Environmental Protection & the Oceans: Regulating Intentional Oil Pollution

1. Environmental Protection & the Oceans: Regulating Intentional Oil Pollution “It was in many ways in the field of marine pollution that the international environmental negotiating community learnt its craft” (Tony Brenton, 1993:91)

2. Environmental Protection & the Oceans: Regulating Intentional Oil Pollution • Intentional discharge of oil is the primary source of oil pollution: 1 million tons annually (60-70% of all oil from ships, including from spills) • Three major sources of intentional oil pollution: * Oil tankers fill their cargo holds with seawater to serve as ballast on return journeys, later pumping this back out to sea * Cleaning tanks with water before receiving more oil * Oil and lubricants leak and mix with ship bilges

3. Why Regulating ShippingActivities is Difficult • Thousands of ships and port visits around the world each year • Most ships are foreign owned • Most ships registered in foreign countries different than that of owners: “Flag States” (e.g., Bahamas, Cyprus) • Ships operated by other companies usually based in other countries • Crews often from LDC’s: poorly paid with limited training • Officers often of different nationalities from crew • Margins are tight as merchant ships are in oversupply • Maritime “culture” dislikes regulation: the law of the sea is not the same as the law of the land

4. Early History of Action(1920 - WWII) • 1920s: Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (UK) and National Coast Anti-pollution League (US) lobbied respective governments in response to oiled birds and beaches • 1922: UK responds by banning intentional discharges within 3 miles of shore (territorial limit) • 1924: US does the same • 1926: US convenes first international conference to eliminate intentional discharges: attended by 13 nations • Much debate over the persistence of oil in the ocean • Compromise agreement to restrict discharges to outside 50 miles from coast • Agreement never signed • Limited voluntary compliance by industry (where cost-effective)

5. Early History of Action(1920 - WWII) • 1920s: Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (UK) and National Coast Anti-pollution League (US) lobbied respective governments in response to oiled birds and beaches • 1922: UK responds by banning intentional discharges within 3 miles of shore (territorial limit) • 1924: US does the same • 1926: US convenes first international conference to eliminate intentional discharges: attended by 13 nations… - Much debate over the persistence of oil in the ocean - Compromise agreement to restrict discharges to outside 50 miles from coast - Agreement never signed - Limited voluntary compliance by industry (where cost-effective)

6. Early History of Action(1920 - WWII) 1935: Draft Convention: • Expanded restricted zone from 50 - 150 miles • Discussions over requiring on new ships expensive oily water separators (to be discharged in port receptor facilities) overturned by nations with strong shipping interests, including US and UK. i.e., UK/US took leadership role to placate domestic environ. lobbies, but not willing to impose costly regulations • States required to impose fines on violators • Ship masters required to record in log book incidences involving oil discharges • Convention never signed: opposition from Italy, Japan, and Germany and related looming conflict...

7. Early History of Action(1920 - WWII) • 1936: Oil tanker accidents in US raise concern and prompt passage of Tank Vessel Act = “stricter operational and construction standards for American tankers”, and required US/UK ship owners to expand voluntary compliance to 1926 regulations to 100 miles offshore • These led to noticeable decrease in oil pollution along US coasts with subsequent declining concern by US

8. Post-War Progress Vastly increased international shipping, especially oil tankers, led to dramatic rise in marine pollution 1954: UK-led International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of Sea by Oil • Meeting in London: 32 countries attended • UK proposed regulating discharges throughout ocean • UK recommends “slop tanks” & reception facilities • Industries opposed slop tanks and governments opposed reception facilities because of costs • Few countries felt problem serious enough to warrant strong regulations • Convention resembled pre-War agreements, but with slightly more stringent requirements for releases within zones (lowered max. from 500 to 100ppm) • Convention was first one officially signed, but problem of enforcement remained and so agreement was largely ineffective

9. Post-War Progress, cont`d. 1958: Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) founded by UN. General mandate to address all aspects of international shipping regulation. Assumed responsibility for marine oil pollution issues. 1962: IMCO sponsored Conference: 38 states attending • Expanded restricted zone to 100 miles in many areas, including whole of Baltic and North Seas • New tankers (>20,000 tons) banned from discharging anywhere in the ocean • Problem of compliance persists • Increasing R&D into alternative technologies for reducing oil discharges. e.g., Load on Top (LOT) method inexpensive and widely adopted by industry 1967: Torrey Canyon spill in English Channel plus general increase in environmental awareness led to greater public pressure 1969 Convention Amendments: Established total discharge limits for all oceans--first time that total discharges were reduced, not just redistributed

10. Post-War Progress, cont`d. 1958: Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) founded by UN. General mandate to address all aspects of international shipping regulation. Assumed responsibility for marine oil pollution issues. 1962: IMCO sponsored Conference: 38 states attending • Expanded restricted zone to 100 miles in many areas, including whole of Baltic and North Seas • New tankers (>20,000 tons) banned from discharging anywhere in the ocean • Problem of compliance persists • Increasing R&D into alternative technologies for reducing oil discharges. e.g., Load on Top (LOT) method inexpensive and widely adopted by industry 1967: Torrey Canyon spill in English Channel plus general increase in environmental awareness led to greater public pressure 1969 Convention Amendments: Established total discharge limits for all oceans--first time that total discharges were reduced, not just redistributed

11. Post-War Progress, cont`d. 1958: Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) founded by UN. General mandate to address all aspects of international shipping regulation. Assumed responsibility for marine oil pollution issues. 1962: IMCO sponsored Conference: 38 states attending • Expanded restricted zone to 100 miles in many areas, including whole of Baltic and North Seas • New tankers (>20,000 tons) banned from discharging anywhere in the ocean • Problem of compliance persists • Increasing R&D into alternative technologies for reducing oil discharges. e.g., Load on Top (LOT) method inexpensive and widely adopted by industry 1967: Torrey Canyon spill in English Channel plus general increase in environmental awareness led to greater public pressure 1969 Convention Amendments: Established total discharge limits for all oceans--first time that total discharges were reduced, not just redistributed

12. Post-War Progress, cont`d. 1972: Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment 1972: Strong domestic pressure in US leads to US Ports and Waterways Safety Act, which unilaterally threatened to deny ships entry to US ports if they failed to comply to a whole sweep of new technology standards 1973: International Conference on Marine Pollution and International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) • Addressed oil discharge within a broader framework of marine pollution (garbage, sewage, chemicals) • Tightened regulations for 1969 Amendments • Required new technologies for all ships built after 1979: Oily water separators using SBT: Segregated Ballast Tanks and monitoring devices. • Increased inspection rights of states for ships entering their ports • Provided funds for training of LDC Merchant Marine and for reception facilities

13. Post-War Progress, cont`d. 1972: Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment 1972: Strong domestic pressure in US leads to US Ports and Waterways Safety Act, which unilaterally threatened to deny ships entry to US ports if they failed to comply to a whole sweep of new technology standards 1973: International Conference on Marine Pollution and International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) • Addressed oil discharge within a broader framework of marine pollution (garbage, sewage, chemicals) • Tightened regulations for 1969 Amendments • Required new technologies for all ships built after 1979: Oily water separators using SBT: Segregated Ballast Tanks and monitoring devices. • Increased inspection rights of states for ships entering their ports • Provided funds for training of LDC Merchant Marine and for reception facilities

14. Post-War Progress, cont`d. 1976/7: Series of oil spills plus pro-environment US President (Carter): threats of unilateral action if MARPOL not strengthened quickly 1978: Protocol to MARPOL • Industry responded to pressures by proposing Crude Oil Washing (COW) on all tankers • All new crude oil tankers over 20,000 tons to install COW and SBT; while requiring existing tankers over 40,000 tons to install either COW or SBT (the former is cheaper so typically used) 1980s -1990s: With regulations in place, effort shifted more towards improving monitoring and compliance. • e.g., EU Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control; increased inspections in US, Canada and Japan 1989: Exxon Valdez spill, Alaska, prompts US 1990 Oil Pollution Act requiring double hulls on tankers by 2015 2003: Spill of coast of Spain: Has prompted efforts to strengthen EU policy with intent to eliminate older tankers from EU waters

15. Post-War Progress, cont`d. 1976/7: Series of oil spills plus pro-environment US President (Carter): threats of unilateral action if MARPOL not strengthened quickly 1978: Protocol to MARPOL • Industry responded to pressures by proposing Crude Oil Washing (COW) on all tankers • All new crude oil tankers over 20,000 tons to install COW and SBT; while requiring existing tankers over 40,000 tons to install either COW or SBT (the former is cheaper so typically used) 1980s -1990s: With regulations in place, effort shifted more towards improving monitoring and compliance. • e.g., EU Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control; increased inspections in US, Canada and Japan 1989: Exxon Valdez spill, Alaska, prompts US 1990 Oil Pollution Act requiring double hulls on tankers by 2015 2003: Spill of coast of Spain: Has prompted efforts to strengthen EU policy with intent to eliminate older tankers from EU waters

16. Post-War Progress, cont`d. 1976/7: Series of oil spills plus pro-environment US President (Carter): threats of unilateral action if MARPOL not strengthened quickly 1978: Protocol to MARPOL • Industry responded to pressures by proposing Crude Oil Washing (COW) on all tankers • All new crude oil tankers over 20,000 tons to install COW and SBT; while requiring existing tankers over 40,000 tons to install either COW or SBT (the former is cheaper so typically used) 1980s -1990s: With regulations in place, effort shifted more towards improving monitoring and compliance. • e.g., EU Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control; increased inspections in US, Canada and Japan 1989: Exxon Valdez spill, Alaska, prompts US 1990 Oil Pollution Act requiring double hulls on tankers by 2015 2003: Spill of coast of Spain: Has prompted efforts to strengthen EU policy with intent to eliminate older tankers from EU waters

17. Post-War Progress, cont`d. 1976/7: Series of oil spills plus pro-environment US President (Carter): threats of unilateral action if MARPOL not strengthened quickly 1978: Protocol to MARPOL • Industry responded to pressures by proposing Crude Oil Washing (COW) on all tankers • All new crude oil tankers over 20,000 tons to install COW and SBT; while requiring existing tankers over 40,000 tons to install either COW or SBT (the former is cheaper so typically used) 1980s -1990s: With regulations in place, effort shifted more towards improving monitoring and compliance. • e.g., EU Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control; increased inspections in US, Canada and Japan 1989: Exxon Valdez spill, Alaska, prompts US 1990 Oil Pollution Act requiring double hulls on tankers by 2015 2003: Spill of coast of Spain: Has prompted efforts to strengthen EU policy with intent to eliminate older tankers from EU waters

18. Canada and Intentional Oil Pollution • Major Shipping lanes along SE coast of Newfoundland (to St. Lawrence) and east coast off Nova Scotia • Most Obvious Impact: est. 300,000 seabirds die each year from oil exposure (murres, puffins, sea ducks, gulls) • Minimal exposure (spot the size of a quarter) will slowly kill a bird by destroying insulation and enabling freezing water to contact skin directly.

19. Canada and Intentional Oil Pollution Key Government Players & Responsibilities: • Environment Canada: Pollution (CEPA, Fisheries Act, Migratory Birds Convention Act) • Transport Can.: marine poll’n, safety (Shipping Act) • Coast Guard (DFO): surveillance, search & rescue • National Defense: security, search & rescue • Justice: prosecutions • Foreign Affairs: international law • Industry Canada/Canada Space Agency: commerce and surveillance

22. Canada, cont’d. Enforcement & Prosecutions: • Surveillance by airplane or satellite (all weather) • Oil analysis: chemical fingerprinting comparing marine spill with on-ship bilge waters • Wind drift back-cast modeling (Meteorological Service) • Formal charges under one of Statutes (CEPA, FA, CSA, MBCA) • 2005: Bill C-15: Act to Amend the Migratory Birds Convention Act and Canadian Environmental Protection Act: Puts teeth in government’s ability to prosecute infractions

23. Canada, cont’d. Enforcement & Prosecutions: • Surveillance by airplane or satellite (all weather) • Oil analysis: chemical fingerprinting comparing marine spill with on-ship bilge waters • Wind drift back-cast modeling (Meteorological Service) • Formal charges under one of Statutes (CEPA, FA, CSA, MBCA) • 2005: Bill C-15: Act to Amend the Migratory Birds Convention Act and Canadian Environmental Protection Act: Puts teeth in government’s ability to prosecute infractions

24. Canada, cont’d. Enforcement & Prosecutions: • Surveillance by airplane or satellite (all weather) • Oil analysis: chemical fingerprinting comparing marine spill with on-ship bilge waters • Wind drift back-cast modeling (Meteorological Service) • Formal charges under one of Statutes (CEPA, FA, CSA, MBCA) • 2005: Bill C-15: Act to Amend the Migratory Birds Convention Act and Canadian Environmental Protection Act: Puts teeth in government’s ability to prosecute infractions

25. Summary: Lessons Learned • Experience showed a history of low compliance on discharge standards, but high compliance on equipment and construction standards because the latter are easier to enforce and also produce a “level-playing field” for industry. Newer ships are far less polluting and so can expect continued improvements. • Unilateral action to spur international action was critical: US/UK in early years and US in later years (1970s) • Industry influential, both in stalling early progress and later developing cost-effective alternatives; motivated by desire to head-off more rigorous regulations • Continued problem of inadequate reception facilities, especially in LDCs • Influence of environmental disasters: oil tanker accidents have often triggered action, even though accidents and intentional releases are largely un-related issues • Minor role of science (in contrast to Ozone, Whaling, Climate change, etc.). In fact, there still is little consensus over just how serious a threat intentional oil releases are to the environment

26. Summary: Lessons Learned • Experience showed a history of low compliance on discharge standards, but high compliance on equipment and construction standards because the latter are easier to enforce and also produce a “level-playing field” for industry. Newer ships are far less polluting and so can expect continued improvements. • Unilateral action to spur international action was critical: US/UK in early years and US in later years (1970s) • Industry influential, both in stalling early progress and later developing cost-effective alternatives; motivated by desire to head-off more rigorous regulations • Continued problem of inadequate reception facilities, especially in LDCs • Influence of environmental disasters: oil tanker accidents have often triggered action, even though accidents and intentional releases are largely un-related issues • Minor role of science (in contrast to Ozone, Whaling, Climate change, etc.). In fact, there still is little consensus over just how serious a threat intentional oil releases are to the environment

27. Summary: Lessons Learned • Experience showed a history of low compliance on discharge standards, but high compliance on equipment and construction standards because the latter are easier to enforce and also produce a “level-playing field” for industry. Newer ships are far less polluting and so can expect continued improvements. • Unilateral action to spur international action was critical: US/UK in early years and US in later years (1970s) • Industry influential, both in stalling early progress and later developing cost-effective alternatives; motivated by desire to head-off more rigorous regulations • Continued problem of inadequate reception facilities, especially in LDCs • Influence of environmental disasters: oil tanker accidents have often triggered action, even though accidents and intentional releases are largely un-related issues • Minor role of science (in contrast to Ozone, Whaling, Climate change, etc.). In fact, there still is little consensus over just how serious a threat intentional oil releases are to the environment

28. Summary: Lessons Learned • Experience showed a history of low compliance on discharge standards, but high compliance on equipment and construction standards because the latter are easier to enforce and also produce a “level-playing field” for industry. Newer ships are far less polluting and so can expect continued improvements. • Unilateral action to spur international action was critical: US/UK in early years and US in later years (1970s) • Industry influential, both in stalling early progress and later developing cost-effective alternatives; motivated by desire to head-off more rigorous regulations • Continued problem of inadequate reception facilities, especially in LDCs • Influence of environmental disasters: oil tanker accidents have often triggered action, even though accidents and intentional releases are largely un-related issues • Minor role of science (in contrast to Ozone, Whaling, Climate change, etc.). In fact, there still is little consensus over just how serious a threat intentional oil releases are to the environment

29. Summary: Lessons Learned • Experience showed a history of low compliance on discharge standards, but high compliance on equipment and construction standards because the latter are easier to enforce and also produce a “level-playing field” for industry. Newer ships are far less polluting and so can expect continued improvements. • Unilateral action to spur international action was critical: US/UK in early years and US in later years (1970s) • Industry influential, both in stalling early progress and later developing cost-effective alternatives; motivated by desire to head-off more rigorous regulations • Continued problem of inadequate reception facilities, especially in LDCs • Influence of environmental disasters: oil tanker accidents have often triggered action, even though accidents and intentional releases are largely un-related issues • Minor role of science (in contrast to Ozone, Whaling, Climate change, etc.). In fact, there still is little consensus over just how serious a threat intentional oil releases are to the environment

30. Summary: Lessons Learned • Experience showed a history of low compliance on discharge standards, but high compliance on equipment and construction standards because the latter are easier to enforce and also produce a “level-playing field” for industry. Newer ships are far less polluting and so can expect continued improvements. • Unilateral action to spur international action was critical: US/UK in early years and US in later years (1970s) • Industry influential, both in stalling early progress and later developing cost-effective alternatives; motivated by desire to head-off more rigorous regulations • Continued problem of inadequate reception facilities, especially in LDCs • Influence of environmental disasters: oil tanker accidents have often triggered action, even though accidents and intentional releases are largely un-related issues • Minor role of science (in contrast to Ozone, Whaling, Climate change, etc.). In fact, there still is little consensus over just how serious a threat intentional oil releases are to the environment