Introduction to Ethics Lecture 10 Susan Wolf & Moral Saints

1. Introduction to EthicsLecture 10Susan Wolf & Moral Saints By David Kelsey

2. What is a moral saint? • What is a moral saint? • A person whose every action is as morally good as is possible. • One whose life is dominated by a commitment to improving the welfare of others or of society as a whole. • “…a moral saint must have and cultivate those qualities which are apt to allow him to treat others as justly and kindly as possible. He will have the standard moral virtues to a nonstandard degree. He will be patient, considerate, even-tempered, hospitable, charitable in thought as well as in deed. He will be very reluctant to make negative judgments of other people. He will be careful not to favor some people over others on the basis of properties they could not help but have.” (791)

3. The Loving Saint • The Loving Saint: • A moral saint out of love. • The happiness of the loving saint lies in the happiness of others… • The promotion of the welfare of others would play the role that for most of us is played by the enjoyment of material comforts, the opportunity to engage in the intellectual and physical activities of our choice, and the love, respect, and companionship of people whom we love, respect, and enjoy. (791)

4. The Rational Saint • The Rational Saint: • Derives his happiness in all the things the rest of us derive happiness from. • But he pays little or no attention to his own happiness in light of the overriding importance he gives to the wider concerns of morality. • Sacrifices his own interests to the interests of others. And he feels the sacrifice as such. (791)

5. Problems for the Moral Saint • Why the moral saint is problematic: • In Wolf’s words “…I believe that moral perfection, in the sense of moral saintliness, does not constitute a model of personal well-being toward which it would be particularly rational or good or desirable for a human being to strive.” (790) • So for Wolf, a moral saint is too morally good for his own well being. This is because: • The moral virtues are all present in the same individual and to an extreme degree. Thus they “are apt to crowd out the nonmoral virtues, as well as many of the interests and personal characteristics that we generally think contribute to a healthy, well rounded, richly developed character.” (792) • Thus, if the moral saint is devoting all his time to helping others he won’t have any time to devote to himself. • “…if the moral saint is devoting all his time to feeding the hungry or healing the sick or raising money for Oxfam, then necessarily he is not reading Victorian novels, playing the oboe, or improving his backhand…” (792)

6. Ways the moral saint must beand ways he mustn’t be • Ways the moral saint cannot be: • He cannot encourage the discovery and development of significant non-moral interests and skills. • He cannot encourage in himself any non-moral characteristics that go against the “moral grain”. For example: • A cynical or sarcastic wit… • An interest in gourmet cooking, high fashion… • Ways the moral saint must be: • Should try to look for the best in people, giving them the benefit of the doubt as long as possible. • He will have to be very very nice. He must not be offensive. Thus, he might be dull witted…

7. There is a limit to how much morality we can stand • There seems to be a limit to how much morality we can stand: • Characters we take as moral ideals always have talents or accomplishments in non-moral respects as well. • Katherine Hepburn’s grace • Paul Newman’s cool • Looking for moral ideals in individuals, we look for people whose moral achievements occur in conjunction with or colored by some interests or traits that have low moral tone. (793) • When we look at lives dominated by moral commitments we are relieved to discover idiosyncrasies or eccentricities not quite in line with moral perfection. (792) • Preferring the blunt, tactless, and opinionated Betsy Trotwood to the unfailingly kind and patient Agnes Copperfield. • One prefers the mischievousness and the sense of irony in Chesterton’s Father Brown to the innocence and undiscriminating love of St. Francis.

8. The Moral Saint lacks an identifiable, personal self • Morality doesn’t seem a suitable object for passion: • The desire to be as morally good as possible is apt to have the character not just of a stronger but of a higher desire, which subsumes or demeans every other desire. • “The normal person’s direct and specific desires for objects, activities, and events that conflict with the attainment of moral perfection are not simply sacrificed but removed, suppressed, or subsumed. • The Loving saint might give up his fishing trip, his stereo or his hot fudge sundae at the drop of a moral hat. • And the Rational Saint might have the desire for to fish or to eat the hot fudge sundae but he forgoes any such desire. • So the way in which morality would dominate the moral saint’s life requires either the lack or the denial of the existence of an identifiable, personal self.

9. Concerns about Morality • Concerns about morality: • Is it always better to be morally better? • Wolf’s argument seems to suggest the answer is NO. • Wolf’s point: • Other values besides morality (for example, an interest in the arts or sports,) are important. • The question then is which values are most important and how do we attain the right balance of moral and non-moral values in our lives? • So maybe what we want is a set of principles that allows us more freedom to develop non-moral values. • A theory that will give us “…principles, or, at least, informal directives on the basis of which we can develop and evaluate more comprehensive personal ideals. Perhaps a theory that distinguishes among the various roles a person is expected to play within a life.” (801)