Challenges for Integrated Safety Assessments for NextGen

1. Challenges for Integrated Safety Assessments for NextGen AP-15 Meeting Miami, FL March, 2009

2. Briefing Outline • Current SMS Processes • NextGen Safety Process Needs • Integrated Safety Challenges • JPDO Safety Assessments – Far Term • Capability Safety Assessments (CapSA) • Operational Safety Assessments (OSA) – CDA example • NextGen Implementation Plan Safety Assessments – Mid Term

3. Current SMS Processes

4. NextGen Safety Process Needs • SRM: • Standard SMS practice calls for safety management of individual NAS changes (usually implemented and funded by FAA programs) • NextGen includes large changes composed of many smaller changes • Discrete program-level analyses do not adequately address all hazards, particularly those arising from integration of NextGen components • NextGen implementation and integration activities occurring prior to traditional acquisition processes • Safety analysis needed during research and system analysis phase before detailed information is available to conduct current safety analysis

5. NextGen Safety Process Needs • Safety Assurance (SRM alone is not enough): • NextGen ConOps calls for prognostic safety capabilities at AVS and ATO levels to identify safety issues and trends • Safe NextGen implementation requires pro-active safety to address safety issues and trends identified via prognostic analysis or other assurance functions

6. Safety Assessment Structure Increasing integration

7. Integrated Safety Challenges • Organizational responsibilities hamper collaborative safety assessments (JPDO, FAA, AVS, ATO) • Near-term, Mid-term and Far-term activities not currently coordinated • Emphasis until now almost exclusively on safety assurance functions, as opposed to SRM • General agreement that NextGen requires integrated SRM activities and assurance processes without specific responsibility for safety analysis

8. JPDO Safety Assessments – Far Term • Capability Safety Assessment (CapSA) • Targeting the JPDO “Capabilities” • Conducted by the Safety Working Group • Output: general safety observations related to major changes to identify areas requiring further investigation (e.g., MOSA input) • Modified Operational Safety Assessment (MOSA) • Targeting the JPDO concepts (OI’s in most cases) • Conducted by the Working Group owning the concept and facilitated by the Safety Working Group (STAT SC) • Output: specific safety issues requiring design considerations

9. Capability Safety Assessments • CapSA Description • High-level safety assessments of the proposed changes to the air transportation system to identify primary safety issues • Systematic scenario-based process using Subject Matter Experts (SME) • Resources • Sponsored by FAA ATO-P and Safety Working Group • Contract support – Safety WG/ATO-P • Government, industry and academia (directs and SME’s) • Dependencies • Functional analysis of NextGen system • Well-defined NextGen capabilities • Safety accident and incident databases • Access to domain SMEs • Outcome • Quick assessments to identify main safety issues and to focus resources for more in depth safety assessments. • CapSAs will be used by concept WGs and implementing agencies as input into their Safety Assessment process • Work will be sponsored by FAA ATO-P/Safety WG • Inventory of safety issues to be used as input by the Working Groups when performing more detailed safety assessments • Results of analyses feed Safety Assessments by WGs or implementing agencies

10. Modified Operational Safety Assessment (MOSA) • MOSA Definition • High-level safety assessments of concepts/ OI’s to identify existing and emerging hazards • Simplified version of the formal OSA • Resources • Safety Working Group STAT SC will prepare working groups to do their own MOSA for their concepts • Working Group members • Dependencies • LSA results • Well-defined NextGen concepts/ OI’s • Safety hazard databases • Outcome • Safety hazards associated with each concept/ OI and mitigation design considerations to be included with the concept definition throughout the lifecycle

11. MOSA Schedule • FY09Q1 • Develop a credible example of a MOSA to prepare the other Working Groups to perform their own (Continuous Descent Arrival - CDA) • Validate CDA MOSA • FY09Q2 • Prepare Working Groups to perform their own MOSA for each of their concepts

12. NextGen Implementation Plan Safety Assessments – Mid Term • Transition of JPDO Concepts to FAA • NextGen Safety Blueprint • Integrated Safety Analysis • Shift toward risk based modeling and simulation to improve safety • Uses Enterprise Architecture to identify potential interface hazards

13. NextGen Mid-Term SMS Activities SRM Processes • Integrated safety analysis to identify hazards and safety gaps at the capability level Assurance Functions • Coordinated ATO concept for prognostic safety analysis • Address specific ATO analytical needs • Data sharing with ASIAS NextGen Integrated Safety Assessment Increasing integration Capability Safety Assessments Acquisition Management System Safety Assessments (system and program level assessments) Levels of Integrated Safety Analysis

14. Mid-term Safety Activities • Develop process for integrated safety analyses • Determine when data from safety analysis is required to support acquisition decisions and R&D activities • Integration with JPDO safety activities (don’t do the same analysis twice) • Develop coordinated ATO concept for prognostic safety analysis

15. Capability Safety Assessments - Purpose • Early consideration of safety for NextGen concepts / capabilities • identify any safety red flags and watch items for the Regulatory Council • identify the need for potential risk reduction strategies (safety features, alerting functions—e.g., TCAS, GPWS, etc. • provide ATO with necessary safety information for their cost-benefit analyses, for the enterprise architecture and planning, and trades • provide sponsoring entities with safety issues which will likely need to be addressed, planned and budgeted for • support executive decisions with safety information • provide safety issues to be assessed during planned R&D and gather data to support safety analysis • Integrated look at a capability across operational improvements (OIs)

16. Capability Safety Assessments • Description • High-level safety assessments of NextGen concepts/capabilities to identify primary safety issues • Description of the capability or operational change (mini-Operational Service and Environment Description)‏ • Safety Assessment • Hazard identification • Operational Hazard Analysis • Risk Analysis • Resources • Sponsored by FAA ATO-P • Contract support – ATO-P • Dependencies • Functional analysis of NextGen concepts/capabilities • Safety accident and incident databases • Access to domain SMEs • Outcome • Quick assessments to identify main safety issues and to focus resources for more in depth safety assessments during AMS process • Potential Mitigation Strategies • Preliminary Findings and Recommendations • Results of analyses feed other NextGen Implementation Organizations

17. List of Assessments • Equivalent Visual Operations • Airborne Merging and Spacing • Time-Based Metering • Conflict Resolution Advisories • Delegated Responsibility for Separation • Ground-based Augmentation System enabled capabilities • Integrated Arrival / Departure Airspace Management • Enhanced Surface Operations

18. NextGen Safety Context Near Term Mid Term Long Term Conduct integrated safety analyses Supports Design of safe, integrated NextGen systems Develop prognostic safety capabilities Supports Safety assurance of operational NextGen systems

19. Questions