German expansion in Europe, 1936 - 39

2. German expansion in Europe, 1936 - 39

3. In November 1937 Hitler called a meeting of his military chiefs. He outlined his military plans. Colonel Hossbach made these notes of the meeting: ‘German politics must reckon with its two most hateful enemies, England and France ... The German question can be solved only by way of force, and this is never without risk ... For the improvement of our military position it must be our first aim ... to conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria.‘

4. When I think of those four terrible years [1914 – 18] and I think of the seven million young men who died, the thirteen million who were maimed and mutilated, then I am bound to say – in war there are no winners, but all are losers. It is those thoughts which have made me feel that it was my duty to make every effort to avoid a repetition of the Great War in Europe. Neville Chamberlain‘s speech (adapted), July 1938

5. I will begin by saying what everybody would like to ignore or forget but which must nevertheless be stated ... We have experienced a total defeat. Silent, mournful, abandoned, broken, Czechoslovakia disappears into the darkness ... You will find that sooner or later Czechoslovakia will be swallowed up in the Nazi regime ... And do not suppose this is the end. This is only the beginning. Winston Churchill‘s speech (adapted) on the Munich Conference

6. Chamberlain gave Hitler everything he asked for. Hundreds of thousands of Czech citizens and the magnificent defences of their frontier were handed over ... It was not only Czechoslovakia that was ruined. We and the French had lost a good cause and our good name; we had lost a well-armed ally on Germany‘s southern frontier and the chance of resisting Germany in alliance with Russia. We rearmed during this year [1938 – 39], but not to equal the Czech arms which had been thrown away. Chamberlain did not realise the disaster he had helped to cause. E. Nash and A. Newth, Britain in the Modern World, 1967

7. The British statesmen [concerning Munich] used practical arguments: the danger from air attack by the Germans if war broke out, the backwardness of Britain‘s military forces. It would be impossible for Britain to help Czechoslovakia even if she had the military strength. British policy at Munich supported the belief that the Germans were entitled to the Sudetenland on the grounds that it was German territory. The settlement at Munich was a triumph for British policy – not a triumph for Hitler. It was a triumph for all those who believed in equal justice between peoples. Adapted from A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, 1961