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A Data Access Policy based on VOMS attributes in the Secure Storage Service. Diego Scardaci INFN (Italy) EELA-2 First Conference Bogota, Columbia, 25-27.02.2009. Outline. The Insider Abuse Problem The Secure Storage Service for the gLite Middleware: Main Functionalities
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A Data Access Policy based on VOMS attributes in the Secure Storage Service Diego Scardaci INFN (Italy) EELA-2 First Conference Bogota, Columbia, 25-27.02.2009
Outline • The Insider Abuse Problem • The Secure Storage Service for the gLite Middleware: • Main Functionalities • Data Access Policy based on VOMS attributes Bogota, EELA-2 Conference, 25-27.02.2009
Insider Abuse: Problem • A grid user could store sensitive data in a Storage Elements managed by external organizations. • Storage Elements Administrators could access data (but the data are sensitive!). For this reason data MUST be stored in an encrypted format. • Data Encryption/Decryption MUST be performed inside user secure environment (for example inside the user’s organization). Bogota, EELA-2 Conference, 25-27.02.2009
Insider Abuse: A Solution SECURE ENVIRONMENT USER (VIRTUAL) ORGANIZATION SE File Encryption /Decryption Encrypted File Key Encrypted File SE Key Repository Bogota, EELA-2 Conference, 25-27.02.2009
The Secure Storage service • Provides gLite users with suitable and simple tools to store confidential data in storage elements in a transparent and secure way. The service is composed by the following components: • Command Line Applications: commands integrated in the gLite User Interface to encrypt/upload and decrypt/ download files. • Application Program Interface: allows the developer to write programs able to manage confidential data. • Keystore: a new grid element used to store and retrieve the users’ keys. It is identified by an host X.509 digital certificate and all its Gridtransactions are mutually authenticated and encrypted according to GSI model. Bogota, EELA-2 Conference, 25-27.02.2009
Command Line Applications and API • Secure Storage provides a new set of commands and API on the gLite User Interface: • Like lcg-utils commands and API, but they work on encrypted data. • Encryption and decryption process are transparent to the user. • These commands and API allow to make the main Data Management operations: • lcg-scr: Copy data/file on Storage Elements • lcg-scp: Read data/file from Storage Elements • lcg-sdel: Delete data/file on Storage Elements • …. • API like GFAL (encrypt and decrypt block of data): • allows developers to work to encrypted remote file as local files in clear format. Bogota, EELA-2 Conference, 25-27.02.2009
ACL OWNER DN DN1 DN2 FQAN1 FQAN2 … lcg-scr: Encryption and Storage Access authorized to: DN1, DN2, FQAN1, FQAN2, … GSI AUTHENTICATED CHANNEL A FQAN AUTHORIZED TO ACCESS THE FILE CAN REPRESENT A WHOLE VO OR A VO GROUP ETC. Bogota, EELA-2 Conference, 25-27.02.2009
ACL OWNER DN DN1 DN2 FQAN1 FQAN2 … lcg-scp: Retrieval and Decryption GSI AUTHENTICATED CHANNEL THE KEYSTORE PROVIDES USERS WITH THE KEY ONLY IF USER’S DN OR ONE OF THE VOMS ATTRIBUTES INCLUDED IN HIS PROXY MATCHES ONE ENTRY OF THE ACL Bogota, EELA-2 Conference, 25-27.02.2009
Any questions ? Bogota, EELA-2 Conference, 25-27.02.2009