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On SC in Computing CCMP MIC. Craig Conkling, WenChung Chen, Kevin Huang, Ivan Chan, CM Lin, Kwei Tu, YC Maa, Allen Tsai. Current CCMP MIC Computation (in 8.3.4.4.3 of D2.5). MIC is computed from Frame Control, MPDU address 1, 2; 3, 4 (optional), Sequence Control , QoS Control.
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On SC in Computing CCMP MIC Craig Conkling, WenChung Chen, Kevin Huang, Ivan Chan, CM Lin, Kwei Tu, YC Maa, Allen Tsai Craig Conkling, et al.
Current CCMP MIC Computation (in 8.3.4.4.3 of D2.5) • MIC is computed from • Frame Control, MPDU address 1, 2; 3, 4 (optional), Sequence Control, QoS Control Craig Conkling, et al.
Including SC in MIC Computing • Affects the strict ordering of SC, which is incurred from non-trivial delay in AES. • Ordering is needed for QoS concern too. • Mixes up security layer function (MIC) with MAC layer function (SC), a bad practice unseen in TKIP, and OCB. • Introduces unnecessary redundancy in protecting against fragmentation attack. Craig Conkling, et al.
Protecting Against Fragmentation Attack • For CCMP: MIC is computed to protect MPDU against fragmentation attack. • Including SC in MIC computation for CCMP protection is unnecessary since • each MSDU is well protected by the MIC of MPDU • different from the TKIP case, where the MIC protection is for MSDU rather than MPDU Craig Conkling, et al.
Conclusion • SC should be removed from CCMP MIC computation • To preserve proper ordering of SC • To remove unnecessary protection already addressed by PN Craig Conkling, et al.
Motion • Move that the editor remove including Sequence Control for MIC computation in 8.3.4.4.3 of TGi draft (D2.5), including striking L24, L29-31 of pp. 61, and removing the SC block in Fig. 25. Craig Conkling, et al.