Case Study: Somalia

1. Case Study: Somalia Bianca Chan Ji Hyun Rhim Matilda Ronning Chenyu Yao

2. Outline • Historical background • Action taken by the international community • Tipping points and important decisions • Failures of the international community • Nicholas Wheeler’s Theory of Human Intervention and Somalia • Somalia today • Conclusion

3. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

4. About Somalia(الصومال) • Location: Horn of Africa • Capital: Mogadishu • Population:700 thousand • Resources: poor in profitable natural resources, poorly developed economic infrastructure after independence • Clan system

7. History

8. History 2

9. SiadBarreand Somalia Civil War • Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC)-Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) • renamed the country the Somali Democratic Republic • Brutal communist, totalitarian rule • 1986: attacked clan-based dissident groups opposed to his rule -> used special forces, the "Red Berets“ • Eventually ousted by combined northern and southern clan-based forces, all of whom were backed and armed by Ethiopia.

10. Those against SiadBarre • Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) • United Somali Congress (USC) • Somali National Movement (SNM) • Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) • together with non-violent political oppositions: • Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) • Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA) • Somali Manifesto Group (SMG)

11. After SiadBarre President Ali Mahdi Muhammad Opposition United Somali Congress military leader General Mohamed FarrahAidid Somali National Movement leader Abdirahman Ahmed Ali Tuur Somali Patriotic Movement leader Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess refused to recognize Mahdi as president • selected by the manifesto group as an interim state president

12. a split between the SNM, USC and SPM and the armed groups Manifesto, SDM and SNA and within the USC forces

13. Propaganda leaflet depicting a white dove of peace being crushed by a fist labeled "USC/SNA" ("United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance").

15. UN situation • Growing criticism of the UN role • Too preoccupied with the Iraq crisis and the developing war in the former Yugoslavia to busy itself with civil war

17. American situation • Ceased to have any strategic significance at the end of the cold war • Too preoccupied with the situation in Iraq, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the collapse of the former Yugoslavia to give much attention to the plight of Somalis • Bush vs. Clinton • American people were sympathetic towards the suffering Somalis vs. After soldiers faced fire from armed clans and 19 soldiers were killed in 1993 in the Battle of Mogadishu

18. Action taken by the international community

19. Action taken by the international community • November 1991 - March 1992: UN’s humanitarian agencies withdrew from Somalia out of fear for the security of UN personnel • UN Security Council authorized sending of 50 unarmed observers to monitor ceasefire as well as 500 peacekeepers to assist with delivery of humanitarian aid

20. Action taken by the international community • 1992 US’s first course of action to help Somalia crisis: airlifts food to Somalia

21. Operation Provide Relief • April 1992-March 1993 • Led by United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) • The Air Force C-130s delivered 48,000 tons of food and medical supplies in six months to international humanitarian organizations in Somalia • 50 UN military observers to make sure food wasn’t stolen • UN oversaw ceasefire • Unsuccessful • 100,000 lives were saved as a result of outside assistance, about 10,000 after the United States join

22. Operation Restore Hope • December 1992 - May 1993 • Led by the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) • To make environment safe to deliver assistance • UNITAF was followed by the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) • Raid in Mogadishu to make area safe for aid • Military supervised aid process • Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia • Addis Ababa Agreement • Worst of starvation over by March 1993 • Humanitarian success!!

23. Operation Continue Hope • March 1993-March 1995 • Led by UNOSOM II • An estimated quarter of a million lives were saved • Revived the Somali police: some 8,000 were deployed in 82 district stations • By March 1995, there were 46 district courts, 11 regional courts and 11 appeals courts

24. Tipping points and important decisions

25. Important decisions • Resolution 733: enabled the council to authorize an arms embargo under chapter 7 of the charter • Resolution 733, 746: led to the creation of UNOSOM I to provide humanitarian relief and help restore order in Somalia after the dissolution of its central government • Resolution 794: unanimously passed on December 3, 1992 to form UNITAF, to ensure distribution of humanitarian aid and establishment of Somalia.

26. Negotiations Addis Ababa Agreement Mohamed Sahnoun Sahnoun did a lot to see the clan system and secured the support of the clan elders Strengthened his bargaining leverage with the warlords But the secretary general pushed a more forcible way to solve the problem quickly • Some difficult negotiations in Somalia between UN Special Envoy, Aidid, and Ali Mahdi • The principles of a ceasefire were agreed • Overly optimistic as Mogadishu collapsed into a state of general lawlessness FAIL

27. The Bush Administration and ‘Operation Restore Hope’ • Telegram from US Ambassador in Kenya + Bill Clinton’s criticism towards Bush for his foreign – policy failures over Somalia and Bosnia + Bush’s personal reaction to the stories of the suffering of the Somalis • Sustained media coverage on Somalia • Support from US public

29. Failures of the International community

30. Failures of International Society United States: • The intervention was too late • Worst part of the famine already over • Biggest threat was diseases, not starvation • More lives could have been saved • Too much force put into finding Aidid • Many civilians killed in the search • No previous warning given before the raid against Abdi house (which was thought to been Aidid’s command and control center) • The Somalias killed was estimated to 10.000 by US intelligence, while Adid says it was 13.000 • Resulted in a distrust of US and UN, and a growing support of Adid

31. Was the use of military force really necessary? • Sahnoun’s approach to solve the situation • Make the clan-leaders cooperate and weaken the power of the warlords • Some argue that the attempt was stopped at the time when it had just started to show results • The promise of disarmament, March 27 • Even though 14 warlords signed the agreement of a disarmament within 90 days, it actually never took place • Instead they were told that they could keep their heavy weapons if they moved them into UN monitored containment areas or Mogadishu. • The disarmament didn’t happen mainly because it would have taken too much time and US wasn’t ready to comit and stay in Somalia for the time period needed.

32. Operation Gothic Serpentaka. “Black Hawk Down,” Battle of Mogadishu • October 3-4, 1993 • Part of Operation Continue Hope • 18 U.S. soldiers were killed (1 more killed two days later in a separate incident) • The United States continued operations until March 25, 1994, when U.S. forces withdrew and was replaced by forces from India, Pakistan, Malaysia and Egypt

33. The early withdrawal by US and UN • US withdrawal • Operational Gothic Serpent • Withdrew in early 1994 • Eager to hand over everything to UN • Did not stay long enough to be able to help in creating institutions such as idenpendent police and judicary • UN withdrawal • Tried to rebuild Somalia and restore legitimate authority – but failed • Finally withdrew from Somalia by February 1995

34. Somalia Today • The situation in Somalia is still unstable • No central government have had control over the whole country since 1991 • Considered a failed state

35. Problems • No central government • Civil war • Informal economy • Religious extremists • Drought • Piracy

36. The Government • Transitional Federal Government • Internationally recognized • Only have control over parts of the capital and some territories int the center of Somalia • Have reestablished National Insistutions • Militairy of Somalia etc. • The north-west part of Somalia, Somaliland • Self-declared but unrecognized state • Relatively stable • The north-east part, Puntland • Declared an autonomous state in 1998 and its leaders • Considering themselves to be independent • Al-Shabaab • Controls most part of the South

37. The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) • Controlled most part of southern Somalia until the end of 2006, and also the capital Mogadishu • Lost their territory in December 2006 • After this loss some of the hardline Islamists from ICU formed other militant groups, such as Al-Shabaab • By January 2009 a reconciliation and deal was done between the TFG and Djibouti contingent from former ICU • Resulted in expansion of parliament • And the former leader of ICU, Sheik Sharif Ahmed, became President of TFG in an election in 2009 – still president today

38. Al-Shabaab • Islamic militant organization • Controls large parts of southern Somalia • Using force and terrorist tactics in order to gain control • In February 2008 they were added to US’s list of foreign terrorist organizations

39. Economy • According to the CIA and the Central Bank of Somalia: • Somalia have a quite healthy informal economy based on mainly livestock • remittance/money transfer companies • telecommunications • GDP per capita: $600 (2010)

40. GDP GDP in current U.S. dollars. Only until 1990.

41. GDP US: $114.119 trillion, Japan: $5.069 trillion

42. GDP Growth Rate Percentage change of real GDP compared to previous year.

43. Industry It comprises value added in mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity, water, and gas. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources.

44. Drought in Somalia Data from 2006 • Around 1.5 million people in Somalia are in acute state of food crisis • Water storage areas have dried up • Crop production is estimated to be the lowest in over a decade • Big problems with cattle deaths • Displacement of around 400, 000 people • Everyday up to 2000 Somalia refugees are migrating into Ethiopia

45. Nicholas Wheeler’s Theory of Human Intervention and Somalia

46. Solidarism • States should satisfy certain basic requirements of decency before they qualify for the protection which the principle of non-intervention provides (28) • committed to upholding minimum standards of common humanity (38) • State leaders have a responsibility to protect the security and well-being of their citizens (49) • State leaders override their primary responsibility not to place their citizens in danger (51)

47. Solidarist Theory of Legitimate Humanitarian Intervention Four Minimum Requirements/ Threshold Criteria Four Additional Criteria Humanitarian Motives Humanitarian Justifications Legality Selectivity • Supreme humanitarian emergency • Necessity/ Last Resort • Proportionality • Positive Humanitarian Outcome

48. Supreme Humanitarian Emergency • “A supreme emergency exists when the danger is so imminent, the character of the threat so horrifying, and when there is no other option available to assure the survival of a particular moral community than violating the rule against targeting civilians.” (50) • Crimes against humanity-genocide, mass murder, state breakdown, and ethnic cleansing • Michael Bazyler-“Intervening nation or nations need not wait for the killings to start if there is clear evidence of an impending massacre” (34)

49. Somalia (1991-1992) • Ongoing civil war: • More than 20,000 people killed in battle (Sept. 1991-Dec. 1991) • Outside of battle: • Starvation; over 3 million suffering • Massive death; 500,000 dead • Displacement; 1.5 million displaced • 80% of food aid stolen

50. Humanitarian Motives and Justification • “Governments that justify intervention in humanitarian terms establish a normative benchmark against which we can judge their subsequent actions.” (39) • Actions following claims are more important than the claims themselves • Mona Fixdal & Dan Smith- humanitarian intervention is “just if it produces a surplus of good over harm-taking all affected parties into consideration. (36)