The evolution of Japan’s Foreign Policy

1. The evolution of Japan’s Foreign Policy International Relations of East Asia

2. Japan’s historical background • 1853-54.The Western ‘gunboat diplomacy’ reaches the shores of Japan, under the flag of the American Expedition led by Commodore Perry. • Meiji Era (1868-1912). Unlike China, Japan rapidly acknowledges and embrace Western superiority in statecraft and technology, re-modelling its political institutions in light of these models. Intense modernization and Japan’s ascendance as the first non-Western great power. • The rise of a militarist Empire: the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). Japan annexes Taiwan in 1895 and gains control over Korea in 1905 as a protectorate (full annexation in 1910);

3. The Battle of Tsushima (27-28 May 1905) and Japan’s tradition with preemptive wars…

4. 1931. Building the ‘East Asia’s co-prosperity sphere’: the conquest of Manchuria and the second Sino-Japanese war (1937-1945). • December, 1937. During the ‘Nanjing massacre’ the Japanese Imperial Army murders and brutalizes Chinese civilians and disarmed combatants, perpetrating widespread rape and looting. Estimates of the number of victims vary from 40,000 to over 300,000. • The American sanctions on Japan and Tokyo’s thirst for natural resources: Pearl Harbor and the road to WW2 (1941-1945).

5. The early postwar period and the Yoshida doctrine • On September 2, 1945, aboard the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay, Japan formally signs the Instrument of Surrender to the Allied forces. US General Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) during the American occupation of Japan. • The first directives from Washington outlined an idealized American-style democracy for Japan. The Emperor, if retained, was to have a purely symbolic role as figurehead of the nation. There were to be guarantees of civil rights and personal freedoms, enforced by a new constitution. The military apparatus and the old-style police were to be abolished. • Japan was also stripped of the foreign territories it had previously gained by military means, effectively returning it to the situation before the start of the Sino-Japanese war of 1894–95.

6. The most significant effort towards the full demilitarization of the country was the insertion into the new constitution, drafted early in 1946 by SCAP staff, of Japan’s famous ‘no war’ clause. • In full, the article (Article IX) reads: “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”

7. The punishment of war criminals was also part of the general process of demilitarization. • At the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, held between May 1946 and November 1948 under the newly created Military Tribunal for the Far East (which involved all 11 victor nations), 25 men were tried for major (Class A) crimes, such as having plotted and brought about the war. • The new constitution was promulgated in November 1946, becoming effective in May 1947. In most cases the constitution simply endorsed in a formal way policies that had been put in place already by the Occupation, through various directives.

8. Together with demilitarization, its key points included: • the emperor made a mere symbol of the people; • sovereigntyvested in the people; • equalityof the sexes; guarantee of human rights in general; • guarantee of freedom of assembly, thought, belief (including religion), and expression; • rightto vote given to all adults over 20; separation of church and state; guarantee of workers’ rights to organize and bargain collectively, and of minimum labour standards; • establishment of free and equal education.

9. Japan’s institutional architecture • Parliamentary system way more similar to the British form of government then the American presidential structure. Sovereignty now resides in the Japanese people, not the Emperor. • Legislative power assigned to the National Diet, consisting of the House of Representatives (480 members, 4-year term), and the upper house – the House of Councillors – with 242 members serving on 6-year terms. More or less, 75% of the seats in both houses are awarded through single-member districts, while the rest is assigned by proportional representation. • The executive branch is directed by the Prime Minister, who acts as Head of the Cabinet for a 4-year term.

10. No ‘checks and balances’, power is shared among various stakeholders: the legislature, the government, and the bureaucracy. Clientelism as a direct byproduct of this system; • Power of bureaucracy as the result of Japan’s historical and political path, starting from its modernization efforts in late 19th century and further enhanced after WWII to assist the country’s reconstruction. The so-called ‘Iron Triangle’ between elected public officials, bureaucracy (unelected civil servants) and big businesses; • Judicial system also inherited from the European experience, and vested in the Supreme Court and lower courts. • Political party system shaped by the LDP’s long-standing dominance. DPJ as the rising competitor (2009-2012), plus several second-tier actors: the Japan Socialist Party, Komeito, and Japan’s Communist Party.

11. From mid-1947, with the emergence of the bipolar confrontation, the emphasis in the American policy for Japan switched from political/institutional restructuring to economic recovery: the so-called ‘reverse course’. • Japan as the main stronghold of Washington’s military presence in East Asia, as well as the centerpiece of the ‘hub and spoke’ alliancesystem. • This meant stopping certain existing policies, and introducing new ones, as in the case of the proposed dissolution of the Zaibatsu system, that was drastically interrupted with the aim of re-industrializing Japan as a bulwark against Communism. • During this period, Japan’s most prominent political figure was Yoshida Shigeru, a former Ambassador with pro-Western sympathies, who was firstly elected as Prime Minister in May 1946.

12. After a significant electoral defeat in April 1947, Yoshida was re-elected as PM in October 1948, thanks also to a sound victory of his newly-formed and conservative Democratic Liberal Party in the subsequent general election of January 1949. • In the domestic arena, the government’s main task was to rebuild the economy and balance the budget, by reducing inflation and stabilizing the exchange rate. • Yoshida’s austere approach proved quite effective, even if it caused severe hardships among the population, paving the way for Japan’s economic miracle during the 1950s and 1960s.

13. Regarding foreign policy, Yoshida faced three major challenges: • Oversee Japan’s transformation from a “normal” country into a “peace-loving” one, giving substance and effectiveness to the ‘no-war clause’; • Forge an enduring alliance with the U.S.; • Erase the scars in regional perceptions towards Japan, still dominated by Tokyo’s aggressive and often brutal conducts during World War II; • The greatest boost for Japan’s economy, however, came from another external source. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, labelled by Yoshida as a ‘gift of the gods’, deeply benefited the country’s industrial base, thanks to the ‘special procurements’ (tokuju) from the US Army as it fought in Korea.

14. In order to attain Japan’s re-admission into the international community and put an end to its occupation, however, a formal peace agreementwas absolutely crucial. Eventually, a Peace Conference was held in San Francisco in September 1951, at which Japan and 48 nations signed a peace treaty. • The San Francisco Treaty confirmed Japan’s loss of its former colonies, including Taiwan and Korea. • Southern Sakhalin and the nearby Kurile Islands were given to the Soviet Union, though there was to be a fierce dispute – which still continues today – as to what islands exactly constitute the Kuriles archipelago.

15. At the other end of the country, Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands were placed in an indefinite American trusteeship, being formally returned to Japan in 1972, but continuing even today to be the major location for American troop bases in Japan, despite opposition. • Concerning the Senkaku/Diaoyu, no formal indications were contained in the treaty, and the islands temporary fell into the American Ryukyu’s trusteeship. Such vagueness will be an important factor, years later, in motivating the resurgence of the East China Sea dispute. • The PRC and Taiwan, in fact, claimed that the islands had been seized by Tokyo during the First Sino-Japanese War, and had to be returned in light of the peace treaty. Japan, on its side, argued that it had incorporated the islands as terra nullius, refusing to apply to this special case the provisions of the “San Francisco system”.

16. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (Okinawa): then and now

17. Despite its limits, the treaty came into effect on 28 April 1952, thereby bringing an official end to the occupation of Japan. • Immediately after, Japan and the United States signed a joint security treaty that indefinitely guaranteed the maintaining of American military bases in Japan, mostly in Okinawa. • This not only helped Japan in terms of military security, it also brought major economic benefits, allowing Tokyo to divert the lion’s share of available resources to postwar reconstruction, while maintaining a ‘war potential’ for functions of mere ‘defensive defense’.

18. An asymmetrical alliance and Japan’s dual fear of ‘entrapment’ and ‘abandonment’. Washington’s provision of deterrence and security in exchange for Japan’s role as ‘America’s unsinkable Aircraft carrier’ in East Asia. • A logic embodied by Article 5 of the Mutual Security Treaty (ANPO) signed in 1960, which obliged Washington to defend Japan in case of attack, while Tokyo had no such obligation in case of a direct attack against the United States. • The general public appeared less enthusiastic about the continued American presence, and it was later to lead to a number of political and social tensions. However, its economic benefit was beyond question as a major factor in setting Japan on the road to becoming an economic superpower.

19. The Yoshida doctrine also entailed a process of further entrenchment of the ‘no war clause’ within the new constitution, obtained through the auto-imposition of the “self-binding principles” with regards to defense and security policy: • no participation in collective self–defense arrangements; • no power-projection capabilities; • no production, transport and storage of nuclear weapons; • no arms exports or sharing of defense–related technology; • no more than one percent of nationalGDP for defense expenditure; • and no military use of space.

20. Becoming an economic Superpower • Japan did not waste the economic opportunity it had been given by the United States. The government had played a guiding role in the economy since the Meiji period, and it continued to do so. • The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), which was created in 1949 out of the former Ministry of Commerce and Industry, played a particularly important part. One of its key functions was ‘administrative guidance’. • During the 1950s the agreed priority was the development of heavy industry(iron & steel). It was to be followed in the 1960s by a new focus on lighter, more knowledge- and technology-intensive industries.

21. Along with light industry, which rose from 22 per cent in 1950 to 35 per cent in 1970, also the growth of tertiary (service) industries should not be overlooked. • The economy, as measured by GNP, grew fairly evenly at around 9 per cent per annum during the 1950s. This rose slightly to around 10 per cent in the early 1960s, and then to more than 13 per cent in the late 1960s and early 1970s. • In 1973, at the outbreak of the global oil shocks, Japan had already reached the status of third-largest economy in the world (after the United States and the Soviet Union), largest producer of ships, third-largest producer of steel, second-largest producer of cars (the largest by the end of the 70s), largest producer of radios and televisions, and so on.

22. Stability in government clearly provided a helpful setting to economic growth. • After 1948, despite frequent shuffling and jockeying behind the scenes, Japan was to be governed by conservatives of essentially the same philosophy right through till the mid-1990s. In particular, it was to be led from 1955 till 1993 by the Liberal Democratic Party (JiyuMinshuto). • Around the same time as the Oil Shocks, America had also given Japan a shock or two. These were known as the ‘Nixon Shocks’. In July 1971, without any prior consultation with Japan, Nixon announced his plan to visit the People’s Republic of China.

23. It was the start of a US-PRC rapprochement,that caused great difficulty for Japan’s foreign policy. Tokyo had followed the American line and favored Taiwan to this point. It now had to make rapid and sometimes embarrassing adjustments. • Then, just a month later, again with no consultation, Nixon announced his New Economic Plan. This included a 10% surcharge on many of the goods Japan exported to the U.S. (about a third of its total exports went to the U.S.). It also meant an abandoning of the gold standard, forcing the Japanese Yento move from the fixed rate that had applied since the war. • The Yen’s value increased greatly, making its exports more expensive. But Nixon was still not finished sending cold messages to Japan. In the summer of 1973, fearing a shortage of soybeans in the domestic market, he abruptly embargoed soybean exports. This badly hit Japan, where American soybeans were an important commodity.

24. Despite such setbacks, Japan’s economy continued to grow at around 4 per cent during the early 1980s. Its trade surplus with America, which had started to develop since the late 1970s, reached massive levels, typically in the order of US$40–50 billion. Japan’s mercantilist attitude, hence, became the target of rising criticism abroad. • Some of the criticism was justified. The Japanese were at times undoubtedly guilty of ‘dumping’ (selling below cost in a targeted market) or erecting non-tariff barriers (disadvantaging imports by noneconomic practices such as time-consuming testing). • To try to remedy the situation a meeting was convened in 1985 in New York’s Plaza Hotel, attended by the financial leaders of the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Japan.

25. In the so-called ‘Plaza Accord’ they agreed effectively to devalue the dollar relative to the yen. The yen duly rose, in what is known as ‘endaka’ (‘high yen’). • One result was an increased delocalization of Japanese business operations overseas, so as to make use of cheaper labour. The strategic role of ODA in assisting similar trends. • At this stage, however, growing of tensions between Japan and its neighbors were also fueled by historical controversies. In 1982 the Japanese Ministry of Education tried to substitute, in the school texts which it vetted, the word ‘advance’ (shinshutsu) for ‘invasion’ (shinnyu) to describe Japan’s prewar actions on the Asian mainland, giving voice to rising revisionist trends within the Japanese society.

26. It also tried to delete or tone down references to Japanese atrocities. This caused outrage among Asian nations, and Japanese neo-nationalismthus became an increasing concern to the international community. • In August 1985 Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, a former military officer noted for his old-style nationalistic views (including his wish to revise Article IX of the constitution), broke with postwar convention and paid homage to Japanese war dead at the Yasukuni Shrine not in a private and personal capacity, as previous prime ministers, but in his official role as head of government. • Simultaneously, the maritime dispute in the East China Sea, fueled by a powerful mix of historical, geopolitical and economic drivers (discovery of hydrocarbons in 1969), began to witness a slow but steady escalation of tensions with Beijing.

27. Japan in the post-Cold War era • 1989 represented, for a number of reasons, a significant turning point for Japan. Besides the massive transformations in the global arena, Hirohito died in January, bringing an end to an era. • Economically, the years 1990 and 1991 saw Japan plunging into a recession which, in substance, was to stay with it through the 1990s and into the new millennium: the so-called ‘lost decade’. Its origins were to be found in the ‘bubble economy’ of the late 1980s. • After more than a decade of economic sluggishness, the economy finally recovered in 2003. In fact, through the years 2003 to 2007 Japan’s economy maintained a reasonable growth rate of just over 2 per cent. Then, like all countries, it was hit by the recent worldwide economic slump in 2008–09.

28. The 1990s saw a flurry of political activity. Parties formed and unformed, allegiances shifted, intrigues abounded. Brevity of office was commonplace. • In the nine years between late 1987 and early 1996 Japan had as many prime ministers, and it had three more by the spring of 2001, when the prime ministership started to achieve some stability under the popular Koizumi Junichiro. • The one constant factor was the continuing control of the nation by conservatives. The main opposition to the LDP in the first decade of the new millennium has been the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), founded in 1998 with leading figures being Kan Naoto and Hatoyama Yukio. • Koizumi stepped down from the position of prime minister in September 2006. Despite his popularity in Japan, he had upset a number of Asian nations, including China, for his persistent visits tothe Yasukuni Shrine.

29. He also proposed a review of Article IX of the Constitution (the ‘Peace Clause’) with a view to allowing Japan to take a greater role in global security issues. • Indeed, in 2004, at America’s request, and following relevant legislative changes (though not to the Constitution itself), he dispatched SDF personnel to Iraq, purely for humanitarian and reconstruction work. It represented, nonetheless, the first deployment of Japanese troops abroad since WW2. • In addition, the legislative acts that paved the way for the dispatch of Japanese military in Iraq were part of a wider and gradual process, designed to alleviate the effect of the self-binding principles by means of a ‘salami tactic’. • Koizumi was replaced by Abe Shinzo, who resigned the following September (2007) on health grounds.

30. Abe had also been a somewhat controversial prime minister, who backed a much-criticized revisionist view of Japan’s history which played down wartime atrocities. He too took up Koizumi’s call for a review of the Constitution, though this was deferred. • Abe was replaced by Fukuda Yasuo, the grandson of the former prime minister Fukuda Takeo (1976–78). As if a change of prime minister was an annual event, Fukuda suddenly resigned the following September (2008), on the grounds that he felt he was in a stalemate with the opposition (the DPJ). • Fukuda’s position as PM was thus assumed by Aso Taro (sept. 2008-sept. 2009), who was also forced to resign after the 2009 general elections, that marked the first and historical electoral victory of the DPJ.

31. DPJ’s leading role within the government lasted from 2009 to 2012, with the succession of three different PMs: Hatoyama Yukio, Kan Naoto, and Noda Yoshihiko. • Two of the major issues that weakened public support behind the DPJ were the proposal (later dismissed) to close the Marine Corps Air Base at Futenma, together with the international scandal associated with the Fukushima nuclear disaster. • Accordingly, the 2012 general elections saw the return of the LDP at the center stage of Japanese politics, with the re-election of Abe Shinzo as PM, the first to serve two non-consecutive terms since the end of the American occupation.

32. Concerning the evolution of Japan’s diplomacy, the mid-1990s witnessed the emergence of two intertwined tendencies: first, an overall transformation and recalibration of the alliance with the U.S., towards a more equal burden-sharing among Washington and Tokyo. • Consequently, in 1997 the revised Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Cooperation enabled Japan for the first time to provide ‘rear-area support’ to the US military in the event of ‘contingencies in areas surrounding Japan’. (Up to then, only in case of contingencies for the defense of Japan). • Another major step in the redefinition of the alliance took place in 2005, with the signing of the agreement titled ‘US-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future’, which made provisions for the evolution of the duties of Japan’s armed forces, from limited self-defense to a progressively more marked commitment to ‘Far East contingencies’ issues.

33. Between 2014 and 2015, moreover, Tokyo and Washington have finalized a new set of updated guidelines, emphasizing the ‘global’ nature of the alliance and the permanent avenues of defense cooperation between the two actors both in peacetime and wartime. • The guidelines, thus, are expected to raise U.S.-Japan coordination in humanitarian and peacekeeping missions around the world, with regards to bilateral cooperation in cyberspace, and concerning maritime activities. • From an organizational standpoint, the document is aimed at strengthening alliance-coordination mechanisms, and, in particular, the Security Consultative Committee (SCC), the bilateral foreign and defense ministry body that oversees the alliance.

34. The second interlocking trend in Japan’s foreign and security policy during this phase regarded the gradual erosion of the Yoshida Doctrine, as a way to achieve a “normalization” of the country’s foreign and defense policy. • The most significant example of this trend can be seen in the progressive dilution of the self-binding principles associated with Article IX. • Those efforts, however, deeply accelerated under the current Abe government, as demonstrated by the Cabinet’s decision in July 2014 to partially approve the exercise of the right to collective self-defense,by changing the interpretation of the Constitution. • In addition, Japan is strengthening its military power-projection capabilities, while beginning to use outer space for security purposes. From “Basic Defence Force” to “Dynamic Defense Force”.

35. Additionally, in April 2014 the Abe government has significantly relaxed its arms export ban, as a way to regain regional leadership in security affairs and to provide a stimulus to domestic firms. • The new policy is targeted at replacing Tokyo’s traditional “three NOs” of not exporting arms to countries that are communist, subject to UN arms embargos and involved or likely to be involved in wars. • Under the new framework, the Japanese government will be allowed to export armaments for humanitarian and peaceful purposes, or if they serve the goal of contributing to its security interests and diplomatic partnerships, with two residual exceptions: in the case of states already involved in conflicts, and when such exports violate U.N. resolutions.

36. The establishment of a National Security Council (NSC) and the drafting of a new National Security Strategy (NSS) represent two addition tools introduced under Abe, along with a brand-new State Secrecy Law. • The NSC, modeled after the American council, is an inter-agency body with the task of assisting the PM in the formulation and implementation of national security policies.It has been formed in December, 2013, amid rising regional tensions following the establishment of a Chinese ADIZ in the East China Sea. • Among its first decisions, at the end of 2013 the Council drafted Japan’s first ever National Security Strategy. The NSS contains a mid-term defense program for 2014-2019, and it’s centered on the concept of ‘proactive contribution to peace’.

37. Diplomatically, Japan is also strengthening and diversifying its range of bilateral and multilateral partnership in the Asia-Pacific (Vietnam, Australia, India, ASEAN). • Why? Both trends (recalibration of U.S.-Japan alliance + relaxation of Article IX) stem from the same premise, widely shared among Japanese policymakers: in recent years, the country’s security environment has sharply deteriorated, pushing Tokyo to frame new solutions to equally unprecedented challenges. • China’s increasing naval assertiveness, in particular, looms large behind Japan’s recent trajectory.

38. Another major driver behind Tokyo’s recent proactiveness can be identified in the American ‘Rebalance to Asia’. The logic of alliance-diversification entrenched in the ‘Pivot’, in fact, pushes Japan to a stronger commitment, fearing an hypothetical downgrading within the regional network of partnerships erected by the U.S. • Which goals for Japan’s regional strategy? • Sustain and protect a norm–based regional order, able to ensure several public goods such as the freedom of navigation, particularly in contested waters; • Forge a coalition of like-minded states, also through a stronger emphasis on regional multilateral venues; • Strengthen an open and intertwined regional market, fueled by the free flow of investment, people, and goods;

39. Which tools? Renewed commitment requires both a recalibration of the already existing diplomatic tools and the introduction of new venues of cooperation: • Defense-related cooperation (exports, joint development, training, disaster-relief operations); • Official Development Assistance (ODA): towards a more strategic use? From infrastructural development to bureaucratic assistance and institutional capacity-building; • Soft power tools and the role of perceptions; • Technological tools, e.g. Tokyo’s ‘railway diplomacy’:

40. Abe has also proved quite successful in consolidating his leadership, in particular after his victory at the Japanese general elections of December 2014. • Economically, instead, Abe’s blueprint has been centered on the so-called ‘Abenomics’, as well as on the related ‘three arrows’ strategy. • The ‘three arrows’ strategy is aimed at kick-starting a new stage of national economic growth, pushing on three different fronts: fiscal stimulus (govt. spending), monetary easing, and structural reforms. • The net effect, up to now, has led to a significant depreciation of the yen, with a slow but steady growth also in terms of occupation and consumers spending. Japan’s huge public debt, however, keeps on growing.

41. Historical controversies, in the meantime, are still fomenting tensions between Japan and its neighbors. Despite Abe’s stated intent at the beginning of his administration to review the country’s official position on the comfort women issue, the government backed away from this plan in early 2014. • Three right-wing conservative members of his Cabinet, moreover, had visited the Yasukuni Shrine on August 15, 2013, to commemorate Japan’s defeat in World War II. • Abe himself had paid an official visit to the Shrine on 26 December 2013, exactly within one year of his assuming office. This decision attracted sharp criticism from policymakers and the general public not only in China and South Korea, but also vis-à-vis the US and the wider international community, that labelled it as a highly provocative move.

42. The Abe agenda and the recent deterioration of Sino-Japanese ties • The ‘Chinese challenge’ looms very large in accounting for Japan’s rising proactiveness in the security realm, as well as in providing further incentives to Japan-ASEAN expanding security cooperation. • The ‘East and South China Seas issue’: two interlocked disputes demanding a firmer and coordinated approach; • Sino-Japanese escalation of tensions along the Senkaku/Diaoyu during the period 2010-15 mirrored by similar developments in the SCS (the cases of the Philippines and Vietnam);

43. Additional sources of Japanese apprehension vis-à-vis Beijing: • Pace and opaqueness of China’s military modernization; • Rising nationalistic appeals within CCP’s shifting sources of legitimacy; • Growing incommunicability between the two leaderships;

44. Xi and Abe: a frosty first handshake (APEC, Nov. 2014)

45. A renewed Chinese assertiveness in tackling territorial disputes? • From a framework of Sino-Japanese collaboration and co-existence to a condition of incipient competition and friction; • Sept. 2010: revamp of the Senkaku dispute following a clash between Chinese and Japanese vessels. Progressive dismissal of the deep-rooted policy of ‘shelving controversies and carrying out joint development’; • Sept. 2012: Tokyo’s purchase of three islands pertaining to the disputed archipelago from their private owner; • Nov. 2013: Chinese ADIZ covering East China Sea;

46. Meanwhile, in the South China Sea: • Jan. 2014: filing of a case against the PRC at the Permanent Court of Arbitration by the Filipino government; • Latest developments: China’s ‘great wall of sand’ and America’s FONOP patrols; • Mar. 2013, Japan-Vietnam ‘extensive strategic partnership’; • June 2014, Japan-Philippines ‘strenghtened strategic partnership’; • Emphasis on maritime security. Two prominent goals: internationalize the maritime disputes and consolidate a potential counterweight to China’s military assets.

47. Conclusion: is a ‘Realist Japan’ back on stage? • Abe’s southward ‘pivot’ as the most tangible sign of the Japanese incipient attitude to ‘softbalance’ China’s rising assertiveness; The adherence of soft balancing with Japan’s goals and modus operandi: • Purposes: check and dissuade a potential source of perils, without overtly confront it; • Tools: strategic partnerships as opposed to traditional alliances, limited arms buildups, informal channels of security cooperation, coalition-building efforts, economic instruments (ODA), reassurance measures towards the target state.