Welcome to Intuitionism!

Welcome to Intuitionism!

Sir William David Ross:(1877-1971) The Right and the Good (1930): An introduction to Intuitionism as a Model of Ethics:

1. An Introduction Ross advocates ethical intuitionism: We now the basic truths of ethics by a special power called intuition; intuitive recognition is neither reason nor feelings. Consider: when you are in the right circumstance, you can see what is right and what is wrong. It is immediately, directly known and undeniable; it is self-evident. Whether this faculty is implanted in us by God or part of our nature that distinguishes us from other creatures, it is a special power we have, and if we are receptive to it and honest about it we cannot deny its existence. He lists 7 prima facie (conditional duties we know): Fidelity, reparations, gratitude, non-injury, justice, generosity, and self-improvement? This list is not exhaustive.

1. An Introduction Therefore, when you have a genuine intuition of rightness or wrongness, you cannot help recognizing that it is an ethical truth. Having the ethical tuition without recognizing it as an ethical truth would be like seeing a square without seeing that it is square And if you don’t get these intuitive ethical insights, it is because you are deceiving yourself, lying, or your intuitive power is severely disabled.

2. Significant Points of Ross’ Model A.. This deontological approach states that we have a number prima facie duties: • A prima facie duty (also called "conditional duty") is a "characteristic . . . which an act has, in virtue of being of a certain kind . . . , of being an act which would be a duty proper if it were not at the same time of another kind which is morally significant." 1. A prima facie duty is more an account of the materials from which we must make a selection than it is an account of our actual obligations. 2. In our daily life we are more frequently than not confronted with conflicting and competing prima facie duties.

2. Significant Points of Ross’ Model B. There is an absolute obligation to obey the prima facie duty that is the most “weightiest” in a given situation. These prima facie duties will assist in determining the content of the moral ought. 1. These duties are not all-inclusive. 2. They are not in a prearranged harmony of ranked priority nor do they occur singly. 3. These duties may contract each other in a given situation but because one of them is most apropos or most weighty, there is an absolute obligation to obey.

2. Significant Points of Ross’ Model 4. There are a few general "rules of thumb" to follow in judging which prima facie duties are "more incumbent" than others in various situations--e.g., causing no harm is generally more incumbent than generosity. 5. There is no ranking among the prima facie duties that applies to every situation. Each situation must be judged separately. 6. We apprehend our prima facie duties in much the same way that we apprehend the axioms of mathematics or geometry: we do so by reflecting on "the self-evident prima facie rightness of an individual act of a particular type." 7. "The moral order expressed in [the principles of prima facie duties] is just as much part of the fundamental nature of the universe . . . as is the . . . structure expressed in the axioms of geometry or arithmetic."

2. Significant Points: C. Ross is a moral realist: Rightness and goodness are objective features in the world in the way that shape, size, and masses are. D. When are attitudes are appropriate it is because something is the way we think it is: it is really good, bad, right, or wrong. E. If X is good or right it is because X has a property or quality of goodness or rightness. F. It is the existence of our moral properties that make our moral judgments true. If there were no moral properties, there would be no truth for the moral properties make our moral judgments true.

2. Significant Points: G. We do not live in an objective valueless world. Rather, there is no reason to think that the universe is valueless. Thus, some of our moral judgments are true and what makes them true is the presence of the relevant objective value.

2. Significant Points: H. Ross was a non-naturalist realist: moral properties cannot be understood in wholly non-moral terms. I. If you define “right” as meaning derived from natural moral sentiments, you are putting forth a non-moral naturalistic definition. If you define good as meaning “such that it ought to be desired”, you are putting forth a non-naturalistic explanation. J. Ross doesn’t deny that certain empirical will be relevant to deciding whether we ought or ought not act in a certain way. His point is that when all the empirical facts are in, there is still a further moral judgment to be made-namely that these empirical facts make a certain act right or good. K. Ross also believes that these moral properties are simple, meaning they are not in combination with two or more properties or relations. And if it is simple it cannot be defined. So, rightness or goodness is indefinable.

2. Significant Points of Ross’ Model L. There are a variety of relations among individuals that are morally significant--including potential benefactor-potential beneficiary, promiser-promisee, creditor-debtor, wife-husband, child-parent, friend-friend, fellow countryman-fellow countryman, and others.

2. Significant Points of Ross’ Model M. There is are differences between prima facie duty and an actual, absolute, duty proper: 1. Actual duty or duty proper is our obligatory responsibility, no matter the nature of the occasion. 2. Whenever I have to make a moral decision in a situation in which more than one prima facie duty applies, I must "study the situation as fully as I can until I form the considered opinion (it is never more) that in the circumstances one of them is more incumbent than any other. . . ." The prima facie duty I judge to be "more incumbent than any other" in the situation is probably my "duty proper" or actual moral obligation.

2. Significant Points of Ross’ Model: N. List of prima facie duties (not exhaustive): FRG-NI-J-B-SI 1. Fidelity (Keep one’s promise); 2. Reparation (make up for wrongs done to others); 3. Gratitude (gratefulness and return the same); 4. Non-Injury (not to harm others); 5. Justice (prevent or correct mismatch between person’s pleasure or happiness and their merit); 6. Beneficence (generosity) 7. Self-Improvement (improve one’s condition).

3. Differences to Consider: A. Ross agrees with G.E. Moore that defining ethical predicates in terms of natural predicates commits the naturalistic fallacy. However, he disagrees with Moore’s view of consequential ethics, believing that he commits a fallacy as well, namely, believing that good-maximization is the only content of the moral “ought.”

3. Conscience Theorists: B. Infallible conscience theorists who subscribe to the view that we always have immediate or direct knowledge of our actual duty. Ross responds: 1. They fail to take into account the complexity of the situational setting and all that is involved therein. 2. They fail to face up to the fact that there are honest differences of opinion between people of good character as to what ought to be done in a given context. 3. They simply assume that there is no problem about selecting one’s actual duty from among the variety of moral claims simultaneously incumbent upon a person in a particular situation.

3. Utilitarians: “It is plain, I think, that in our moral thought we consider that the fact that we have made a promise is in itself sufficient to create a duty of keeping it, the sense of duty resting on remembrance of the past promise and not on thoughts of the future consequences of its fulfillment. Utilitarianism tries to show that this is not so, that the sanctity of promises rests on the good consequences of the fulfillment of them and the bad consequences of their nonfulfillment. It does so in this way: it points out that when you break a promise you not only fail to confer a certain advantage on your promise but you diminish his confidence, and indirectly the confidence of others, in the fulfillment of promises….

3. Utilitarians: It may be suspected…that the effect of a single keeping or breaking of a promise in strengthening or weakening the fabric of mutual confidence is greatly exaggerated by the theory we are examining. And if we suppose two men dying together alone, do we think that the duty of one to fulfill before he dies a promise he has made to the other would be extinguished by the fact that neither act would have any effect on the general confidence? Anyone who holds that neither act would be suspected of not having reflected on what a promise is.” The Right and the Good, 37-39.

3. Utilitarians: C. He rejects the utilitarianism for two reasons: 1. Single Criterion. He Rejects them on the ground that the single criterion upon which an actual obligation is supposed to rest-namely, whatever maximizes good-is both too simple for the diverse circumstances we face and too restricted in it scope. 2. Violates common sense. Imagine that we could bring about slightly more good by breaking a promise to benefit someone to whom we had made no promise. Ought we then to break the promise? Surely not. Consider this interesting portion where he defends the fact that his theory does not reduce to a mere production of good consequences:

3. Kant D. Ross also rejects Kant on the basis of common sense: 1. Kant embraced exceptionless duties (e.g., the duty to keep promises). But common sense recognizes exceptions to these duties. Imagine a case where keeping a trivial promise would cause much harm. Ought we then to keep the trivial promise? Surely not.

4. Advantages: • Deontological yet flexible in view of what prima duty will best fit situation. • Appeals to common sense. We don’t get tangled up in ethical theory and confused by moral speculation. 3. Feelings about right and wrong have a distinctive force that is appealing. • Acknowledges real moral conflicts and says we must choose the weightier principle in that situational setting. 5. We naturally tend towards Kantian-type principles.

5. Potential Objections: • The list of prima facie duties is unsystematic and follows no logical principle. Response: The list is not complete. • Provides no principle for determining what our actual moral obligations are in a particular situation. Response: There is no reason to assume that they will be the same in any given situation. • List of prima facie duties is without justification; how can we be sure it is accurate? Response: Apprehending what is self-evident; we don’t overturn our moral convictions just because they conflict with some moral theory.

5. Potential Objections: 4. Don’t our intuitions change or evolve in view of interaction with culture. 5. Clearly people can have different intuitions about moral issues. 6. How can we decide which intuitions we should trust. Consider the following response…

Response: “We have no more direct way of access to the facts about rightness and goodness and about what things are right or good, than by thinking about them; the moral convictions of thoughtful and well-educated people are the data of ethics just as sense perceptions are the data of natural science. Just as some of the latter have to be rejected as illusory, so have some of the former; but as the latter are rejected only when they are in conflict with other convictions which stand better the test of reflection. The existing body of moral convictions of the best people is the cumulative product of the moral reflection of many generations, which has developed an extremely delicate power of appreciation of moral distinctions; and this the theorist cannot afford to treat with anything other than the greater respect. The verdicts of the moral consciousness of the best people are the foundation on which he must build….” ~ The Right and the Good, pg. 46-7.

Welcome to Intuitionism!