LEZIONE 3 Tassazione del risparmio e degli investimenti in economia chiusa e aperta

1. LEZIONE 3 Tassazione del risparmio e degli investimenti in economia chiusa e aperta Tassazione internazionale delle società - PARTE I Clamep8 crediti – 50 ore27.9.2010-2.11.2010

2. Effetti sul risparmio e sugli investimenti di una imposta sui redditi di capitale (economia chiusa) r S (p-rn)/ p = cuneo fiscale % p=MPC r0 Cuneo fiscale rn =MRS I I1 I0 S,I (NB ipotesi che il risparmio sia canalizzato solo nell’acquisto di beni capitali)

3. Cuneo fiscale sul risparmio e sugli investimenti

4. Tassazione del risparmio e degli investimenti • In economia chiusa sia che si tassi il risparmio, sia che si tassino gli investimenti, un’imposta sul reddito di capitale: • introduce un cuneo tra rendimenti lordi (sull’investimento) e netti (sul risparmiatore) • riduce S e I • Nel caso della tassazione del risparmio si può annullare questo cuneo con ET (CFT o PPT). • Nel caso degli investimenti il ragionamento è un po’ più complesso, ma vi sono comunque sistemi neutrali (vedi lezione 2).

5. Principi di tassazione internazionale dei redditi di capitale: principio di residenza • Principio di residenza: i redditi percepiti all’estero sono tassati nel paese di residenza del percettore, alla stessa aliquota a cui sono tassati i redditi di origine interna rH (1-tH) =rF (1-tH) rH=rF=r • Si uguagliano anche i rendimenti lordi: è rispettata la Capital export neutrality (CEN) • La CEN garantisce una efficiente allocazione internazionale dello stock di capitale (il capitale va dove è più produttivo e non dove è meno tassato) • Perché si realizzi è necessario poter accertare i redditi esteri

6. Residence principle and CEN (Griffith et al, 2008) • A pure residence-based tax gives us capital export neutrality (CEN) - investments from the UK are treated the same for tax purposes regardless of the destination. • While consistent residence-based taxation ensures CEN, this type of neutrality may also be attained even if source countries tax the income from inbound investment, provided residence countries offer a full credit for foreign taxes against the domestic tax bill (vedi dopo).

7. Principi di tassazione internazionale dei redditi di capitale: principio di fonte • Principio di fonte: i redditi esteri sono tassati solo nel paese fonte (esenzione nel paese di residenza) rH (1-tH) =rF (1-tF) • Si uguagliano solo i rendimenti netti: è rispettata la Capital import neutrality (CIN) • La CIN garantisce un’efficiente allocazione internazionale del risparmio • Ma i capitali tendono a muoversi dove le aliquote sono più basse: c’è incentivo alla concorrenza fiscale • In presenza di aliquote diverse, il rendimento lordo è diverso e la CEN è violata (non c’è una allocazione efficiente del capitale)

8. Source principle and CIN (Griffith et al, 2010) • A pure source-based tax gives us capital import neutrality (CIN) - investment into the UK is treated the same for tax purposes regardless of the country of origin. CIN is achieved when foreign and domestic investors in a given country are taxed at the same effective rate and residence countries exempt foreign income from domestic tax.

9. Ancora su CEN e CIN (Devereux, 2010) • CEN implies that • the international tax system will not distort the location decisions of any individual investor, • the pre-tax rate of return in all jurisdictions will be the same (production will be efficiently organized), but • investors in different jurisdictions may face different post-tax rates of return on their investment, and hence different incentives to save. • CIN implies that • the marginal pre-tax rates of return will differ across jurisdictions (there will not be production efficiency), but • investors in different jurisdictions will face the same post-tax rate of return on each of their investments, and hence all face the same incentive to save.

10. CEN holds in both countries if tAA = tAB and tBA = tBB: that is, each individual investor faces the same effective tax rate on the returns from both assets. In this special case, equalizing post-tax rates of return for either investor will ensure that the pre-tax rates of return from the two assets will also be equal, implying that production will be efficiently organized. In this case as well, both investors can hold both assets—though if their tax rates differ— tAA = tBB—then their post-tax rates of return will also differ. By contrast, CIN holds in both countries if tAA = tBA and tAB = tBB: that is both investors face the same effective tax rate when investing in a single asset. In this case, and assuming that the effective tax rates on the two assets are different from each other, equalization of post-tax rates of return will not generate equalization of pre-tax rates of return. However, the post-tax rates of return faced by each investor will be the same. The distinction between these two notions of neutrality has led to some debate as to which is the more important (see, for example, Keen, 1993). The economic literature has generally favoured CEN, on the grounds that it generates production efficiency (discussed further below), though this has not always met with approval. Thus, for example, McLure (1992) has claimed that: ‘economists have generally favoured CEN because it maximizes global welfare . . . but businessmen generally favor the “level playing field” provided by CIN’. However, through a number of contributions discussed below, the question of the optimal tax structure has now progressed well beyond a simple analysis of CEN and CIN. (Devereux 2010)

11. Principi di tassazione internazionale dei redditi di capitale: la realtà (1) Nella realtà solitamente: • Si applicano sistemi misti. Esempio: • tassazione nel paese fonte, • tassazione nel paese di residenza, • credito per le imposte pagate all’estero • il credito è solitamente limitato alle imposte interne dovute su quel reddito estero (per evitare di dare un rimborso per imposte pagate all’estero). • Se l’aliquota interna è superiore a quella estera, il risultato è uguale a quello che si avrebbe con principio puro di residenza (senza alcuna tassazione alla fonte). E’ però diversa la ripartizione del gettito fra gli stati • Se l’aliquota interna è inferiore a quella estera, non si dà rimborso e l’aliquota rilevante resta quella estera, come nel caso di applicazione del principio di fonte.

12. Principi di tassazione internazionale dei redditi di capitale: la realtà (2) Nella realtà solitamente: • Si applicano sistemi diversi per redditi attività finanziarie e di impresa (investimenti di portafoglio e diretti) • Tendenze: • Tassazione in base al principio di residenza dei redditi derivanti da investimenti diportafoglio esteri (i frutti del risparmio allocato all’estero da parte di un investitore-persona fisica). Soprattutto non si tassano i redditi dei non residenti. La capacità di tassare i redditi esteri dei residenti dipende dalle possibilità di accertamento. • Tassazione con il principio di fonte dei redditi derivanti da investimenti diretti (una sussidiaria estera di una madre residente è tassata nel paese estero e i redditi sono esenti nel paese di residenza della madre; Direttiva UE madri-figlie 435/90/CE lascia in realtà opzione fra credito ed esenzione…)

13. Tassazione del risparmio in economia (piccola) apertaPaese importatore di capitali: tassazione del risparmio in base al principio di residenza r S’ S Importazioni di capitali r* I S1 S0 I0 S, I

14. Tassazione del risparmio in economia (piccola) aperta • Il risparmio interno si riduce (vi è distorsione nelle scelte di risparmio, legata alla tassazione dei redditi di capitale) • Gli investimenti non si riducono • Aumentano infatti le importazioni di capitali dall’estero • HP restrittive: • Capitali perfettamente mobili • Possibilità di accertare i redditi da capitale (interni ed esteri): piena applicazione del principio di residenza • Se invece di tassare il risparmio (in base al principio di residenza), si tassassero gli investimenti (in base al principio di fonte) l’effetto sarebbe molto diverso (diminuirebbero gli investimenti e le importazioni di capitale). • A differenza economia chiusa, in economia aperta non è la stessa cosa tassare il risparmio o gli investimenti.

15. Tassazione degli investimenti in economia (piccola) aperta (principio di fonte) r S Importazioni di capitali rl r* I I’ S0 I1 I0 S, I

16. Tassazione degli investimenti in economia (piccola) aperta • Il risparmio interno non si riduce, ma si riducono gli investimenti • La tassazione alla fonte con aliquote diverse dei profitti può provocare. • Inefficiente allocazione del capitale (il capitale va dove è meno tassato invece di dove è più produttivo) • Concorrenza fiscale per attrarre investimenti esteri • Un indicatore di questa concorrenza fiscale è l’aliquota legale • L’aliquota legale di imposizione societaria è calata notevolmente e la tendenza (come abbiamo visto) non sembra arrestarsi…

17. Sorensen, 2007 “Under the source principle (the return to) capital is taxed only in the country where it is invested. Source-based taxes may therefore be termed taxes on investment. Under the residence principle the tax is levied only on (the return to) the wealth owned by domestic residents, regardless of whether the wealth is invested at home or abroad. Since wealth is accumulated saving, residence-based taxes may also be termed taxes on saving. The most important example of a source-based capital tax is the corporate income tax, since most countries only tax corporate income generated within their borders.In contrast, the personal income tax as well as the personal wealth tax are based on the residence principle, since domestic residents are liable to tax on their worldwide capital income and on wealth invested abroad as well as at home. As a rough approximation, we may therefore say that the corporation tax is a tax on investment,whereas the personal taxes on capital income and wealth are taxes on saving….. ….ma attenzione alle difficoltà di accertamento… (nota 6)

19. Sorensen, 2007 • In an open economy with free international mobility of capital, the twotypes of taxes have very different effects on the domestic economy and oninternational capital flows. This is illustrated in Figure 1 where thehorizontal axis measures the volumes of domestic saving andinvestment,while the vertical axis measures the real rates of return on saving andinvestment. The downward-sloping curve labelled ‘I’ indicates how thelevel of domestic investment varies with the required pre-tax rate ofreturn. The lower is the required return, the greater is the volume ofinvestment which will be deemed profitable. The upward-slopingcurve denoted by ‘S’ shows how the level of domestic saving varies withthe after-tax rate of return. The positive slope of this curve reflects thecommon assumption that a higher after-tax return will induce a highervolume of saving… • …… In Figure 1 a rise in the savingstax tS implies a movement down along the S-curve, leading to a lowervolume of domestic saving and a higher level of capital imports withoutaffecting domestic investment. By contrast, a rise in the investment tax tIreduces the level of domestic investment and leads to lower capital importsbut does not affect domestic saving..

20. Sorensen, 2007 • This analysis has important implications for tax policy. In particular, it shows that if the government of a small open economy wishes to stimulate domestic real investment through lower taxes on capital, it should concentrate on lowering source-based taxes on investment such as the corporation tax. According to Figure 1, a lowering of savings taxes such as the personal taxes on dividends and capital gains on shares will not stimulate domestic investment. Rather, it will stimulate domestic savingand will most likely imply that some shares in domestic companies thatwere previously owned by foreign investors will be taken over by domesticinvestors, thus increasing the share of the domestic business sectorcontrolled by domestic owners. • E’ preferibile (per un’economia piccola e aperta) ridurre l’imposta sulle società (alla fonte), piuttosto che quella sul socio (residenza).

21. Principi di tassazione internazionale dei redditi di capitale e delle società: diversi concetti di neutralità (1) Principio di fonte: CIN Principio di residenza : CEN rH (1-tH) =rF (1-tF) Solo se le aliquote di imposta sono uguali (tH = tF) sono contemporaneamente rispettate la CEN e la CIN

22. Principi di tassazione internazionale dei redditi di capitale e delle società: diversi concetti di neutralità (2) • In assenza di armonizzazione delle aliquote fra paesi: • il rispetto della CEN è ritenuto preferibile al rispetto della CIN per i redditi delle attività finanziarie: • le distorsioni nell’allocazione del flusso di risparmio internazionale (che si ha quando si applica il principio di residenza e sono diversi i rendimenti netti nei diversi paesi) sono ritenute meno importanti (meno penalizzanti in termini di benessere) delle distorsioni nell’allocazione dello stock di capitale; • l’applicazione del principio di residenza (CEN) è coerente con il principio di equità orizzontale; • deve però essere possibile accertare i redditi derivanti da investimentidi portafoglio esteri!

23. Principi di tassazione internazionale dei redditi di capitale e delle società: diversi concetti di neutralità (3) • Per la tassazione degli investimenti sono importanti sia la CIN sia la CEN. • La CIN garantisce che imprese di nazionalità diversa siano tassate in modo uguale quando operano su uno stesso mercato; • la CEN garantisce che la tassazione sia la medesima su un investimento di fonte interna e su uno di fonte estera. • Da qui, altro concetto di neutralità: Capital Ownership neutrality (CON) • Worldwide taxation (con credito pieno) • Esenzione • Occorrerebbe armonizzazione….

24. “The distinction between these two notions of neutrality has led to some debate as to which is the more important (see, for example, Keen, 1993). The economic literature has generally favoured CEN, on the grounds that it generates production efficiency…, though this has not always met with approval. Thus, for example, McLure (1992) has claimed that: “economists have generally favoured CEN because it maximises global welfare ... but businessmen generally favor the ‘level playing field’ provided by CIN”. • However, through a number of contributions discussed below, the question of the optimal tax structure has now progressed well beyond a simple analysis of CEN and CIN.” (Devereux, 2008)

25. Principi di tassazione internazionale dei redditi di capitale e delle società: diversi concetti di neutralità (4) • Da qui, altro concetto di neutralità: Capital Ownership neutrality (CON), che tiene presente la proprietà (la produttività di un asset dipende da chi detiene la proprietà): • Worldwide taxation (con credito pieno) • Esenzione (soddisfa NON: vedi dopo) • Anche CON si presta a diverse interpretazioni: • “A broader interpretation of CON is therefore that one company has no competitive advantage over another as a result of differential effective tax rates depending on ownership” (Devereux, 2008)

26. Principi di tassazione internazionale dei redditi di capitale e delle società: diversi concetti di neutralità (5) • Concetto ancora più generale (che tiene conto del commercio internazionale): Market neutrality • “It is perhaps useful to define a new term - market neutrality – which holds if taxes do not distort competition between companies; that is, one company does not derive a tax-induced competitive advantage over another. It is clear from this analysis that market neutrality would require full harmonisation of source- and residence corporation” (Devereux, 2008) • Occorrerebbe armonizzazione….

27. “ …. in a real-world situation in which there are cross-border flows of portfolio and direct investment, and also international trade, then all traditional forms of taxation would be distorting unless they were completely harmonised”. Michael P. Devereux (Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation), Taxation of Outbound Direct Investment: Economic Principles and Tax Policy Considerations, Paper WP08/24, http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/Tax/publications/working+papers/WP0824.htm

28. “ If effective capital income tax rates were completely harmonised across countries, both CEN and CIN would prevail. When tax rates are not harmonised, so that a choice between the two forms of neutrality has to be made, it has usually been argued that, from a global perspective, CEN should take precedence over CIN, implying a preference for the credit method of international double tax relief. The reasoning is that when investors face the same effective tax rate on foreign and domestic investment, the cross-country equalisation of after-tax rates of return enforced by capital mobility is achieved when the pre-tax rates of return are brought into line. In this way a regime of CEN will tend to equalise the marginal productivities of capital across countries, as required for maximisation of world income. The time-honoured concepts of CEN and CIN were developed by Richman (1963). She also pointed out that from a national as opposed to a global perspective, neither the credit method nor the exemption method of international double tax relief seems optimal……

29. Principi di tassazione internazionale: da NN a NON, passando per CON • In assenza di coordinamento, il singolo paese che agisce individualmente ha come obiettivo la massimizzazione del reddito netto generato dall’investimento estero: • Principio di National Neutrality, che implicherebbe solo la deduzione delle imposte pagate all’estero… • Nella realtà si va invece diffondendo sistema di esenzione…(territoriale) • più coerente con National Ownership Neutrality…

30. ….. From the viewpoint of the individual country, the addition to national income generated by investment abroad is the rate ofreturn after deduction for the foreign source country tax. To maximise national income foreigninvestment should only be carried to the point where its marginal return after payment of foreigntax equals the pre-tax marginal return to domestic investment. Since capital mobility tends toequalize after-tax rates of return, this national optimum is attained when international doubletaxation is (partially) relieved through the deduction method. Under this method the residencecountry taxes foreign income net of foreign taxes at the same rate as domestic income. Such a taxsystem is sometimes said to imply National Neutrality (NN), by making foreign and domesticinvestment equally attractive from a national perspective. rH (1-tH) = rF (1-tF) (1-tH)

31. National Neutrality(optimal policy for an individual government) • Supported by more the formal analysis of Feldstein and Hartman (1979), the key policy prescription is that a government should tax the worldwide income of its residents, treating foreign taxes as a cost (and hence allowing them to be deducted, but not allowing a credit). • The rationale behind this is as follows. Suppose there is a fixed supply of saving, to be allocated between domestic and outbound investment. For the country as a whole, the optimal allocation of investment would equate the ‘social’ rates of return from the two. In a simple framework, the social rate of return to the home country is the return net of foreign taxes but before domestic taxes (since domestic taxes are used to benefit domestic residents). • Hence the post-foreign-tax rate of return on outbound investment should be set equal to the pre-tax rate of return on domestic investment. Private investors, however, will allocate investment to equalize post-tax rates of return. These two allocations are only the same under a worldwide tax system where foreign taxes are deductible from the home-country tax base. (Devereux, 2008)

32. …. In a world with little explicit tax coordination it may seem surprising that national governmentshardly ever use the deduction method of international double tax relief in the area of foreign directinvestment (FDI). Indeed, the trend in developed countries has been towards increased reliance onthe exemption method for corporate taxpayers (see Mullins (2006)). However, as argued by Desaiand Hines (2003), this trend may be easier to grasp once one recognizes the importance ofownership of the assets utilized in FDI. Desai and Hines point out that the assets developed by multinationals through R&D, marketing etc.are often highly specific, so the productivity of these assets may depend critically on who owns andcontrols them. From this perspective it is important that the tax system does not distort the patternof ownership. Building on earlier work by Devereux (1990), Desai and Hines (op.cit.) thereforesuggest that the concept of “ownership neutrality” should carry at least as much weight in theevaluation of the international tax system as the traditional concepts of CEN and CIN….

33. …. A tax systemsatisfies Capital Ownership Neutrality (CON) if it does not distort cross-country ownershippatterns. • CON may be attained if all countries in the world practice worldwide income taxation withunlimited foreign tax credits and if they all apply the same definition of the tax base. Under such aregime of worldwide income taxation multinationals will acquire the assets that maximise their pretaxreturns in the different countries, since this acquisition policy will also maximise their after-taxreturns. Hence assets will be held by those companies that would be willing to pay the highestreservation prices for them in the absence of tax, i.e. by those companies that can utilize the assetsmost productively (è come CEN a livello di impresa) • However, the same result may be obtained if all residence countries exemptforeign income from domestic tax and if they apply the same rules regarding the deductibility offinancing costs or writing-off of cross-border acquisitions. In that case companies from all over theworld face the same effective tax rate in each individual country, so again the assets invested ineach country will be held by those companies that can earn the highest pre-tax (and hence thehighest after-tax) return on them… (è come CIN a livello di impresa)

34. CON : RP and SP (new slide) “Desai and Hines also look at what sorts of tax systems will or will not distort the ownership of capital. They conclude that global adoption of either territorial or worldwide taxation will not distort ownership patterns even if tax rates vary across countries.

35. “…In order to understand the circumstances under which ownership neutrality occurs, the example needs more structure. Recall that the before-tax rate of return for investments in the United States is 10 percent a year. Assume that there is an investment available (the “candidate investment”) through which a $1000 investment will yield $1100 in one year when that investment is liquidated. If the candidate investment in made by a US investor in the United States, the US investor will report $100 income to the US treasury, pay $40 tax, and be left with an after-tax cash flow of $1060. The candidate investment is, thus, worth $1000 to a US investor.48 That is because at that price the investment generates an after-tax return of 6 percent, the same rate as other readily available investments.

36. “…Assume that the United States and the European Union both adopt worldwide tax systems. The before-tax rate of return in the European Union, then, will be 10 percent as well. However, on their alternative investments EU investors will earn 7 percent after tax, not the 6 percent after tax as do US investors. The reason why EU investors earn more after tax than do US investors is they are taxed at 30 percent instead of 40 percent.

37. “…If an EU investor acquires the candidate investment in the United States, then that investor will report $100 of US source income to the US government. The US government will assess the taxpayer a tax liability of $40 on that amount. That will allow the EU investor to repatriate $1060. The EU investor will also report $100 income to EU tax authorities and be assessed a tentative tax liability of $30. That investor will also receive a foreign tax credit of $40 for the $40 paid to the US treasury on that same income. Because the EU tax liability on that income is only $30, the EU investor is entitled to a rebate from the EU treasury of $10. That will leave the EU investor with a net total tax liability of $30 and hence with a cash flow of $1070 after tax. The EU investor will, thus, value the candidate investment at $1000, the same as a US investor. Because the EU and US investor both value the candidate investment at $1000, CIN is satisfied with respect to the US market.” (M. Knoll, Reconsidering International Tax Neutrality, 2009, University of Pennsylvania Law school, http://lsr.nellco.org/upenn_wps/277/)

38. …. The point is that if global ownership neutrality is the policy goal, the exemption system (alsoreferred to as a territorial tax system) is just as attractive as a system of worldwide taxation withforeign tax credits.Moreover, if optimisation of the ownership pattern is the overriding goal, theterritorial system is actually the preferred policy from the national viewpoint of an individualcountry, as argued by Desai and Hines (2003). If a country practices worldwide income taxation, itsmultinationals will tend to earn a lower after-tax return on operations in a foreign low-tax countrythan will multinationals headquartered in countries that exempt foreign income. Assets invested inlow-tax countries will therefore tend to be taken over by companies based in territorial countries,even if those assets could be used more productively by companies based in countries with aworldwide system. By giving up the worldwide system and switching to territoriality, a country willincrease the reservation prices that its multinationals are willing to pay for assets located in foreignlow-tax countries, enabling domestic companies to take over assets that they can use moreefficiently than companies based in other countries.…

39. …. Thus a policy of exemptionwill maximise the after-tax profitability of domestic multinationals. A country seeking to maximise the sum of its tax revenue and the after-tax profits of its companies will therefore opt for the exemption system if such a system does not reduce domestic tax revenue raised from domestic economic activity. This condition will be met if any increase in outbound investment triggered by the switch to territoriality is offset by an equally productive amount of new inbound investment from foreign firms. Desai and Hines (op.cit.) argue that increased outbound FDI will indeed typically be offset to a very large extent by additional inbound investment. They point out that the bulk of global FDI takes the form of acquisitions of existing firms rather than new greenfield investment. Thus most cross-border FDI seems to involve a reshuffling of global ownership patterns rather than involving a net transfer of saving from one country to another. The active market for corporate control also suggests that asset ownership may have important consequences for business productivity. In these circumstances a policy of territoriality may come close to maximising national welfare. In the terminology of Desai and Hines, a tax system that exempts foreign income from domestic tax may be said to satisfy National Ownership Neutrality (NON).

40. The focus on the importance of ownership and the concept of NON may help to explain the trend in the OECD towards greater reliance on the exemption system in recent decades where FDI has tended to grow relative to total economic activity. Apparently governments feel that the exemption system is better suited than the worldwide system to promote the global competitiveness of domestic multinationals….. (Griffith at al. 2010)

41. Ancora su CON , CIN e CEN (new slide) • CON si focalizza sulla neutralità relativamente alla proprietà degli asset (ownership neutrality) • CEN si focalizza sulla neutralità rispetto alla localizzazione degli asset (locational neutrality) • Quale sia più importante è una questione empirica

42. Difficoltà ad applicare il principio di fonte per l’imposta societaria (1) • Unfortunately, identifying that there is no clear rationale for taxing the returns to outbound investment, and hence exempting income earned by foreign affiliates from domestic tax, is relatively straightforward compared to the problems of implementing a pure source-based tax system. • A number of difficult problems arise as income and costs need in principle be allocated between jurisdictions. • Yet not only is that difficult to achieve in practice, in many cases there is simply no conceptual basis to support any particular approach. (Devereux, 2010)

43. Difficoltà ad applicare il principio di fonte per l’imposta societaria (2) • In a simple case, we can consider for example a British resident company that wholly owns a subsidiary which is registered, and which carries out all its activities – employment, production, sales – in, say, France. Then France would typically be considered to be the source of the corporate profit. Conventionally, we can also drop sales from the list of activities: if the subsidiary exported all its product to Germany, France would still conventionally be regarded as the source of the profit (although in economic terms it is less clear why this would be the case).

44. Difficoltà ad applicare il principio di fonte per l’imposta societaria (3) • Things are less clear, however, if the British holding company owns several subsidiaries in different countries, which undertake different aspects of the multinational’s activities: for example, finance, marketing, R&D, production, sales. • The existing system of separate accounting requires all transactions between these different parts of the group to be valued, in order to divide total profit between the countries involved. The contribution made by each would be determined using “arm’s length pricing” – in principle, the price that would be charged by each subsidiary for its services as if it were dealing with an unrelated party. Of course, such a procedure is difficult in practice since in many cases no such arm’s length price can be observed; transactions between subsidiaries of the same corporation may not be replicated between third parties. But in many cases, not only is this difficult to administer, it has no conceptual foundation.

45. Difficoltà ad applicare il principio di fonte per l’imposta societaria (4) • The treatment of different forms of income creates another problem: for example, interest payments are typically taxed in the country where they are received, rather than the country from which they are paid; yet this is in contradiction to the general principle that tax should be levied only where the income-generating activity took place. • It is not clear why the form of financing of a foreign affiliate by its parent should turn the international tax system from one based on source (for equity-financed investment) to one based on residence (for debt-financed investment). • … The basic structure of the international tax system for multinational companies is close to a source-based tax for equity-financed investment, but a corporate-residence based tax for debt financed investment. It is hard to think of a sensible economic rationale for this practice, especially when the finance provided is internal to the multinational company. (Devereux, 2008)

46. Race to the bottom? • Prevalenza tassazione alla fonte, per l’imposta societaria • Concorrenza fiscale: tendenza al ribasso delle aliquote (più marcata nei paesi più piccoli) • Modello base di concorrenza fiscale: prevede che un’imposta alla fonte su un fattore mobile come il capitale sia destinata a scomparire. Anzi sarebbe meglio non tassarlo, il capitale, perchè in ultima istanza l’incidenza sarebbe sul fattore immobile (tipicamente il lavoro) • Ma abbiamo visto che il “race to the bottom” non si è verificato: le aliquote (legali e un po’ meno METR e AETR) sono calate, ma CIT/Pil no, è anche aumentato soprattutto nei paesi medi e piccoli…… • Cosa possiamo aspettarci nel futuro? • Un’ulteriore riduzione delle aliquote legali ed effettive? • Una progressiva scomparsa della CIT (e più in generale delle imposte sui fattori mobili…)

47. Race to the bottom: il futuro • Abbiamo visto fattori che concorrono a determinare CIT/Pil, e abbiamo visto che vi sono motivi per essere meno ottimisti nel futuro (BI non può crescere all’infinito, anche se vi sono ancora spazi per una indeducibilità IP; i profitti del settore finanziario, che sono stati una importante spiegazione, hanno subito forti riduzioni …) • Vediamo adesso se vi sono fattori che contrastano la tendenza alla riduzione delle aliquote…. ossia al race to the bottom previsto dai modelli di concorrenza fiscale.

48. Motivi che contrastano le predizioni di una “race to the bottom”… • Rendite specifiche di localizzazione, incluse alcune infrastrutture materiali e immateriali che possono essere finanziate con l’imposta • Non perfetta mobilità dei capitali • Presenza di un credito di imposta per le imposte pagate all’estero • Ruolo dell’imposta societaria come backstop per l’imposta personale • Vincoli politici all’abolizione dell’imposta societaria • L’imposta societaria permane solo per le imprese interne (fattori non mobili); le altre possono sempre eludere o evadere……

49. Testi di riferimento • P.B.Sorensen, Can Capital Income Taxes Survive? And Should They? CESifo Economic Studies, vol.53, 2/2007 • A. J. Auerbach, M.P. Devereux e H Simpson, Taxing corporate income, DIMENSIONS OF TAX DESIGN, The Mirrlees Review, Chair SIR JAMES MIRRLEES, IFS, 2010, http://www.ifs.org.uk/mirrleesreview/dimensions/ch9.pdf • R. Griffith, J. Hines e P.B.Sorensen, International capital taxation, DIMENSIONS OF TAX DESIGN, The Mirrlees Review, Chair SIR JAMES MIRRLEES, IFS, 2010,, http://www.ifs.org.uk/mirrleesreview/dimensions/ch10.pdf • OECD, Fundamental reform of corporate income tax, OECD Tax policy studies, n.16, 2007 • M.C.Guerra, Neutralità della tassazione degli interessi in economia aperta, Lettura n. 7

50. Altre letture citate o utili: • Mitchell A. Kane, Ownership Neutrality, Ownership Distortions, and International Tax Welfare Benchmarks, 2008, http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/files/Kane.pdf • Michael P. Devereux, Business taxation in a globalized world, Oxf Rev Econ Policy (2008) 24(4): 625-638 • Devereux, M.P., 2008. ‘Taxation of outbound direct investment: economic principles and tax policy considerations.’ Oxford Review of Economic Policy 24 (4), 698–719; reprinted in Head, J & Krever, R (eds) 2009, Tax reform in the 21st century, Kluwer. • M. Knoll, Reconsidering International Tax Neutrality, 2009, University of Pennsylvania Law school, http://lsr.nellco.org/upenn_wps/277/ • M. Ruf, Determining Taxable Income to Ensure Capital Ownership Neutrality, WP Mannheim Univ. 2009