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Medicare Advantage Payment System. Mark Miller, PhD Medicare Payment Advisory Commission May 4, 2009. Principle of Medicare Advantage payments. FFS is a fragmented delivery system No focus on coordination or quality MA plans paid monthly capitated amount to provide Medicare benefits
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Medicare Advantage Payment System Mark Miller, PhD Medicare Payment Advisory Commission May 4, 2009
Principle of Medicare Advantage payments • FFS is a fragmented delivery system • No focus on coordination or quality • MA plans paid monthly capitated amount to provide Medicare benefits • Ability to coordinate care, target quality improvements, negotiate provider networks and rates • Underlying principle: savings from efficiency allow plans to provide extra benefits and increase enrollment • Original payments: 95% of FFS
Bids and benchmarks • MA plans bid against county-level bidding targets, known as “benchmarks” • If a plan’s bid exceeds the benchmark: • Program pays benchmark • Enrollee pays the remainder as premium • If bid is less than the benchmark: • Program pays the bid + 75% of difference to plan for “extra benefits” to beneficiary • Program keeps 25% of difference
MA benchmarks and FFS spending • MA benchmarks are administratively set and related to a county’s FFS spending • Counties with high per beneficiary FFS costs (high utilization) have higher benchmarks • Greater ability to offer extra benefits • Conversely, counties with low per beneficiary FFS costs (low utilization) have lower benchmarks • Less ability to offer extra benefits • Led to exceptions, e.g., rural and urban “floors”
Current MA benchmarks simplified High Current Benchmark Floor Benchmark Low Low High Local FFS spending
Implications of MA payment system • Non-neutrality: Payments 14 percent above FFS • Each enrollee in MA results in costs to Medicare relative to FFS • No incentive for efficiency: All extra benefits are subsidized on average $1.30 per $1.00 of extra benefits, or $3.26 per $1.00 of extra benefits in a PFFS plan • No incentive for care coordination: High benchmarks encourage plans that are not designed to coordinate care and improve quality • Costs subsidized by taxpayers and Part B premium higher for all beneficiaries in MA or not