200 likes | 312 Views
The crisis: have we thrown the banking baby out with the bath water?. Patrick Minford Keele World Affairs January, 2013. The crisis. In summer 2007 first problems with sub-prime mortgage products In rest of 2007 and into 2008 central banks stabilise banks; but Sept Lehman collapse
E N D
The crisis: have we thrown the banking baby out with the bath water? Patrick Minford Keele World Affairs January, 2013
The crisis • In summer 2007 first problems with sub-prime mortgage products • In rest of 2007 and into 2008 central banks stabilise banks; but Sept Lehman collapse • World economy collapses; crisis starts • Governments sucked into massive bail-outs ; interest rates cut close to zero • Quantitative Easing starts, to reopen credit markets
The recovery • Emerging markets and world bounce back; but Advanced economies have weak growth • Commodity prices return to pre-crisis peak • Productivity growth differential since 2001: advanced v emerging --Structural transformation in emerging creating rapid growth in commodity use --Productivity growth in advanced held back by high commodity prices
A closer look at causes • Boom from 1983 fuelled by low commodity prices, assisting ‘computer age’ • Commodity shortage of mid-2000s --inflation and rising interest rates --falling western living standards --structural shift to less resource-hungry sectors --banking crisis; fall of banking industry
The nature of crises ‘Trends’ due to productivity growth (innovation- unpredictable!). Stalling growth means future productivity level permanently lower. • Raw material availability/price key element in productivity/costs • Economy (incomes, house prices…) driven by productivity • ‘Run’ of good growth= boom. Run of bad growth= crisis
Evidence of Political effect 1996 HUD target for F and F: 42% of mortgages to go to borrowers with income below area median (50% 2000; 52% 2005). 1996 HUD target for ‘special affordable’ (borrowers with less than 60% of area median) was 12% (20% 2000; 22% 2005). Also Community and Reinvestment Act of 1977 (Carter) strengthened in 1995 for ordinary banks. F and F securitised $394 billion of CRA loans 2000-2002. Taxpayer relief Act raised CGT exclusion band on houses.
Policy conclusions • The ‘new normal’ in UK and most of west: weak growth due to new fundamentals • Alibi 1: ‘balance sheet weakness’. Symptom not cause • Alibi 2: ‘austerity the problem’. Government solvency limit fundamental too! • Alibi 3: ‘euro-zone crisis holding us back’. We can sell elsewhere and are doing so!
How to restore (productivity) growth • Stop bank-regulation backlash; revive bank competition and credit growth to SMEs • Eliminate/weaken regulation (labour market mainly) on SMEs- Beecroft Report • Resist drift to anti-business populism • Reform tax system: flatter and broader • Liberate infrastructure planning