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Thank you very much for your attention! borisov.evgeny@gmail

Evgeny Borisov Tomsk State University Faculty of Philosophy On the Semantics of Definite Descriptions in Predicative Position.

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Thank you very much for your attention! borisov.evgeny@gmail

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  1. EvgenyBorisovTomsk State UniversityFaculty of PhilosophyOn the Semantics of Definite Descriptions in Predicative Position

  2. A definite description (DD) can be used as an argument for a predicate and as a predicate. Strawson (‘On Referring’) illustrates this distinction as follows:(1) The greatest French soldier died in exile.(2) Napoleon was the greatest French soldier.In (1), the DD occurs in argumental position.In (2), it occurs in predicative position.

  3. I adopt the presuppositional analysis of DDs according to which they trigger presuppositions.Informally, presuppositions triggered by ‘the F’ in argumental position can be expressed like this:(Existence) There is an F.(Uniqueness) There is no more than one F.For instance, uttering ‘The King is bald’, we presuppose that there is a king, and that there is no more than one king.

  4. The question to be discussed: What presupposition is triggered by a DD in predicative position (PDD)?My hypothesis: a PDD triggers the same presuppositions as an argumental DD does - Uniqueness and Existence.

  5. The alternative theory to be discussed was proposed by E. Coppock & D. Beaver. Coppock E., Beaver D. (2012). ‘Weak uniqueness: The only difference between definites and indefinites’. In A. Chereches (Ed.), Proceedings of semantics and linguistic theory (SALT) 22 (pp. 527–544). Ithaca, NY: CLC PublicationsCoppock E., Beaver D. (2015). ‘Definiteness and Determinacy’, Linguistics and Philosophy 38, pp. 377-435.

  6. According to C.&B., ‘the F’ in predicative position triggers ‘weak uniqueness’ (Uniqueness without Existence): (x, y)(Fx & Fyx=y)

  7. ‘The anti-uniqueness effect’ (Coppock & Beaver)(1) Scott is not the only author of Waverley.(1) is inconsistent with there being exactly one denotation of ‘the only author…’. Coppock and Beaver conclude that the DD in question does not presuppose Existence.

  8. Consider two sentences:(1) Scott is the author of Waverley.(2) Scott is the only author of Waverley.In (2) ‘only’ seems to be redundant. But it is not so if I utter (2) to deny your belief that Scott and Russell jointly wrote Waverley. The conversation might look like this:- The part written by Russell is especially good, isn’t it?- You are wrong – Scott is the only author!

  9. (2) Scott is the only author of Waverley.My hypothesis: in (2), ‘only’ is not part of the description ‘the only author…’. It rather modifies ‘the author…’ by cancelling the uniqueness presupposition am making Uniqueness to be the asserted content.

  10. ‘a is the only F’ presupposes: xFx (the existence presupposition of ‘the’)Fa (the presupposition signalled by ‘only’)asserts: (x)(Fxx=a).

  11. Accordingly, ‘a is not the only F’ presupposes: xFx (the existence presupposition of ‘the’)Fa (the presupposition signalled by ‘only’)asserts: (x)(Fxx=a)or, equivalently: x(Fx & x=a)This assertion accounts for the anti-uniqueness effect.

  12. How can we account for such behavior of ‘only’?My hypothesis: in conversation, we can use restrictive expressions (‘the only’, ‘the sole’ etc.), as well as negation, not to contribute to the common background but to refute/correct something in the background of our interlocutor. When doing so, we make presuppositions explicit.

  13. Returning to C.&B.’s example.Uttering ‘Scott is not the only author…’, I want to say:Indeed, Scott was an author. But you seem to presuppose that nobody else was. This presupposition is wrong – there was another author.Thus, I do still presuppose Existence. I just cancel Uniqueness (as a presupposition) in order to be able to explicitly deny it. Cancelling Uniqueness does not affect Existence.

  14. C. & B. support their anti-uniqueness claim by three sorts of example – negations, questions, and conditionals:Scott is not the only author.Is Scott the only author?If Scott is the only author, then…My hypothesis: all the three sorts of sentence have in common that we use them to discuss presuppositions. Because of this, questions and conditionals can be treated along the lines of suggested treatment of negation sentences.

  15. Thank you very much for your attention! borisov.evgeny@gmail.com

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