Israel U.K. Spain Greece Italy Ireland Ireland Japan Japan Spain Canada Australia Switzerland. Italy Israel Canada U.S. 30 Taiwan Hungary Poland France France Hungary Australia Switzerland. Romania Belgium Pola nd U.K. Russia Taiwan Germ any Netherlands Austria Czech R. Denmark Sweden Norway 25 Slovenia Netherlands Slovenia Germany Denmark Slovak Rep. Finland Luxembourg Development log10(per capita GDP PPP) Austria Belgium Norway Sweden Finland Czech R. 20 3,6 3,7 3,8 3,9 4 4,1 4,2 4,3 4,4 4,5 4,6

  12. 45 Costa Rica Mexico Inequality (Gini coeff) Malaysia Russia Tunisia From early 1980’ to 2000 Venezuela Tunisia 40 Turkey Korea R Korea R U.S. Greece Portugal Portugal 35 Israel U.K. Spain Greece Italy Ireland Ireland Japan Japan Spain Canada Australia Switzerland. Italy Israel Canada U.S. 30 Taiwan Hungary Poland France France Hungary Australia Switzerland. Romania Belgium Pola nd U.K. Russia Taiwan Germ any Netherlands Austria Czech R. Denmark Sweden Norway 25 Slovenia Netherlands Slovenia Germany Denmark Slovak Rep. Finland Luxembourg Development (per capita GDP - PPP) Austria Belgium Norway Sweden Finland Czech R. 20 3,6 3,7 3,8 3,9 4 4,1 4,2 4,3 4,4 4,5 4,6

  13. Construction européenne et croissance des inégalités

  14. 2. Objective intensity of inequality and class consciousness: paradoxical dynamics (in the French case) • Distinction between objective and subjective class systems • Class system without class consciousness • The spiral of social classes

  15. Objective and subjective intensity of class system Number of Book Titles in the catalogue of Bibliothèque nationale de France (BNF) containing « classes sociales » or « classe ouvrière » (20-years mobile average of per decade occurrences) 100 100 90 90 80 80 « classe ouvrière » or « classes sociales » 70 70 60 60 50 50 40 40 30 30 « classes sociales » 20 20 10 10 0 0 1810- 1810- 1820- 1820- 1830- 1830- 1840- 1840- 1850- 1850- 1860- 1860- 1870- 1870- 1880- 1880- 1890- 1890- 1900- 1900- 1910- 1910- 1920- 1920- 1930- 1930- 1940- 1940- 1950- 1950- 1960- 1960- 1970- 1970- 1980- 1980- 1990- 1990- 1819 1819 1829 1829 1839 1839 1849 1849 1859 1859 1869 1869 1879 1879 1889 1889 1899 1899 1909 1909 1919 1919 1929 1929 1939 1939 1949 1949 1959 1959 1969 1969 1979 1979 1989 1989 1999 1999 Source : Bibliothèque nationale de France catalogue

  16. 1960 to 1980 decline in income inequality and stability after Inequality measure : Interdecile ratio D9/D1 1954 to 2002 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Older Source : Paper publications : Enquête revenus fiscaux ERF ; Newer source : INSEE reevaluation ERF

  17. Independence of objective and subjective dimensions : a typology Older Source : Paper publications : Enquête revenus fiscaux ERF ; Newer source : INSEE reevaluation ERF

  18. ‚  Subjectivity of class: consciousness movments, and class Victory of proletariat Class society struggle F 1970 F 1950 Decommodification F 1982 F 1890 F 1830 F 1989 Recommodification F 2000 Alienation classless society „ ƒ Objectivity of class: The historical social classes spiral Intensity of Inequalities

  19. 3. The middle class dynamics and Welfare state expansions and retrenchments • Back to Schmoller : the state and the “new middle class(es)” • Post-affluent societies: the lost paradise of the new middle class • The fate of generational dynamics

  20. Higher strata Economic Ressources Educational ressources Lower Strata • The state and the “new middle class” SCHMOLLER G. 1897, Was verstehen wir unter dem Mittelstande? Hat er im 19. Jahrhundert zu oder abgenommen?, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. Against the Marxist theory of absolute pauperization : => Late Nineteenth century and the expansion of large state and private technical, managerial and expertise bureaucracies – supported and institutionalized by increasing social rights – foster the constitution of a culturally educated and economically comfortable “neu mittelstand” New higher middle class => The state is not simply an equalitarian ruler, a provider of decommodified resources, it could be also a specific employer Old higher middle class New lower middle class Old lower middle class

  21. Higher strata Economic Ressourcesdominant Educational ressourcesdominant Lower Strata The Bourdieu scheme • Post-affluent societies: the lost paradise of the new middle class Professions libérales Professeurs, professions scientifiques Cadres de la Ingénieurs Cadres Chefs d'entreprises fonction pub. administratifs Instituteurs ou de 10 salariés et plus d'entreprise assimilés Professions Professions Professions intermédiaires de la intermédiaires intermédiaires santé et du travail administratives administratives de la social entreprises Employés Commerçants fonction publique Techniciens Contremaîtres, Employés fonc pub, Employés entreprises agents de maîtrise Policiers et militaires agents de service Artisans Personnels des Ouvriers qualifiés de Ouvriers qualifiés, services directs aux particuliers type industriel manutention, Ouvriers qualifiés de magasinage, Chauffeurs Ouvriers non qualif transport industriel artisanal Ouvriers agricoles

  22. 1992 to 2002 densification on the Bourdieu scheme 50 to 59 Years old 30 to 39 Years old

  23. Available explanations ? • Decline in the return to educational assets (and not to economic assets) — is it really a “knowledge society”? • State as an employer is more and more a state as a pension system for former civil servants (strong decline in hiring for the newer generations) • The fate of generational dynamics: the newer generations are the children of a gifted generation (first cohorts of the baby-boom) which was massively new middle-class, but the newer generations have little room in the “new” middle-class

  24. Upward and downward mobility rate (cohort diagrams) - male population Upward mob rate Downward mob rate 14 35 % % Age Age 30 30 12 30 35 35 40 40 10 25 45 45 50 50 8 20 6 15 4 10 5 2 Cohorte Cohorte 0 0 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 • The fate of generational dynamics first cohorts of the baby-boom their parents their children

  25. 4. Conclusion: Farewell to the “new” middle class? • What is ever “new” with new middle class, 1 century later? • A social backlash after affluence? • Which consequences? • Which are the adequate social policies:feeding the poor (bread and circuses), or rehomogeneisation of Europe? • Were are sociologists in terms of new/old higher/lower middle class : are we the next slice of the salami?

  26. Semi-plenary session: “Role of the state in reduction/amplification of inequality” • THE END • Louis ChauvelPr at Sciences-Po University Paris and Institut Universitaire de France • Site : http://louis.chauvel.free.fr • chauvel@sciences-po.fr

More Related