Game Rules

1. Game Rules • Rule #1: • The number of objects left in the bowl at the end of every 10 seconds will double. (max: 14) • Rule #2: • The object of the game is for the players to acquire as many objects as possible. • Rule #3: • Players cannot communicate with each other

2. Dollar Auction • I will auction off a dollar in class today • Rules: • Both the highest bidder and the previous highest bidder have to pay their bids

3. International trends • In 1971, Italy’s population - 54 million • Bangladesh had 66 million people in a smaller area (size of Wisconsin) • In 2000, Italy’s population stabilized at 57 million • Bangladesh population doubled to 132 million, and still growing

4. International trends • Italians now among world’s wealthiest & best educated. • Bangladeshi children are mostly underfed, unemployment is high, and literacy rate is low (65 percent are illiterate). • Bangladeshis emigrants not welcome in India (also overcrowded). ~ ½ size of U.S., almost 4x number of people • Why don’t Bangladeshis, like Italians, stop self-destructive overpopulation?

5. Defining Social Dilemmas • Social Dilemma: • A situation in which individuals profit from selfishness unless everyone chooses the selfish alternative, in which case everyone loses. • Individuals must choose between maximizing their personal outcomes and maximizing their group’s outcomes

6. Bonnie and Clyde Arrested! • Bonnie and Clyde have been arrested for suspected bank robbery, but the police has little evidence • The police offered them immunity from prosecution for a confession • If both stay silent then both get a short sentence on a minor charge • If both blame other then both receive a moderate sentence • If only one blames the other then that criminal goes free and the remaining criminal gets a long sentence

7. Prisoner’s Dilemma Bonnie 1 year Parole Life 1 year Clyde Life 20 Years Parole 20 Years

8. Cooperate? Compete? What’s the Dilemma? • This a social dilemma—there is no perfect choice. • The best outcome occurs if both individuals cooperate and remain quiet. • But the best individual outcome comes from confessing. • Many social dilemmas pit individual against group interests.

9. Focus on Social Dysfunction: Tragedy of the Commons • Garrett Hardin (1968) noted common pastures in New England were often overgrazed. • Each individual who shared a common pasture faced a dilemma: • Adding another animal could help him/her. • However, if everyone did this, the common pasture would be quickly ruined.

11. Focus on Social Dysfunction: Tragedy of the Commons • Replenishing Resource Management Dilemma: a situation in which group members share a renewable resource that will: • Continue to produce benefits if group members don’tover-harvest, but • Each person profits from harvesting as much as possible.

12. 24 18 12 6 0 If students kept pool in top quarter, points replenished rapidly (1 every 6 sec) If they took points too fast, replenishment slowed

13. 24 Down to 12 sec in second quarter 18 When last point taken, the game was over 12 6 18 sec in third quarter 0 24 sec in 4th quarter

14. U.S. energy use as % of world total U.S. population as % of world total

15. “Goals” of Social Dilemmas • Gain immediate satisfaction • Defending ourselves and others • Reproduction

16. 1. Gaining Immediate Satisfaction • Social trap situation where individuals or groups are drawn towards immediate rewards that later prove to have unpleasant or lethal consequences

17. 1. Gaining immediate satisfaction • How can we change the consequences of short-sighted behavior? • Change the timing of rewards & punishments • Use alternative technologies to change long-term negative consequences • Move future negative consequences into present • Add immediate punishments for undesirable behavior • Reinforce more desirable alternatives

18. Will any one strategy work? Type of Intervention Motive Activated Example Fear Loss of educational benefits for families having too many children Command-and Control Tax rebates for consumers who purchase solar heating panels Organization appeals for people to write Congress in support of wilderness preservation Greed Market-based Voluntarist Social Responsibility

19. 2. Defending ourselves and others • Defensive behavior in response to group conflict often has unintended negative consequences

20. Research Study: Threats • Participants could win/lose $$ by making “truck deliveries” on either direct or circuitous routes • Could cooperate or compete (blocking) with opponent • Most $$ by cooperating on direct route

21. The Trucking Game • Each company has indirect route • A shared one lane short route • Best solution is cooperation to go one at a time on the shared route ACME Start ACME Destination BOLT Start BOLT Destination

22. The Trucking Game • Each company has indirect route • A shared one lane short route • Best solution is cooperation to go one at a time on the shared route ACME Start Start A Destination A ACME Destination BOLT Start Destination B BOLT Destination

23. The Trucking Game • Each company has indirect route • A shared one lane short route • Best solution is cooperation to go one at a time on the shared route ACME Start Start A Destination A ACME Destination BOLT Start Destination B BOLT Destination

24. Research Study: Threats • Participants could win/lose $$ by making “truck deliveries” on either direct or circuitous routes • Could cooperate or compete (blocking) with opponent • Most $$ by cooperating on direct route • Opponent’s strategy: • Punitive deterrent severe punishment if blocked • Nonpunitive deterrent mild punishment, switched back to cooperative • Turn-the-other-cheek  no punishment ever

25. Non-punitive deterrentis similar to “Tit-for-Tat” - rewards cooperation, punishes defection Thepunitive strategystarted out successfully, but over time it made the opponent angry and elicited costly counter-attacks 12 10 Non-punitive deterrent 8 Average Payoff Earned 6 Punitive deterrent 4 Turn-the-other-cheek 2 0 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 15 trial blocks

26. 2. Defending ourselves and others • Complex thinking in leaders goes down as conflict goes up • Likelihood of failing at social dilemmas increases

27. The Dollar Game • A game in which a group bids for a dollar, but in which second bidder also has to pay. • Bidders begin seeking easy reward, but end up desperately trying to avoid loss. • Bids sometimes go as high as $20(Teger, 1980) • Real world example? • U.S. / U.S.S.R. arms race

28. 1947 - U.S. Sen. Edward Johnson - “God almighty in his infinite wisdom dropped the A-bomb in our lap” 1948 - General Carl Spatz - predicted nukes would lead to “lasting peace” 1949 - Russians also blessed with the A-bomb 1952 - Americans developed more powerful H-bomb, Russians followed shortly 1950s- U.S. military concerned Russians had more nukes, feverishly built B-52 bombers 1961 - Americans 600 nuke bombers Russians 190 1964 - Americans 800 ICBMs Russians 200 1969- Americans – 4200 nukes Russians - 1300 The Dollar Game

29. Center dot represents total firepower of all bombs dropped during WWII including Nagasaki and Hiroshima All the other dots represent firepower of world’s nuclear weapons by 1981

30. Defending ourselves and others • What can we do to interrupt these dilemma spirals? • One strategy = GRIT (Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension-reduction) • Publicly challenge the opponent to match your de-escalations. • Used successfully by Kennedy on Kruschev, and Gorbachev on Reagan.

31. 3. Reproduction • According to natural selection, the implicit goal is to get more stuff in order to further reproductive ends • (e.g., more kids, kids that survive longer) • The outcome of this goal may be the root of all major problems facing us today • “No technical solution can rescue us from the misery of overpopulation. Freedom to breed will bring ruin to all.” – Garrett Hardin

32. What is the biggest problem facing the world? SOCIAL DILEMMAS Overpopulation Dwindling Natural Resources Economic Problems Political and Military Conflict

33. State of the World 6 5 Human population of world (Billions) 4 3 2 1 0 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 YEAR

34. Pop: 132 million

35. What can we do? • Recognize social dilemmas • Resist ineffective interventions (e.g., punitive deterrent, turn-other-cheek) • Education and population control • Change salient goals (esp. away from immediate satisfaction) • Put tradition in its place • Recognize there are no simple solutions