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Semantically Rich Application-Centric Security in Android

Machigar Ongtang , Stephen McLaughlin, William Enck , Patrick McDaniel Department of Computer Science and Engineering The Pennsylvania State University ACSCA 2009. Semantically Rich Application-Centric Security in Android. Outline. Introduction Smartphone Application Security Android

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Semantically Rich Application-Centric Security in Android

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  1. MachigarOngtang, Stephen McLaughlin, William Enck, Patrick McDaniel Department of Computer Science and Engineering The Pennsylvania State University ACSCA 2009 Semantically Rich Application-Centric Security in Android Advanced Defense Laboratory

  2. Outline • Introduction • Smartphone Application Security • Android • Application Policies • SAINT Policy • SAINT Architecture • Related Work • Conclusion Advanced Defense Laboratory

  3. Introduction • Applications on mobile platform • Apple’s App Store • Android’s Market • BlackBerry App World • Android Security • Using permission label Advanced Defense Laboratory

  4. Introduction (cont.) • In Manifest.xml: • You can not use the functions which are not in your application permission Advanced Defense Laboratory

  5. Introduction (cont.) • Users are impossible to make good choices about the application permissions • The Android system protects the phone from malicious applications, but provides severely limited infrastructure for applications to protect themselves Advanced Defense Laboratory

  6. Introduction (cont.) • Android Security Framework • Permission Assignment Policy • Interface Exposure Policy • Interface Use Policy • Secure Application INTeraction (Saint) framework • Installation-time Policy • Runtime Policy Advanced Defense Laboratory

  7. Outline • Introduction • Smartphone Application Security • Android • Application Policies • SAINT Policy • SAINT Architecture • Related Work • Conclusion Advanced Defense Laboratory

  8. Smartphone Application Security PersonalShopper can get location info only if it holds the permissions. • Example: If Ledger has the permission to access Internet, it might leak transaction info. PeronalShopper only trust Secure Payment and Trust Checkout . Password vault app contain bugs in v1.1. So application needs the new version. Advanced Defense Laboratory

  9. Outline • Introduction • Smartphone Application Security • Android • Application Policies • SAINT Policy • SAINT Architecture • Related Work • Conclusion Advanced Defense Laboratory

  10. Android http://developer.android.com/intl/zh-TW/guide/basics/what-is-android.html Advanced Defense Laboratory

  11. Android (cont.) • Applications are ostensibly isolated • Android IPC : Binder and Intent • ioctl driver • Intent Filter: Advanced Defense Laboratory

  12. Android (cont.) • Activity • Display on screen Advanced Defense Laboratory

  13. Android (cont.) • Service • Background process Advanced Defense Laboratory

  14. Android (cont.) • Broadcast Receiver • Asynchronous event notification Advanced Defense Laboratory

  15. Android (cont.) • Content Provider • Share data between applications • Do not use Intents • Use URI (Uniform Resource Identifier) Advanced Defense Laboratory

  16. Android (cont.) • Permission label in Android • Normal • Dangerous • Signature • signatureOrSystem • Developers can define permission labels to access their interface • But developers indirectly influence security Advanced Defense Laboratory

  17. Outline • Introduction • Smartphone Application Security • Android • Application Policies • SAINT Policy • SAINT Architecture • Related Work • Conclusion Advanced Defense Laboratory

  18. Application Policies • Policy Tree: • Double-stoke boxes is supported by Android Advanced Defense Laboratory

  19. Application Policies (cont.) • Signature-based policy (1.2) • Define set of except signatures • Configuration-based policy (1.3) • E.g., Application version and the set of request permissions Advanced Defense Laboratory

  20. Application Policies (cont.) • Signature-based policy (2.2) • Configuration-based policy (2.3) • Phone Context-based Policy (2.4) Advanced Defense Laboratory

  21. Application Policies (cont.) • Install-time Policy Example • com.abc.lbs with “QueryByLocation” service • Developer Permission: com.abc.perm.getloc • Permission: ACCESS_LOCATION • Runtime Policy Example • com.ok.shopper wants to check the payment application • Signature checks Advanced Defense Laboratory

  22. Outline • Introduction • Smartphone Application Security • Android • Application Policies • SAINT Policy • SAINT Architecture • Related Work • Conclusion Advanced Defense Laboratory

  23. SAINT Policy Install-Time Run-Time Advanced Defense Laboratory

  24. SAINT Policy (cont.) • Install-time Policy Example Advanced Defense Laboratory

  25. SAINT Policy (cont.) • Runtime Policy • Access policy • Identify the caller’s security requirements • Expose policy • Identify the callee’s security requirements • Saint is a “conjunctional default allow policy” Advanced Defense Laboratory

  26. SAINT Policy (cont.) • Runtime PolicyExample Advanced Defense Laboratory

  27. SAINT Policy (cont.) • Administrative Policy • May users override the system/application policies? • Operational Policy Advanced Defense Laboratory

  28. Outline • Introduction • Smartphone Application Security • Android • Application Policies • SAINT Policy • SAINT Architecture • Related Work • Conclusion Advanced Defense Laboratory

  29. SAINT Architecture • Saint Installer • PackageParser / PackageManager • Insert each policy into AppPolicy provider only if its permission label is declared by the application Advanced Defense Laboratory

  30. SAINT Architecture (cont.) • Saint Mediator Advanced Defense Laboratory

  31. SAINT Architecture (cont.) • AppPolicy Provider • SQLite • verifyPermissionGrant API • insertApplicationPolicy API • FrameworkPolicyManager • Only FrameworkPolicyManager can update AppPolicy provider Advanced Defense Laboratory

  32. Outline • Introduction • Smartphone Application Security • Android • Application Policies • SAINT Policy • SAINT Architecture • Related Work • Conclusion Advanced Defense Laboratory

  33. Related Work • Kirin • Enforce install policies • Application Security Framework by OMTP • Certificate-based mechanism • Symbian • Symbian-signed Advanced Defense Laboratory

  34. Related Work (cont.) • Linux Security Module (LSM) Framework • Isolation • SELinux on OpenMoko • Rao et al. • MAC system • Windows Mobile .Net • Bind each application to a behavioral profile enforced at runtime Advanced Defense Laboratory

  35. Outline • Introduction • Smartphone Application Security • Android • Application Policies • SAINT Policy • SAINT Architecture • Related Work • Conclusion Advanced Defense Laboratory

  36. Conclusion • Saint framework • Install-time and runtime policy enforcement Advanced Defense Laboratory

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