CHRISTMAS DAY 2009: IMPLICATIONS FOR AIRCREW Presented by: PHILIP BAUM WATS/SCSI, ORLAND

1. CHRISTMAS DAY 2009: IMPLICATIONS FOR AIRCREWPresented by: PHILIP BAUMWATS/SCSI, ORLANDO: 28 APRIL 2010

2. WHICH WERE THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ATTACKS POST-9/11? • DEC 2001: RICHARD REID (FAIL/AIRCREW) • NOV 2002: ARKIA (LUCK) • MAY 2003: DAVID MARK ROBINSON (AIRCREW) • AUG 2004: DOMODEDOVO BOMBINGS (FAIL) • SEP 2004: KATO AIR (AIRCREW) • OCT 2006: TIRANA HIJACK (AIRCREW) • JUN 2007: GLASGOW AIRPORT (FAIL/LUCK) • FEB 2008: EAGLE AIR (AIRCREW) • MAR 2008: CHINA SOUTHERN (AIRCREW) • SEP 2009: AEROMEXICO (FAIL/AIRCREW) • DEC 2009: ABDULMUTALLAB (FAIL/AIRCREW) • FEB 2010: AUSTIN (FAIL)

3. SCREENING METHODOLOGIES DESPITE THIS… COMPARE THE HUGE EXPENDITURE IN SCREENING TECHNOLOGIES vs. INVESTMENT IN AIRCREW TRAINING

4. SCREENING METHODOLOGIES • PROBLEM • PROBLEM→SOLUTION • PROBLEM →METHOD →SOLUTION

5. SCREENING METHODOLOGIES SOLUTION FAILS? • YOU DIDN’T UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM • YOU MISUSED THE METHOD • YOU USED THE WRONG METHOD • YOU USED THE WRONG PEOPLE TO USE THE METHOD

6. 25 DECEMBER 2009 A “SYSTEMIC FAILURE”… TO IDENTIFY THE LIKES OF ABDULMUTALLAB • WE DIDN’T UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM • WE USED THE WRONG METHOD = POOR RISK MANAGEMENT

7. REACTIVE SECURITY • UMAR FAROUK ABDULMUTALLAB → - BODY SCANNERS - INFLIGHT RESTRICTIONS - BLACKLISTING CERTAIN COUNTRIES

8. FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT 9/11 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS • Recommendation: The TSA and the Congress must give priority attention to improving the ability of screening checkpoints to detect explosives on passengers. As a start, each individual selected for special screening should be screened for explosives. [emphasis added] (p. 393)

9. METAL DETECTION vs. WHOLE BODY IMAGING • COST: AMD: between $5,000 and $20,000 Millimetre Wave: around $150,000 Backscatter X-ray: between $100k and $200k Transmission: $200,000 • THROUGHPUT RATE: AMD: max. 500 pax per hour (no baggage) MMV/Backscatter: approx. 200 per hour Transmission: 150 per hour

10. CHECKPOINT COST TO PROCESS 10,000 PAX PER HOUR AMD: requires 20 systems, using average equipment COST: $220,000 In comparison: MMV/Backscatter: requires 50 systems @ cost of $7,500,000 TRANSMISSION: requires 67 systems @ cost of approx. $15,000,000

11. BODY SCANNING: BACKSCATTER X-RAY

12. BODY SCANNING: BACKSCATTER X-RAY

13. BODY SCANNING: MILLIMETRE WAVE

14. BODY SCANNING: TRANSMISSION X-RAY

15. RADIATION COMPARISON GROUND LEVEL: 2.4mSv per annum background radiation FLIGHT: Depends upon altitude and latitude; higher at higher altitudes and closer to the Poles. Concorde, 12-15 µSv (microsieverts) p/h; Long haul aircraft, 5 µSv (microsieverts) p/h; Short haul aircraft, 1-3 µSv p/h (BA)

16. RADIATION COMPARISON LIMITS: 20mSv per annum (on average) for Aircrew 1mSv per annum for general public = 200 hours flying per year on subsonic trans-equatorial routes. AS&E (backscatter) reports 0.09 μSv per scan; the dose for a six hour flight is 200 to 400 times larger at 20 μSv. 1 x SOTER RS (transmission) scan is less than 3 μSv. This is approximately equivalent to a one hour subsonic flight at 10,000 m.

17. TRANSMISSION X-RAY COMPARISON According to a Radiation Metrology Report published in the United Kingdom by the Health Protection Agency’s Radiation Protection Division • Assuming 1 Conpass LD scan = approximately 0.25 μSv • 0.25 μSv = 30 minutes of exposure to naturally occurring background radiation in Cornwall in the UK or Denver, Colorado in the USA = I Conpass LD scan • 0.25 μSv = 4g of Brazil nuts ~ consumption of one Brazil nut = 1 Conpass LD scan • 5 μSv single dental X-ray = 20 Conpass LD scans

18. BE VERY AFRAID!!!

19. BODY SCANNING? IF NOT FOR ALL… THEN FOR WHO?

20. WHAT IS PROFILING? A RISK ANALYSIS OF PASSENGERS & SITUATIONS THROUGH A REASONED APPROACH TO SCREENING PERFORMED BY A TRAINED STREETWISE WORKFORCE

21. DISTURBING FACT Every day, immigration and customs officials around the world identify people carrying out illegal acts…AFTER they have got off an aircraft. If we can identify people at that stage, why can’t we do it before they board?

22. DRUG TRAFFICKERS

23. CONCEALEMENT EXERCISE:JULY 2009 • PROJECT MANAGEMENT: - Green Light Ltd., London, UK • SCREENING TECHNOLOGY: - OD Security, The Netherlands • SCREENING PROPS: - Finnish Security Projects, Helsinki - Quelltex Ltd., UK

24. SAUDI SUICIDE BOMBER:27TH AUGUST 2009 • Abdullah Hassan al-Aseeri • Assassination attempt on a Saudi Prince during Ramadan • Flown in to attend meeting with Prince • Fully searched • Internal device detonated by mobile phone

25. WHAT IS PASSENGER PROFILING? APPEARANCE & BEHAVIOUR + PASSPORT + ITINERARY + INTELLIGENCE • + • + • +

26. WHAT IS PROFILING? WE ARE BASELINING... ...and the move towards centralised screening is an impediment to our ability to profile effectively.

27. OBJECTIONS • DISCRIMINATORY Solution: Training • SLOW Solution: It’s not! It’s quicker! • INVASION OF PRIVACY Solution: A necessary evil, just like traffic wardens! • IMPERSONATORS Solution: Far easier to plan to circumvent current checkpoint than pretend to be ‘normal’

28. OBJECTIONS BUT THE REAL HURDLE TO OVERCOME IS THE REGULATOR... • A REGULATORY NIGHTMARE

29. XMAS DAY 2009:BASIC PROFILING • PAID CASH • TICKET BOUGHT IN GHANA; JOURNEY STARTED IN NIGERIA • ALTERED TICKET ONCE PURCHASED • VISA ISSUED IN UK; UK NOT ON ITINERARY • NO LUGGAGE • PREVIOUS TRAVEL TO YEMEN

30. XMAS DAY 2009:WHAT WENT WRONG? • INTELLIGENCE KNOWN…NOT SUFFICIENTLY ANALYSED • FAMILY CUT-OFF (AND FATHERS REPORT)… NOT LINKED TO TRAVEL HISTORY • OLD VISA IN PLACE…NOT REVOKED • SCREENERS DON’T HAVE ACCESS TO PAX DATA • US AGENTS ON GROUND IN AMSTERDAM… NEVER EVEN SPOKE WITH PASSENGER • SCHEDULED FOR INTERVIEW IN DETROIT

31. BOTTOM LINE:IMPLICATIONS FOR AIRCREW • WILL BE LEFT TO RESPOND TO NEXT ATTACK AS GROUND APPROACH FAILS AGAIN • MORE FRUSTRATED PASSENGERS GOING THROUGH “SILLY SECURITY” • GREATER PROPENSITY FOR AIR RAGE • GREATER FOR PROPENSITY FOR OTHER PASSENGERS TAKING THE LAW INTO THEIR OWN HANDS…AND PARANOID AIRCREW! • AIRCREW BEING REPEATEDLY BODY SCANNED

32. BOTTOM LINE:WHAT DO WE NEED TO DO? • PROVIDE BETTER TRAINING • ALERT CREW TO LATEST THREATS/DEVICES • VALUE THEIR OPINION & ENCOURAGE A REPORTING CULTURE • REMEMBER IT WILL BE DIFFERENT NEXT TIME

33. “…distinction between the handling of an IED and a chemical/biological weapon.” “…familiarise crew members with such weaponry.” “Unexpected exposure to an activated chemical/biological weapon within the confines of an aircraft cabin will require quick identification,clear thinking and swift response.” Is this possible without training? ANNEX 6: DOC 9811GUIDANCE NOTES: CHEM/BIO

34. “Perhaps the most important single factor in assuring a successful outcome to a CBW incident is for each crew member to consider in advance how he or she would deal with a genuine CHEM/BIO threat in the airplane.” ANNEX 6: DOC 9811 2.6.21GUIDANCE NOTES: CHEM/BIO

35. JUST TO MAKE IT CLEAR... • PROFILING WOULD HAVE IDENTIFIED THIS PASSENGER…BUT NOT ON GROUNDS OF RACE, RELIGION, GENDER, OR COLOUR OF SKIN • NIGERIANS (AND OTHER COUNTRIES) SHOULD NOT BE SET ASIDE FOR SCREENING BECAUSE OF THEIR PASSPORT …RICHARD REID WAS BRITISH…SO PERHAPS I SHOULD BE SCRENED SPECIALLY!

36. CHRISTMAS DAY 2009: IMPLICATIONS FOR AIRCREWPresented by: PHILIP BAUMWATS/SCSI, ORLANDO: 28 APRIL 2010

37. PHILIP BAUM MANAGING DIRECTOR, GREEN LIGHT LTD.Editor@avsec.com