Computer-Mediated Communication and Cooperation: Experimental Findings

1. Computer-Mediated Communication and Cooperation: Experimental Findings Dr. Azi Lev-On Visiting Professor Institute for Research in the Social Sciences Stanford University Head of new media track School of communication Ariel University Center azilevon@gmail.com

3. Outline • Why does communication facilitate trust? • The ‘communication effect’ and the focus theory of norms. • Experimental results: • Media and messages: Communication content and media richness • Group size • Conclusions and implications

4. Contribution to Literature • Understanding the mechanisms of trust • Behavioral implications of computer-mediated communication

5. Based on… • 2007. Computer-mediated communication and cooperation in social dilemmas: An experimental analysis. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 6: 139-168 (with Cristina Bicchieri). • 2009. The medium or the message? Communication richness and relevance in trust games. Synthese [online] (with Cristina Bicchieri and Alex Chavez). • 2010. Group and dyadic communication in trust games. Rationality and Society22(1): 37-54. (with Alex Chavez and Cristina Bicchieri).

6. The Face-to-Face Communication Effect: Characteristics • Communication- one of two variables most conducive for cooperation, a 40% contribution (Ledyard 95, Sally 95). • unrestricted 2 to 10 minutes FtF communication between subjects who are co-present in the same location.

7. The Face-to-Face Communication Effect: Characteristics • Typical contribution patterns in a public-goods experiment with unrestricted FtF comm. Source: Isaac and Walker 1988.

8. The Face-to-Face Communication Effect: Characteristics • carries over to a number of iterations that directly follow. • without communication cooperation rates deteriorate over time. As long as communication persists, cooperation rates are stable.

9. The Face-to-Face Communication Effect: Characteristics • cooperation rates peak after communication, even when communication takes place after a few rounds of declining cooperation. • Prevails even when agents are made aware of the incentives to defect. • carryover to other agents (but overhearing promises made to others has no significant effect).

10. The Face-to-Face Communication Effect: Characteristics • Three phases of FtF communication processes can cause the ‘communication effect’: identification, discussion, and commitment. • Not identification (Bohnet and Frey 1999 ) • Not discussion (Bouas and Komorita 1996, Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee 1977).

11. The Focus Theory of Norms • Communication can focus agents on pro-social norms (particularly the norm of promise-keeping); when it does so, it generates a normative environment which is conducive for cooperation. • Norm-abiding is more often than not automatic and unreflective, not deliberative and strategic.

12. The Focus Theory of Norms • social norms are not followed by everyone under any circumstances. • Instead, evidence shows that when agents face an ambiguous or unfamiliar environment, they need cues to represent the situation as familiar, and seek available norms which could be applied. • When a social norm becomes situationally salient, it causes a shift in an agent’s focus, and can direct her actions.

13. The Focus Theory of Norms • Develops empirical and normative expectations. • Consequently, the dilemma situation is perceived as representative of other situations where agents make promises and keep them. • This sets the cognitive groundwork for a ‘cooperative choice.’

14. The Communication Effect in Computer-Mediated Environments Patterns of contributions in a public goods experiment with seven conditions of pre-play communication (Brosig, Ockenfels and Weimann2003)

15. The Communication Effect in Computer-Mediated Environments • The communication effect still exists – CMC produces higher cooperation rates than equivalent non-communicative environments. • Cooperation deteriorates over time in the absence of continuing communication, as in FtF communication. • After communication resumes, cooperation rates improve again.

16. The Communication Effect in Computer-Mediated Environments • The communication effect, however, is of varying magnitudes, and differs according to the richness of the communication channels used. • Establishing cooperation takes longer, especially when using ‘poorer’ CMC channels. • Communication is normatively charged, and even intensified than FtF communication.

17. The Communication Effect in Computer-Mediated Environments • Compared to FtF communication, it is more difficult to create ‘social contracts’. • Even when contracts are reached, they are violated more frequently than agreements coordinated FtF.

18. Experiments: • Trust games • Relevant/Irrelevant communication • Face to face/Computer-mediated • Dyadic/Group communication

19. after decision in each game, 1st movers asked about expectation of 2nd mover reciprocation • analyze effects of communication relevance and medium on trust (how much is sent), reciprocity (amount returned relative to amount sent), and expected reciprocity (expected amount returned relative to amount sent) • Relative to control, both relevance and medium had large, positive effect on all three dependent variables

20. Experiment1- Some Results Mean trust, reciprocity and expected reciprocity by communication relevance and medium

22. Trust: • Greater trust with relevant communication (majority sends $6) • No effect of communication medium on trust • Trust increases with expected reciprocity • Message relevance most conducive to create such expectations • Reciprocity: • Bimodal pattern, either 0 or $9 • Affected by medium and amount sent • Pattern depends on conditions: • -- FtF relevant: almost all return $9 • -- Control: almost all return zero • -- When 1st movers send less than $6, little is returned

23. Main Findings • Controlling for type of communication, medium had no significant effect on trust. • The behavior of first-movers is strongly determined by their expectations of second-movers' reciprocation. • Note, however, that those expectations are rarely met, as expected reciprocation was significantly higher than the actual reciprocation, across all conditions.

24. Main Findings • The results demonstrate that the variable most conducive to creating such expectations is not the medium, but rather the message. • In other words, first-movers' investments were significantly higher following unrestricted communication than restricted or no communication. • Communication always involves promises to cooperate/ reciprocate.

25. When communication was restricted, there were no significant differences between the amounts sent following CMC and FtF communication, and the no-communication control

26. Mean trust, reciprocity and expected reciprocity by communication medium and group size

27. Some results

28. As a general rule, higher levels of trust, reciprocation, and expected reciprocity were recorded in the dyadic conditions, compared to the non-dyadic conditions • The medium of communication did not significantly predict trust • Trust level depends on group size and communication • Reciprocity depends on trust, group size, medium -- probability returning each $ increases with amount sent, but increases more rapidly for dyadic conditions, and most rapidly for FtF dyadic

29. Implications for Cooperation in Computer-Mediated Environments • Virtual work groups • File sharing sites • Web-supported collective action • Interface Design • Create opportunity for dyadic communication • Video vs. audio conversation