Inferring Internet Denial-of-Service Activity

1. Inferring Internet Denial-of-Service Activity Authors: David Moore, Geoffrey M. Voelker and Stefan Savage; University of California, San Diego Publish: Usenix Security Symposium 2001 Presenter: Xingbo Gao

2. Outline • Contribution • Motivation • Introduction of Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attacks • Basic Methodology • Attack Classification • Results • Strengths, Weakness and Improvements

3. Contribution • Presented a novel technique “backscatter analysis” to estimate the worldwide DoS activity • Performed three-week long real experiments on /8 network and classified the DoS attacks quantitatively

4. Motivation • How prevalent are DoS attacks in the Internet today? • How often? • What attack protocols used? • Attack rate? • Attack duration? • Victim names and domains? • And more …

5. DoS Attack Introduction • Devastating • Feb. 2000 “fast” and “intense” assault took down Yahoo, Ebay and E*trade • Yahoo main site were unreachable for around three hours on Monday • "This was so fast and so intense that we couldn't even redirect our traffic," Yahoo spokesperson said. (CNN) • Jan. 2001 manual mis-configuration of a router caused Microsoft websites unreachable for Tue and Wed; inaccessible throughout Thursday due to a DoS attack (PC World) • FBI investigated both incidents …

6. DoS Attack Introduction - contd • Logic attacks: software flaws • Ping-of-Death • Flooding attacks: overwhelm CPU, memory or network resources • SYN flood • TCP ACK, NUL, RST and DATA floods • ICMP Echo Request floods • And so on …

7. SYN flood TCP RST DoS Attack Introduction - contd S D A D SYNx LISTEN Non-existent spoofed SYN LISTEN SYNy, ACKx+1 SYN_RECVD SYN_RECVD SYN+ACK ACKy+1 Port flooding occurs CONNECTED

8. DoS Attack Introduction - contd • Distributed denial-of-service attack (DDoS) • Control a group of “zombie” hosts to launch assault on specific target(s) • A botnet can perform the DDoS attacks • IP spoofing • Attackers forge IP source addresses • Simple technique but very difficult to trace-back • “Backscatter” is based on IP spoofing

9. Basic Methodology - Backscatter E Attacker Victim backscatter B D

10. Experimental Platform Internet n - # distinct IP addresses monitored m - # attacking packets Hub Monitor R’ – measured average inter-arrival rate of backscatter /8 network

11. Attack Classification • Flow-based classification • A flow is a series of consecutive packets sharing the same target IP address and IP protocol • Flow lifetime: fixed five-minute approach • Reduce noise and misconfiguration traffic by setting thresholds • Extract packet information from flows • Event-based classification • Flow-based obscures time-domain characteristics • An attack event is defined by a victim emitting at least ten backscatter packets in one minute

12. Experimental Results Breakdown of attack protocols

13. Attack Frequency Estimated number of attacks per hour as a function of time (UTC)

14. Attack Rate and Duration Cumulative distribution of estimated attack rates in packets per second Probability density of attack durations

15. Strengths of the Paper • Presented a novel technique “backscatter analysis” to estimate the worldwide DoS activity • Performed three-week long real experiments on /8 network and classified the DoS attacks quantitatively • Data is still available for public research

16. Weakness of the Paper • Analysis Limitations • Uniformity of spoofed source addresses • Reliable delivery of backscatter • Backscatter hypothesis • Difficult to validate • Unable to explain some scenarios presented in resulted graphs

17. How to Improve the Paper? • Find and create a theoretic model to model DoS attacks like worm propagation? • Take geography into consideration • Take more researches and experiments to fully explain the figures presented

18. Questions ?