The Possibility of Social Choice: From Rationality to Public Reason

1. 第七、八講公共合理性：教育管理与治理的实践基础（三）Public Reason: Practical Foundation of Educational Management & Governance (3) 華東師範大學 教育管理學系 教育管理与教育治理的实践基础工作坊

2. The Possibility of Social Choice: From Rationality to Public Reason • Amartya Sen, the Nobel laureate in economics in 1998, in his Nobel Prize Lecture entitle The Possibility of Social Choice, defines social choice as “the choice ‘of the people, by the people, for the people’.” (Sen, 2002, P. 66)

4. The Possibility of Social Choice: From Rationality to Public Reason • The impossibility of social choice: The conventional view in economics about social choice has been dominated by Arrow’s impossibility theorem. Kenneth Arrow, another Nobel Laureate in economics in 1972, indicates that it is practically impossible to arrive at a unanimous consensus on social-preference ordering among a human aggregate in rational, autonomous and democratic fashion. (Arrow, 1950)

5. The Possibility of Social Choice: From Rationality to Public Reason • The impossibility of social choice: …. Therefore, he stipulates that “If we exclude the possibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility, then the only methods of passing from individual tastes to social preferences which will be defined for a wide range of sets of individual orderings are either imposed or dictatorial.” (1950, P. 342)

6. The Possibility of Social Choice: From Rationality to Public Reason • The possibility of social choice: In his Nobel Prize Lecture, Sen reviews his career-long stance of taking issue with the Arrow impossible theorem. That is, he asserts that social choice is possible.

7. The Possibility of Social Choice: From Rationality to Public Reason • He defines his enquiry of social choice in three related questions (Sen, 2002, P. 66) • “How can it be possible to arrive at cogent aggregative judgments about the society (for example, about ‘social welfare,’ or ‘the public interest,’ or aggregate poverty’), given the diversity of preferences, concerns, and predicaments of the different individuals within the society?” • “How can we find any rational basis for making such aggregative judgment as ‘the society prefers this to that,’ or ‘the society should choose this over that,’ or ‘this is socially right’? • “Is reasonable social choice at all possible, especially since…there are ‘as many preferences as there are people’?”

8. Distinction between Rational and Reasonable Persons • John Rawls’s distinction between reasonable persons and rational persons • “Persons are reasonablein one basic aspect when, among equals say, they are ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so. ….The reasonable is an element of the idea of society as a system of fair cooperation and that its fair terms be reasonable for all to accept is part of its idea of reciprocity.” (1993, 49-50)

10. John Rawls’s distinction… “The rational is, however, a distinct idea from the reasonable and applied to a single, unified agent (either an individual or corporate person) with the powers of judgment and deliberation in seeking ends and interests peculiarly its own. The ration applies to how these ends and interests are adopted and affirmed, as well as to how they are given priority. It also applies to the choice of means, in which case it is guided by such familiar principles as: to adopt the most effective means to ends, or to select the most probable alternative, other things equal.” (1993, p. 50) Distinction between Rational and Reasonable Persons

11. John Rawls’s distinction … More specifically, “what rational agents lack is the particular form of moral sensibility that underlies the desire to engage in fair cooperation. …Rational agents approach being psychopathic when their interests are solely in benefits to themselves.” (1993, p. 51) As in everyday speech, we may characterize rational agents that “their proposal was perfectly rational given their strong bargaining position, but it was nevertheless highly unreasonable.” (1993, 48) Distinction between Rational and Reasonable Persons

12. John Rawls’s distinction … In light of Rawls’ distinction, practical reason can then be construed as reasons that reasoning agents attributed to their actions. It goes beyond the principle of rationality and means-end calculation. It conforms to the principle of reciprocity and fairness, which members of a given community mutually accepted. Distinction between Rational and Reasonable Persons

13. John Rawls’s distinction … Accordingly, practical reason can be defined as human capacity to attribute their actions to The principle of rationality, The principle of reciprocity, and/or even The principle of fairness Distinction between Rational and Reasonable Persons

14. Amartya Sen’s distinction between rationality and reason From economics point of view, Amartya Sen has made a more specific distinction between the rational person and reasonable persons. He underlines that in mainstream economics, rational persons is “characterized by intelligent pursuit of self-interest”. More specifically, “it has … been assumed that they must also be the detached from others, so that they are completely unaffected by the well-being or achievement of others.” (Sen, 2009, P. 188) Distinction between Rational and Reasonable Persons

15. Amartya Sen’s distinction between rationality and reason In his article entitled “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory”, (1977) he stipulates that human can make choice and action not in accordance with the self-interest pursuant rationality. He suggests that human may choice and act on the bases of “sympathy” or “commitment”. Distinction between Rational and Reasonable Persons

17. Amartya Sen’s distinction between rationality and reason …. By sympathy, It “refers to one person’s welfare being affected by the position of others’ (for example, a person can feel depressed at the sight of misery of others)” (Sen, 2009, P. 188) By commitment, it is “concerned with breaking the tight link between individual welfare and the choice of action”. That is doing what can be done to remove the misery of others without considering one’s own welfare, …”that is a clear departure from self-interest behavious.” (Sen, 2009, P. 188-89) Distinction between Rational and Reasonable Persons

18. Amartya Sen’s distinction … Furthermore, Sen underlines that “Adam Smith, the father of modern economics…is often wrongly thought to be a proponent of the assumption of the exclusive pursuit of self-interest, in the form of the so-called ‘economic man’.” (Sen, 2009, P. 185) Sen points out that it is only in explaining “the motivation for economic exchange in the market” that Smith underscored human’s predisposition of self-interest pursuit. In fact, Smith has distinguished clearly reasons other than egoistic self-interest pursuit in explaining human’s choice and action, for example, sympathy, generosity and public spirit. (Sen, 2009, P. 185) Distinction between Rational and Reasonable Persons

19. Amartya Sen’s distinction between rationality and reason In contrast to narrow-minded self-interest pursuant rationality, Sen agrees with Rawls that humans are capable of reasoning in wider context and with variety of criteria (not confine to egoistic self-interest), to scrutinize one’s thoughts and action as objectively and impartially as possible, and ready to submit one’s erroneous decision or act to stronger evidence and/or better arguments. In his own words, … Distinction between Rational and Reasonable Persons

20. Amartya Sen’s distinction between rationality and reason …. In his own words, he characterizes “reasonable persons” as “capable of being reasonable through being open-minded about welcoming information and through reflecting on argument coming from different quarters, along with undertaking interactive deliberations and debates on how the underlying issues should be seen.” (Sen, 2009, P. 43) Distinction between Rational and Reasonable Persons Fair & Reciprocal Deliberative & Reflective

21. Elinor Ostrom, Nobel Laureate in economics in 2009, also examines the behavioral base of rational choice and collective action from a different methodological and theoretical perspective. Distinction between Rational and Reasonable Persons

22. Elinor Ostrom…. In her presidential address, American Political Science Association, 1997, entitled “A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action’” (2014/1997), Ostrom presents her evidences accumulated from decades of laboratory experiments on game theory. And to up with the conclusion that in social dilemmas, such as the prisoners’ dilemma, reasonable persons may find the solution to escape from the loss-loss situation and arrive at mutual beneficial solution. Distinction between Rational and Reasonable Persons

23. Elinor Ostrom…. Ostrom categorizes her theory as the second-generation models of rationality: She indicates that in the first-generation model of rational choice, theorists simply accept as given the fact that “individual are boundedly rational, they do not calculate a complete set of strategies for every situation they face.” It is because they cannot have obtained complete information on all potential actions, all outcomes, and all strategies of their partners. (Strom, 2014, P. 136) Distinction between Rational and Reasonable Persons

24. Elinor Ostrom…. Ostrom ….second-generation models of rationality: Learnt heuristics: Ostrom underlines that “in field situations (such as laboratory experiments), individuals tend to use heuristics─rules of thumb─that they have learned over time regarding responses that tend to give them good outcomes in particular kinds of situation.” (Ostrom, 2014, P. 136) In short, individuals will reason out and “learn heuristics that approach best-response strategies.” (P. 137) Distinction between Rational and Reasonable Persons

25. Elinor Ostrom…. Ostrom ….second-generation models of rationality: Internalized norms: Furthermore, these learnt instrumental heuristics may sediment into norms and values in repeated situations over time. Ostrom suggests that “by norm I mean that the individual attaches an internal valuation─positive or negative─to taking particular types of action.” (Ostrom, 2014, P. 137) Within a particular societal and physical milieu, a set of prominent norms and values will sediment into culture and they will be socialized and internalized from generations to generations. Distinction between Rational and Reasonable Persons

26. Elinor Ostrom…. Ostrom ….second-generation models of rationality: Institutionalized rules: “By rule I mean that a group of individuals has developed shared understandings that certain actions in particular situations must , must not, or may be undertaken and that sanction will be taken against those who do not conform.” (P. 137) As a result, strategic situations of social dilemma will be institutionalized into typified course of actions and routines, which expected outcomes can be taken granted. Distinction between Rational and Reasonable Persons

27. Elinor Ostrom…. Ostrom ….second-generation models of rationality: Reciprocity: With refers to human’s capability to learn heuristics, to internalize norms and to institutionalize rules, human beings can maintain a state of reciprocity with their fellow humans. By reciprocity, Ostrom refers to “a family of strategies that can be used in social dilemmas involving (1) an effort to identify who else is involved, (2) an assessment of the likelihood that others are conditional cooperators, (3) a decision to cooperate initially with others if others are trusted to be conditional cooperators, (4) a refusal to cooperate with those who do not reciprocate, and punishment of those who betray trust.” (Ostrom, 2014, P. 138) Distinction between Rational and Reasonable Persons

28. Elinor Ostrom…. Ostrom ….second-generation models of rationality: … Taken together, Ostrom has built a model of core relationship in collective action as follow Distinction between Rational and Reasonable Persons

29. (Source: Ostrom, 2014, P.144)

30. Elinor Ostrom…. Ostrom ….second-generation models of rationality: … To incorporate some of the exogenous variables into the core-relationship model, the model can be elaborated as follows Distinction between Rational and Reasonable Persons

31. (Source: Ostrom, 2014, P.144)

32. Is Social Choice or Public Reason Possible? A Matter of How Arrow’s Rational & Autonomous man Rawls ‘Reasonable, Fair and Reciprocal man Social Choice or Public Reason is Possible Sen’s Deliberative, Reflective & Impartial man Ostrom’s Trusting & Rrustworthy man

33. In the previous section we have explicated some main theses explaining “how” social choice of preferences and rational choice of collective action are possible. In this section, we will explicate the substantive choices and actions actually taken by human aggregate or societies. That is to review some prominent theses which attempt to vindicate what should be the preferable, desirable, morally right and/or political legitimate “choices” that a society should choose in a particular public-policy domain. Substantive Theories of Practical Reason and Public Reason

34. Levels of evaluation: The substantive contents of social choice, especially choice among different value stances i.e. evaluation, may be differentiated into three levels of evaluation. Ronald Dworkin has made a distinction between three levels of value. ….. Substantive Theories of Practical Reason and Public Reason

36. Levels of evaluation: ….Ronal Dworkin …..suggests that “ethnics studies how people best manage their responsibility to live well, and personal morality what each as an individual owes other people. Political morality, in contrast, studies what we all together owe others as individuals when we act in and on behalf of that artificial collective person.” (Dworkin, 2011, Pp. 327-8) Substantive Theories of Practical Reason and Public Reason

37. Levels of evaluation: …… Accordingly, evaluation may be categorized into Ethical evaluation: It refers to desirable traits and features attributed to human behaviors, actions, and conducts at individual level. It concerns questions such as, What is a righteous character? What is a virtuous person? What is the worth in life? What is an ethical conduct? … Substantive Theories of Practical Reason and Public Reason

38. Levels of evaluation: …… Accordingly, evaluation may be categorized into … Moral evaluation: It refers to desirable traits and features attributed to human interactions and relationships among fellows humans. It concerns questions such as, What is a fair deal? What is worth in friendship? What is good husband and/or wife? What is good teacher and/or student? Substantive Theories of Practical Reason and Public Reason

39. Levels of evaluation: … Political values: It refers to the ethical and moral values taken by a given society as of prominent importance that they should be imposed onto all members of that society coercively. Accordingly, discourse of political value entails the legitimacy of a public authority (the modern state) in substantiating those prominent values onto the civil society which falls under its sovereignty. More specifically, it relates to sound and legitimate public policies in various public domains, such as education, social welfare, health care, etc. Substantive Theories of Practical Reason and Public Reason

40. In the field of moral and political philosophy, there are varieties of perspectives trying to vindicate the substantive content of “good” at individual ethnical level, social moral level, and public political level. For examples, Emotivism or libertarianism Consequentialism or utilitarianism Deontological perspective Perspective of virtue ethics Perspective of historical institutionalism Perspective of realization-focused comparison Substantive Theories of Practical Reason and Public Reason

41. John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice

42. The backgrounds and significance of Rawls’ theory of justice: John Rawls’s book A Theory of Justice has been characterized as a deontological perspective of practical reasoning. More specifically, his formulations have been categorized as a Kantian approach to the question of what is good society. John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice

43. The backgrounds Kant’s concept of categorical imperative Kant stipulates that in a course of action, “I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.” (Kant, 1996, p. 57) ‘Universal’ here means “an action is morally permissible if you would be willing to have everyone act as you are proposing to act. An action is morally wrong if you are not willing to have everyone act as you are proposing to act.” (Rogerson, 1991, p. 108) John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice

44. The backgrounds G.A. Cohen, one of the outright critics of Rawls’ theory of justice, underlines that John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice

45. The backgrounds G.A. Cohen, … “The publication of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice in 1971 was a watershed. …Before A Theory of Justice appeared, political philosophy was dominant by utilitarianism, the theory that sound social policy aims at the maximization of welfare. Rawls found two features of utilitarianism repugnant. He objected, first, to its aggregative character, its unconcern about the pattern of distribution of welfare, which means that inequality in its distribution calls for no justification. …… John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice

46. The backgrounds G.A. Cohen……. ….But, more pertinently… Rawls also objected to the utilitarian assumption that welfare is the aspect of a person’s condition which commands normative attention. He recommended normative evaluation with new arguments (goods instead of welfare quanta) and new function (equality instead of aggregation) from those arguments to values.” (Cohen, 2011, P. 44; see also, Cohen, 2008, Pp. 11-14) John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice

47. Conception of Justice as Fairness : John Rawls formulate his theory of justice from the idea of “Justice as Fairness”, which was published in the form of a journal article in Philosophical Review, vol. 64, no. 1, Pp. 164-194 in 1958. He wrote in the paper that John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice

48. Conception of Justice as Fairness: John Rawls formulate his theory of justice from the idea of “Justice as Fairness”, which was published in the form of a journal article in Philosophical Review, vol. 64, no. 1, Pp. 164-194 in 1958. He wrote in the paper that “It might seem at the first sight that the concepts of justice and fairness are the same, and that there is no reason to distinguish them, or to say that one is fundamental than the other. I think that this impression is mistaken. In this paper I wish to show that fundamental idea in the concept of justice is fairness; and I wish to offer an analysis of the concept of justice from this point of view.” (Rawls, 1999[1958], p. 42) John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice

49. Justice as fairness: …. The meaning of fairness: “Fundamental to justice is the concept of fairness which relates to right dealing between persons who are cooperating with or competing against one another, as when one speak of fair games, fair competition, and fair bargains. The question of fairness arises when free persons, who have no authority over one another, are engaging in a joint activity and among themselves settling or acknowledging the rules which define it and which determine the respective shares in its benefits and burdens. …. John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice

50. Justice as fairness: …. The meaning of fairness: “….. A practice will strike the parties as fair if none feels that, by participating in it, they or any of the others are taken advantage of, or forced to give in to claims which they do not regard as legitimate. This implies that each has a conception of legitimate claims which he thinks it reasonable for others as well as himself to acknowledge. …A practice is just or fair, then, when it satisfies the principles which those who participate in it could propose to one anotherfor mutual acceptance under aforementioned circumstances.” (Rawls, 1999[1958], p. 59) John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice