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Signaling & International Politics

Signaling & International Politics. John Lee Department of Political Science Florida State University. The Problem. How do states communicate information about themselves? Cheap Talk – The costless communication of information. Rationalist Explanations for War.

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Signaling & International Politics

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  1. Signaling & International Politics John Lee Department of Political Science Florida State University

  2. The Problem • How do states communicate information about themselves? • Cheap Talk – The costless communication of information.

  3. Rationalist Explanations for War • Private information with the incentive to misrepresent. • You are unsure about my probability of victory. Because I know that a bargain is based on my probability of victory I tell you that I will with p = 1. • But, you know that I have an incentive to say that p = 1, so you discount what I say as cheap talk…

  4. Costly Signals • Costly Signal – Forms of communication which are not “free.” • For example, the United States could signal its resolve to attack Iran by deploying naval vessels/troops to the Iranian border.

  5. Types of Costly Signals • Domestic-Political – The institutional make-up of a state may allow the transmission of costly information (e.g. democracies v autocracies). • Military – The use/mobilization of military forces may allow the transmission of costly information (Slantchev 2005).

  6. Domestic-Political • Audience Costs – Electoral penalties leaders suffer for “bad actions.” Leaders who make threats and back down are removed from office. Thus, a military threat from a democratic leader is costly to that leader. • Leaders want to stay in power. • Is a free press necessary (Slantchev 2006).

  7. IR as Two-Level Game • Leaders of states worry about two audiences. • Domestic constituencies. • International actors (e.g. other states). • Think about farm subsidies in US. Good for US farmers, bad for third world countries. • Possibility of multiple levels?

  8. Why Audience Costs? • National honor/reputation (see for example Fearon 1994). • Leader competence. Leader knows his/her competence…citizens are unsure. Foreign policy outcomes represent noisy signals regarding a leader’s competency. Incompetent leaders make threats and then back down more frequently, since they expect poor outcomes (Smith 1998).

  9. Audience Costs – Just Democracies? • Weeks (2008) audiences of all leaders value (1) good international reputations and (2) competent leaders. As a result, any leader with an audience should face audience costs if foreign policy decisions (1) hurt reputation or (2) signal competence. • All leaders have winning coalitions, but do all care about international reputation/competence?

  10. Military Signals • States that undertake military preparations send clear signal to other side that their threats are not hollow. • These types of signals can increase the probability of war since they diminish the cost of conflict (sunk costs). • Generally considered more informative than actions that qualify for “audience costs.”

  11. Other Sources of Information • Opposition political parties in democracies reveal information about resolve. If both parties agree on policy this result sends a strong signal about a country’s resolve (Schultz 1998).

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