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Macdona Derailment Issues and Lessons Learned. Scott Harris, Ph.D. Federal On-Scene Coordinator USEPA-R6. What Happened?. June 28, 2004 Westbound Union Pacific Eastbound Burlington Northern Pulling onto siding to let UP pass Not yet clear of main line UP cuts through BNSF and derails
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Macdona DerailmentIssues and Lessons Learned Scott Harris, Ph.D. Federal On-Scene Coordinator USEPA-R6
What Happened? • June 28, 2004 • Westbound Union Pacific • Eastbound Burlington Northern • Pulling onto siding to let UP pass • Not yet clear of main line • UP cuts through BNSF and derails • Blocks road • Flooded Medina River to rear • Traps at least five families
Initial 911 and Response • 911 misunderstands • Concludes medical call related to smoke • VFD drives into chlorine cloud • Firefighter down • Rescue and withdraw • Lesson • 911 operators must have hazmat training
Order to Evacuate • Local IC orders ENS and evacuation • Model predicts 57,000 residents • No ENS sent • No notification of failure to local IC • Lesson • Must not disregard without consultation
911 and UP Contact • 911 contacts UP • “Train-on-train” • Chlorine • 911 advises of response and situation • Lesson • 911 took initiative • May have prevented casualties
NRC Notification • UP notification to NRC • 45 minutes after 911 / UP call • Two trains collided, no cars derailed • Unknown hazmat, impacts or actions • Lessons • NRC Report lacks information known to UP • Minimized impact and urgency • Cost response time while researching
UC/ICS • Major conflict between locals • OSCs arrived, implemented UC/ICS • UP resisted authority • Refused to participate or cooperate • Intended to act against direction of UC/OSC • “Worst-case scenario” • Threat of U.S. Marshall and Federalizing
UC/ICS • Lessons • Immediate UC/ICS clearly aided response • UP resistance created unnecessary drama • OSCs must be familiar with authorities • Prepared to follow through • RPs and contractors must function in ICS • NIMS / NRP • Understand NCP authorities
Federal Agency Coordination • Limited • NTSB process seemed outside ER / EPA • NTSB off-site operations / FRA? • Difficult logistics • Declined UC role • Declined ER Review participation • Excluded EPA from ER Investigation • Lessons • Evaluate whether relationship value-added • Consider future joint operations
Coordination With Others • Excellent • State and local • Co-location and security • Scalable facilities • Technical, operational areas segregated • Lessons • TCEQ Strike Team support invaluable • Logistics, regulatory, UC
RRT Involvement • No specific request for RRT • Twice-daily briefings with HQ and RRC • Lessons • Excellent support from RRC and HQ • Process in place to convene as needed
NTSB Investigation • Report not yet published • Initial site visit on Day 5 • EPA participation • Site completely altered • EPA provided digital photos from ASPECT • Lessons • Material evidence lost by delay • Value of ASPECT photos and video
NRC Tape • Audio of NRC notification lost • Tapes recycled after ~60 days • Not known to OSC • System down from October-February • Lessons • Request ASAP for event record • Digital upgrades • Receive / retain record of all notifications
Follow-up with UP • ER Review • March exercise in San Antonio • Focus on NIMS / ICS • Lessons • Excellent coverage of lessons learned • Improved capabilities and interoperability
Questions? http://www.epaosc.net/macdonatrainderailment
Norfolk Southern DerailmentGraniteville, South Carolina Kevin S. Misenheimer Federal On-Scene Coordinator
Incident Description • At approximately 0300 on January 6, 2005 a Norfolk Southern Train collided with a parked train in the town of Graniteville, SC • Four hazardous materials tank cars derailed (three chlorine, one sodium hydroxide) • One chlorine car was breached, releasing approximately 40 tons of chlorine vapor and liquid • Nine fatalities and hundreds of victims reporting respiratory affects • 1 mile radius evacuation (5,400 people) and 2 mile radius shelter–in–place
EPA Activities • Oversight of NS response actions (hazmat cars) • Maintenance of comprehensive air monitoring network • ICS / Unified Command • Support local hazmat entries for search and recovery • Home re-entry sampling • Business and infrastructure re-entry sampling / support • Veterinary / Animal support
Regional Response Team • No formal activation of Region 4 RRT • Coordination with RRT members through the Regional Response Center • RRT members (SCDHEC, SCEMD, DOT-NTSB, DOT-FRA) had representatives in the Unified Command
Lessons Learned • Locals need NRP / NIMS ICS coaching • PRP resisted use of ICS / UC / data sharing; Not familiar; Saw no value • NTSB trying to conduct accident investigation in a hotzone without adequate training or equipment; Close coordination with FOSC a necessity • Order resources immediately to account for mobe time for ERT, USCG-NSF, etc
Lessons Learned • Standardize data collection immediately • Unified Command works, but is one integrated ICS possible? • Unified Command must share common workspace (resist tendency for individual agencies to hunker down in their own mobile command posts); • What if this had been terrorism…?