LAND USE PLANNING POLICIES Antony Thanos Ph.D. Chem. Eng. antony.thanos@gmail

1. This project is funded by the European Union Projekat finansira Evropska Unija LAND USE PLANNING POLICIESAntony ThanosPh.D. Chem. Eng.antony.thanos@gmail.com Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Projekat realizuje Human Dynamics Konzorcijum

2. Consequence : The outcome (effect) of an accident, as for example: • Injury from fall from height • Pulmonary damage due to inhalation of released NH3 • Burns from thermal radiation of fire in gasoline tank • Consequence analysis : the procedure applied for calculation of the extent of accidents effects

3. Risk : The probability of cause of harm from accident • Risk expression example : • The probability of death from fall of lightningincountry XYZ is 10-7 per year (1 person per 10.000.000 persons will die from lightning per year in country XYZ)

4. Individual Risk : Risk of certain level of harm from accident, at specific location, independent of number of affected subjects • Example : The risk of lethal effects from thermal radiationfrom pool fire in gasoline tank TK-123 of factory ABC is calculated as 10-6 per year at a distance of 100 m from tank. No interest on how many people can be present in 100 m location.

5. Societal Risk : • Relationship between frequency of accident and number of people suffering from a specified level of harm in a given population from the realisation of specified accidents • Concerns estimation of the chances of more than one individual being harmed simultaneously by an incident

6. Safety Report purpose in Seveso III Directive • art.10 para.1.e : “Providing sufficient information to the competent authority to enable decisions to be made regarding the siting of new activities or developments around existing establishments.” • Safety Report is a tool for : • Permit procedures • Land Use Planningprior to establishment of an installation • Land Use Planningin the area of existing establishments

7. Land Use Planning (LUP) in Seveso Directives • Issue set first time in Seveso II (EU 96/82/EC) due to accidents in Bhopal, Mexico City (referred also in introductory text of Directive) in-line with lessons learned concept • In both cases, populated areas and establishment in vicinity

8. Land Use Planning (LUP) in Seveso Directives (cont.) • In Directive 2003/105/EC (Seveso II amendment), modification of LUP provisions: • inclusion of major transport routes under land use planning provisions (as far as possible) • The Commission is invited by 31 December 2006to draw up guidelines defining a technical database including risk data and risk scenarios, to be used for assessing the compatibility between the establishments covered by this Directive and the areas described in paragraph 1.(AFTER 11 YEARS, WE ARE STILL WAITING !!!)

9. Specific requirements for Land Use Planning (LUP) in Seveso III Directive, article 13 (cont.) • Member states should : • maintain appropriate safety distances between establishments covered by this Directive and residential areas, buildings and areas of public use, recreational areas, and, as far as possible, major transport routes • to protect areas of particular natural sensitivity or interest in the vicinity of establishments, where appropriate through appropriate safety distances or other relevant measures

10. Specific requirements for Land Use Planning (LUP) in Seveso III Directive, article 13 (cont.) • Member states should : • in the case of existing establishments, to take additional technical measures in accordance with Article 5 so as not to increase the risks to human health and the environment

11. Where are we now ? • No EU-wide common guidelines available • Topic to be addressed within each Member state • Different countries, different risk perception, different Land Use Planning Criteria (on always available) • Main trends : • LUP criteria in-line with risk acceptance criteria (for permit reasons) • LUP criteria different that risk acceptance criteria

12. Most difficult problems to solve in LUP • Existing situations • Very old establishments built before any general LUP provision or before Seveso requirements • Who should move-out ?? Establishment or the in-compatible land uses in the area ?? • Who pays the bill for the whatever movement ??

13. Example of evident incompatibility of land uses and Seveso establishment LPG establishment Prison in Zone I (significant lethal effects) PRISON

14. Other example of evident incompatibility of land uses and Seveso establishment Disabled children hospital in BLEVE radius LPG/ liquid fuel establishment School for technicians in BLEVE radius 2000 m3 LPG sphere

15. Even for countries that use similar type of risk assessment methodologies, no unique approach on LUP • Even within a country, possible for no unique rules on : • LUP and new establishments • LUP and existing activities around establishments • LUP and new activities around existing establishments

16. UK case • Leaders along with Netherlands in probabilistic risk assessment, but… for new installations : • LPG case : BLEVE of biggest tank • No probabilities of accidents under discussion. Pure deterministic approach • Specific thermal radiation limits (1800 TDU, 1000 TDU, 500 TDU) set. • Simple installations, toxics, LNG fires : Probabilistic approach (QRA), leading to zones for 10 cpm (chances per million per annum), 1 cpm, 0.3cpm

17. UK case (cont.) • Calculations lead to definition of 3 Zones related to corresponding consultation distances (CD) : • inner-IZ, • middle-MZ • outer-OZ

18. UK case (cont.) • Incompatible land uses for new installations : • More than two houses in the Inner Zone • A workplace that is normally occupied (e.g. – offices) and where the number of people likely to be present is 100 or more, in the Inner Zone. • Developments for use by vulnerable people in the Inner Zone. • Any very large or sensitive developments in the Inner or Middle Zones • If incompatible land uses identified, negative opinion for establishment

19. UK case (cont.) • If new installation is accepted, for the CD defined, new developments around installationare under question (PADHI method) : • residential accommodation, • more than 250 m2 of retail floor space, • more than 500 m2 of office floor space, • more than 750 m2 of floor space to be used for an industrial process, • transport links (railways, major roads etc), • a material increase in the number of persons working or visiting a point within CD

20. UK case (cont.) • New developmentsare checked according to sensitivity level and Consultation Zone • Sensitivity Levels • Level 1 – Based on normal working population • Level 2 – Based on the general public – at home and involved in normal activities • Level 3 – Based on vulnerable members of the public (children, those with mobility difficulties or those unable to recognise physical danger) • Level 4 – Large examples of Level 3 and very large outdoor examples of Level 2

21. UK case (cont.) • New developments compatibility matrix

22. UK case (cont.) • After Buncefield accident, a new CD zone of 150 m was set around bunds of large petrol storage site and a new sensitivity level was defined (level 0)

23. UK case (cont.) • The modified level (SL) 0 refers to developments not normally occupied • DT0.1 Parking Areas (limited to 500 cars), airport long stay parking served by a shuttle bus (exclude multi-storey car parks, SL1) • DT0.2 Storage facilities (not to be used by public) • DT0.3 minor transport links (exclude railways, major roads, trams, and any road used by public buses)

24. UK case (cont.) • Modified new developments compatibility matrix

25. UK case (cont.) • No identical criteria for new installation and new developments • Sensitivity of objects in area take into account • Sensitivity defined on both : • Size of exposed population (societal risk taken into account indirectly) • Category of exposed population (workers, general public, vulnerable people)

26. Ireland case • Probabilistic approach for establishment permitting • Individual Risk Criterion for new establishments • 10-5, current non-residential neighbors • 10-6, residential property • 10-5 criterion can be relaxed in case of new developments similar to existing neighbors (e.g. new oil storage site close to existing oil storage sites) • Societal Risk criterion also valid

27. Ireland case (cont.) • Permitting on traffic light system • Advice similar to UK PADHI, based on Sensitivity Level of area • Level 1 includes Working places and parking Areas • Level 2 includes developments for use by the general public: • Housing, • Hotel/Hostel/Holiday Accommodation, • Transport Links, • Indoor Use by Public, • Outdoor Use by Public. • Sensitivity Level 3 includes developments for use by vulnerable people: • Institutional Accommodation and Education, • Prisons. • Sensitivity Level 4 includes Very large and sensitive developments: • Institutional Accommodation, • Very Large Outdoor Use by Public.

28. Ireland case (cont.) • Sensitivity Levels • Level 1 includes Working places and parking Areas • Level 2 includes developments for use by the general public: Housing, Hotel/Hostel/Holiday Accommodation, Transport Links, Indoor Use by Public, Outdoor Use by Public • Level 3 includes developments for use by vulnerable people: Institutional Accommodation and Education, Prisons • Sensitivity Level 4 includes Very large and sensitive developments: Institutional Accommodation, Very Large Outdoor Use by Public

29. Ireland case (cont.) • Extract sample of Sensitivity Level Definition Table

30. Ireland case (cont.) • Risk Acceptance Matrix

31. Ireland case (cont.) • Societal risk to be checked in accepted case of decision matrix • In case of significant developments, societal risk to be checked even in developments are outside Zone 3, but within consultation distance • Within LUP process, worst case scenarios effects are also provided to Authorities

32. Netherlands case • Unique approach for installations and developments around installation • Probabilistic approach in risk assessment • Limit values of risk set only for annual individual riskof fatality at a specific point (named Location-based Risk) • Risk Limit value : 10-6 • Risk Limit valid only for vulnerable «objects» (defined in legislation, existing or projected), examples : • hospitals, retirement homes, schools • hotels and office buildings with a gross floor area of over 1500 m2 per object • Non-scattered houses

33. Ireland case (cont.) • Consultation distances

34. Ireland case (cont.) • Developments for consultation distance

35. Netherlands case • Probabilistic approach in risk assessment • Limit value of risk set only for annual individual riskof fatality at a specific point (named Location-based Risk) • Risk Limit value : 10-6 • Risk Limit valid only for vulnerable «objects» (defined in legislation, existing or projected), examples : • hospitals, retirement homes, schools • hotels and office buildings with a gross floor area of over 1500 m2 per object • Non-scattered houses

36. Netherlands case • Less vulnerable «objects» (defined in legislation, existing or projected), examples : • gymnasiums, sports grounds, swimming pools and playgrounds • hotels and office buildings with a gross floor area of less than 1500 m2 per object • scattered houses • Annual individual risk of fatality of 10-6 set only as a target valuefor less vulnerable objects

37. Netherlands case (cont.) • Unique approach for LUP related to : • installations • developments around installation • If installation is accepted or existing, Safety Zone defined around establishment or group of establishments based on Individual Risk Limit value • Within Safety Zone, no longer permitted : • house-building • construction or establishment of other vulnerable objects or of less vulnerable objects

38. Germany case • Risk assessment based on determinist approach (no probabilities taken into account) • No risk acceptance criteria set • Permitting and Land Use Planning based on Zoning System based on Separation Distances from residential area • No general binding legislation applied defining Separation Distances

39. Germany case (cont.) • Separation distances North-Rhine Westphalia

40. Germany case (cont.) • Technical Committee for Plant Safety (SKF/TTA-GS, KAS 18), Recommendations on Separation distances between establishments and residential areas (guidance values based on typical assumptions) • Based on history of 15 years of major accidents and operating experience, for most of the cases a DN 25 mm pipe rupture is considered, end point set to : • 1.6 kW/m2 • 0.1 bar • ERPG-2

41. Germany case (cont.) • SKF/TTA-GS, KAS 18

42. Germany case (cont.) • SKF/TTA-GS, KAS 18 • For new installations, data from Safety Report to be used • No bursting of vessel or of very large pipe to be considered, as no improbable when the state of the art technology is applied • Pipe rupture of DN 25 mm to be considered • SKF recommendations not to be considered or existing situations where a permit is already available

43. Cyprus case • Deterministic approach in risk assessment with definition of 3 Zones almost identical to the Zones used in Greece

44. Cyprus case (cont.) • Sensitivity Levels defined for areas around Seveso sites. • Categorisation of Sensitivity Levels, almost identical to ones defined in Ireland • Different criteria for existing/ne establishment and for developments

45. Cyprus case (cont.)

46. Cyprus case (cont.)

47. Cyprus case (cont.)

48. Cyprus case (cont.) • In conditional acceptance, additional safety measures could be imposed along with QRA analysis to support risk reduction • Consultation distances defined for checking of new developments

49. Italy case • Hybrid approach (close to Rulebook) in risk assessment for both permitting and LUP • Endpoints definitions

50. Italy case (cont.) • Vulnerability levels