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Secure Anonymous Authentication Scheme with Roaming for Mobile Networks. sPEAKER : Hong- Ji Wei Date: 2012-12-28. Outline. Introduction Review of Kim et al.’s Scheme Weakness of Kim et al.’s Scheme Our Improved Scheme Security Analysis Conclusion. 1. Introduction (1/2).
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Secure Anonymous Authentication Scheme with Roaming for Mobile Networks sPEAKER: Hong-Ji Wei Date: 2012-12-28
Outline Introduction Review of Kim et al.’s Scheme Weakness of Kim et al.’s Scheme Our Improved Scheme Security Analysis Conclusion
1. Introduction (1/2) Mun et al. proposed an anonymous authentication scheme with roaming for mobile networks on February, 2012. Unfortunately, Kim et al. pointed out that Mun et al.'s scheme contains two weaknesses which is replay attack and man-in-the-middle attack on July, 2012. In order to improve these weaknesses, they proposed an improved roaming authentication scheme with anonymity.
1. Introduction (2/2) In this paper, we analyze Kim et al.’s scheme and point out the weakness in existence. At the same time, we also propose an enhanced roaming authentication scheme to overcome the weakness of Kim et al.’s scheme.
2. Review of Kim et al.’s Scheme (2/5) This scheme contains three main phases 1. Registration 2. Authentication and key establishment 3. Update session key
2. Review of Kim et al.’s Scheme (3/5) Registration MU HA Secure Channel Secure Channel
2. Review of Kim et al.’s Scheme (4/5) Authentication and key establishment MU FA HA
2. Review of Kim et al.’s Scheme (5/5) Update session key MU FA
3. Weakness of Kim et al.’s Scheme (1/3) The weakness of Kim et al.'s scheme can be found in two phases. 1. Authentication and establishment of session key 2. Update session key
3. Weakness of Kim et al.’s Scheme (2/3) Authentication and establishment of session key MU FA HA Replay attack
3. Weakness of Kim et al.’s Scheme (3/3) Update session key MU FA Replay attack
4. Our Improved Scheme (1/3) Registration MU HA Secure Channel Secure Channel
4. Our Improved Scheme (2/3) Authentication and establishment of session key MU FA HA
4. Our Improved Scheme (3/3) Update session key FA MU
5.Security Analysis (1/3) Authentication and establishment of session key MU FA HA Replay
5.Security Analysis (2/3) Update session key FA MU Replay
5.Security Analysis (3/3) Comparison table
6.Conclusion (1/1) In this paper, we propose an enhanced anonymous scheme to improve the weakness of replay attack in Kim et al.'s scheme. From the security analysis, we can know that our scheme indeed can prevent the replay attack in Authentication and establishment of session key and update session key phases.
Q & A Many thanks for your listening
Hong-Ji's Scheme (1/3) Registration MU HA Secure Channel Secure Channel
Hong-Ji's Scheme (2/3) Authentication and key establishment MU FA HA
Hong-Ji's Scheme (3/3) Update session key MU FA
Hong-Ji's Scheme (2/3) Authentication and key establishment MU FA HA
Hong-Ji's Scheme (3/3) Update session key MU FA