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C.F.I.T. “How did that goat get into this cloud?”. CFIT Definition.
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CFIT Definition • A CFIT accident is “one in which an otherwise serviceable aircraft under the control of the crew is flown unintentionally into terrain, obstacles or water, with no prior awareness on the part of the crew of the impending collision”
Causes of CFIT CFIT occurs in IMC or at night or both Lack of Horizontal position awareness 33% Lack of Vertical position awareness 66%
Risk Factors • Altimeter settings • Incorrect units used (inHg/hPa/mbars) • Incorrect values transcribed from radio communications • Confusion of QNH/QFE settings • Extreme atmospheric conditions • Safe Altitudes • ATC Errors • Be prepared to question • Flight Crew Complacency • Familiarity leads to complacency • Non Precision Approaches • No SOP for GPWS pull up warning
CFIT • Is it a new type of accident? • March 1931 the Southern Cloud (Tri-motor Fokker) crashed 200mls NE Melbourne. Since then over 30,000 pax & crew have lost their lives in CFIT accidents • Half of all early piston engine commercial aircraft accidents were due to CFIT • It can happen at any stage of the flight • Virtually all CFIT accidents involve either: • Error in Navigation • Ineffective monitoring • Failure to follow S.O.P.s
Equipment to reduce CFIT risk • Radio Alt - introduced in late 1960’s • GPWS • SAS Electronics Engineer started concept in Europe • 1971 Voluntarily installed by a number of airlines • 1973 Boeing offered it as a recommended safety device • 1974 Basic part of all Boeing aircraft manufactured • 1975 FAA enacted a rule requiring all large transport aircraft to be fitted • This followed a TWA 727 accident in USA, during a VOR/DME approach, 90 Fatalities • FAA Mandatory Requirement rushed through & UK CAA Follows • MSAW – 1975 software package for ATC detects a/c flying below MSA and enables the controller to warn the crew. Developed for use with ARTS (automatic radar terminal systems) radar capabilities • VASI, PAPI, ILS, VOR, DME,
Early GPWS Doubts • Prior to the introduction the FAA expressed doubts • Would crew become complacent? • If crew followed procedures wasn’t that a sufficient safeguard against CFIT? • In a survey conducted soon after the GPWS installation requirement, 83% of the pilots surveyed expressed concerns about false or nuisance alerts. • Concerns included: • having a midair collision while performing a mandatory pull-up • losing control of the airplane while distracted • ignoring a valid warning because of system credibility problems • ignoring a valid warning through a misunderstanding of the cause of the warning.
GPWS Improvements • Frequency of pull-up warnings • Mark 1 = 1 per 750 sectors • Now = 1 per 5,000-7,000 sectors