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OMA-BCAST-2004-0145-RD Comments Issues not addressed in BCAST Requirements. Comments to slides #3 and #4 by Lucent. Submitted To: BCAST Date: 4 th November 2004 Availability: Public OMA Confidential Contact: Arieh Moller ( amoller@ndsisrael.com )
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OMA-BCAST-2004-0145-RD CommentsIssues not addressed in BCAST Requirements Comments to slides #3 and #4 by Lucent • Submitted To: BCAST • Date: 4th November 2004 • Availability: Public OMA Confidential • Contact: Arieh Moller (amoller@ndsisrael.com) • Arjen van der Vegt (avegt@irdetoaccess.com) • Herve Brugal (herve.brugal@gemplus.com) • Ilan Mahalal (imahalal@axalto.com) • Source: NDS, Irdeto Access, Gemplus, Axalto X USE OF THIS DOCUMENT BY NON-OMA MEMBERS IS SUBJECT TO ALL OF THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE USE AGREEMENT (located at http://www.openmobilealliance.org/UseAgreement.html) AND IF YOU HAVE NOT AGREED TO THE TERMS OF THE USE AGREEMENT, YOU DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO USE, COPY OR DISTRIBUTE THIS DOCUMENT. THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" "AS AVAILABLE" AND "WITH ALL FAULTS" BASIS.
Key Issues • We believe that the current version of the BCAST requirement contain some serious security flaws. • The area that we believe need requirements added is Service & Content Protection
Service & Content Protection • The issues that we still believe needs to be addressed are as follows: • There needs to be a mechanism to allow for the application of “bug fixes” to deployed devices • There needs to be a mechanism to allow for upgrading the key management systems if new business models are required to be supported • There needs to be a method to allow for the key management system to be replaced if (and when) it gets compromised. • There needs to be a mechanism that can complement device revocation, as revocation has many negative operational implications e.g. an annoyed user base the requirement as formulated calls for a specific solution to a potential problem (there is no business requirement that would call for replacable modules; the business requirement is to have a secure solution that supports mobility and interoperability) Conclusion: if experts in the DRM group conclude that a mechanism such as the proposed one is needed, this mechanism can and will be specified
S&CP requirements Therefore we suggest that the following requirement be added: • The system SHALL support the defined key management system, and SHALL allow for an open standard secure mechanism to allow for system recovery, upgrades, and bug fixes. • In light of preliminary comments we wish to stress that by no means does the above conflict with the following requirement: • SPCP-2 Openness - All functions needed for service and content protection, including e.g. the key management, the delivery, and encryption and decryption operations of keys and content, and interfaces, SHALL be fully specified so that no proprietary extension to any part of the system are required. • The above does not require any extension, but rather ALLOWS it. DO NOT VIEW IN SLIDE SHOW MODE. SEE BELOW FOR NEC, NOKIA and LUCENT COMMENTS