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Nuclear Africa 2014 Rob Adam NIASA. Contents. Global situation Local situation Perspectives of industry 2014. Global situation. Political fallout. Source: WNA (2013). Expensive upgrades. Source: WNA (2013). Financial challenges. Source: WNA (2013). Positive developments.
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Nuclear Africa 2014 Rob Adam NIASA
Contents • Global situation • Local situation • Perspectives of industry • 2014.
Political fallout Source: WNA (2013)
Expensive upgrades Source: WNA (2013)
Financial challenges Source: WNA (2013)
Positive developments Source: WNA (2013)
Nuclear drivers Source: WNA (2013)
New build map Source: WNA (2013)
Future plans Source: WNA (2013)
What has changed over the past 2 years? •President now chairs (NEC)2 • New Minister of Energy • BRICS dynamic • Mozambican offshore gas • Karoo shale gas
BRICS dynamics •SA is an enthusiastic new member • All other BRICS countries have nuclear (and space!) programmes. • Shifts in relations with Western countries as a result of African geopolitics. • SA – Russia trade levels currently low • China has several nuclear offerings
Recoverable East African gas reserves Trillion cubic feet Source: D. Ledesma, “East Africa Gas – Potential for Export”, 2013.
Is East African gas a baseload option? No problem really. Much longer pipelines reliably deliver gas to much larger markets.
Who will own the value chain? • In 2009 Sasol was a major player but has been overtaken by Anadarko (USA) and ENI (Italy). • Cost of development of LNG train is $US 12 – 20 bn. Australian offshore platform will cost $US 50 – 60 bn. • Mozambique GDP = $US14 bn, Tanzania GDP = $US 28 bn. Pressure will therefore be put on these governments to trade equity for operational contributions. • The conclusion is that these resources will not be controlled by Africa.
Energy security? Conflict returns to Mozambique after 21 years
Initial shale gas success in the US was driven by 9 enablers • Good understanding of a large high quality resource base. • Ease of land accumulation. • Water availability and lenient environmental regulations. • Clear policy and fiscal regime. • Availability of capital. • Technology evolution and aggressive risk appetite. • Sustained periods of high gas prices. • Some available pipeline infrastructure. • Developed oilfield service support network. Source: McKinsey (2013)
Shale gas development typically follows five phases. Source: McKinsey (2013)
South African has significant resources But it takes 1000 – 1500 wells for a basin to be proven. Source: McKinsey (2013)
Cost of extraction ($US6 per MMBtu is the ceiling) Source: McKinsey (2013)
Hindsight and foresight • SA Industry has spent several hundred million rand since 2007 preparing for the new nuclear build. • It’s been a little like training for the Olympics when the date is unknown. There is a danger, on the one hand, of peaking too soon, and losing key people as the process is delayed. There is a danger, on the other hand, of being unprepared. • Preparation is not just technical, it is financial too.
BOO, EPCM, EPC…?? There are implications for how industry prepares itself.
Will procurement go in two phases and choose the tech partner first and then allocate localization? Different strategies are appropriate depending on the answer to this question.
Guarantees and bonds • In order to bid for new build contracts, companies will need to put financial guarantees in place: • Parent company guarantees are typically 30% of the project value • Performance bonds are typically 10% • On a R150 billion project, with 40% localization, this amounts to R24 billion. • The market capitalization of the entire South African construction industry is less than R50 billion. • Government will set a high bar for localization. Will it incentivize by instructing Eskom to reduce the bond requirements for local components of bids?
2014 • There is a new urgency in government regarding the nuclear procurement process. • It will be managed this time to maximize localization. This is different from the 2007 emphasis. Many of us here in this room can congratulate ourselves on a successful campaign in this regard! • We are much more prepared than we were 7 years ago. The Eastern Cape province sees this as a massive opportunity. • Emphasis must also be placed on the human resource pipeline
HR requirements to build 9600MW • At the height of the 9600 MW construction programme we will need: • 1620 engineers • 1770 technicians • 180 scientists • 220 project managers • 30 planners • 200 instructors • 440 security staff • 22650 artisans • 750 other skilled staff