China’s anti-pirate activity in Horn of Africa

1. China’s anti-pirate activity in Horn of Africa Liu Weidong

2. Background • 75% of China’s oil import is from Middle East and Africa. • 2000 Chinese ships pass through the Gulf of Aden and horn of Africa each year. • Economic losses caused by Somali pirates are between 7-12 billion annually. • UN Security Council passed resolution 1816 in 2/6/2008, which calls on international cooperation on anti pirate and has prolonged it twice till now. • From 5/2008 on, senior officials from France, Spain, Germany have respectively encouraged Chinese government to dispatch warships to this area. • 11/2008, Both Foreign Minister of Somali Transitional Government and its ambassador to China issued invitation to China. • At the end of Nov., soldiers in Zhenghe training ship made an anti pirate drill。 • 12/20/2008, Chinese Department of Defense and Foreign Affairs declared simultaneously that China will dispatch a fleet to escort in Somali sea area.

3. General Mission • Security of vessels and crews passing through Gulf of Aden and Somali sea area. • Security of vessels of international organizations such as World Food Programme which conveying humanitarians aid materials. • Cooperating with warships from other countries to escort in this area to keep peace and stability. • Participating in humanitarian relief activities when necessary.

4. Primary process • First formation, 12/26/2008 from Sanya, missile destroyer Wuhan and Haikou , combined with comprehensive supply ship Weishanhu.

5. Second formation, 4/2/2009 from Zhanjiang, destroyer Shenzhen, frigate Huangshan and Weishanhu.

6. Third formation, 7/16/2009 from Zhoushan, frigate Zhoushan and Xuzhou, with supply ship Qiandaohu.

7. Forth formation, 10/30/2009 from Zhoushan, frigate Maanshan and Wenzhou, with Qiandaohu.

8. Fifth formation, 3/4/2010 from Sanya, destroyer Guangzhou, frigate Caohu, with Weishanhu.

9. Sixth formation, 6/30/2010 from Zhanjiang, destroyer Lanzhou, landing ship Kunlunshan, with Weishanhu.

10. Seventh formation, 11/2/2010 from Zhoushan, Zhoushan and Xuzhou with Qiandaohu. • Eighth formation, 2/21/2011 from Zhoushan, Wenzhou and Maanshan first joined the seventh formation, then with Qiandaohu. • Ninth formation, 7/2/2011 from Zhanjiang, Wuhan, frigate Yulin with supply ship Qinghaihu joined eighth formation, then escorted independently till now.

11. Achievement • From 12/2008-7/2011, Chinese warships had supplied escort for more than 4000 ships from 50 countries and districts, kept 40 ships from potential attack, and rescue 8 ships kidnapped by pirates. • Evacuate Chinese citizens from Libya. • Successes in cooperation with foreign navy in such a long period. • host an international cooperation and coordination meeting on escort in bay of Aden. • join the united navy formation conduced by U.S., NATO and EU. • propose a subarea escort plan. • construct a mechanism of information share and regular meeting with commanders of foreign formations. • participate in multilateral joint exercise. And etc. • Dropping in many harbors and cities ranging from Africa, Middle East to South East Asia that has never happened before. • Obtain positive appraise from UN, Europe countries, South Korea, even America. (Build up positive image and deliver active messages of cooperation)

12. Strategic Goal • Set up an image of responsible stake holder in the international society. • Secure the important international waterway against disruptive behavior of pirates. • Train and test Chinese Navy’s capability of fighting , cruising and coordinating in far ocean without a solid land logistical support system. • Improve mutual understanding and impress foreign countries favorably by the “Warship Diplomacy”. • Satisfy domestic requirements for involvement of international affair and enhance the cohesions.

13. Policies Analysis • Repeatedly emphases on the importance of authorization from UN and the agreement of the Somali government means China neither wants to change her long-insisting policy of no interference in internal affairs nor hopes to stir up more uncomfortable feelings among those who have vigilance on her navy’s modernization. • All warships dispatched are modern models and made in China. It reflects the government expects to test the reliability of self-made equipments and inspires the people and shows state power by this expedition. • Driving away instead of direct conflict with the pirates shows that the government is more prudent in using forces abroad, especially when this may lead to a more complicated situation in area of which Chinese ships can not get efficient protection. • Information sharing is important for international cooperation. It indicates they still concern over operations abroad and cooperation with foreign soldiers and are reluctant to take any potential risk. • The warships visited more foreign cities than ever before during and after their escort mission, which is unusual especially when considering their main task. It means Chinese government rates below affairs the same: fight against pirates. develop and improve relations with other countries.

14. Existing Difficulties • Shortage of competent warships results in so high rate of attendance. • Possessing no overseas base makes the escort mission more difficult. • Current policies shows inefficiency comparing with flexible tactics of pirates.

15. Internal Disputes • Whether to undertake the rotating chairman of the international joint fleet? • Whether to establish independent supply bases in riparian states? • Whether to chase pirates to land and destroy their bases?

16. Future expectation • China will continue the escort activity. • China will try to find more effective ways to fight against pirates. • China will cooperate more with foreign countries in various fields.

17. Thank you!