EU energy and market grab Large infrastructure, investment instruments and implications

1. EU energy and market grab Large infrastructure, investment instruments and implications Elena GerebizzaRe:Common - egerebizza@recommon.orgMarch 1-3 2013 http://www.recommon.org

2. Context • Unprecedent crisis in EU – financial, economic, social, political • Crisis of accumulation – massive liquidity in private hands and “lack” of assets where to invest • Since 1980s – progressive extraction of richness from public to private, through privatization, liberalization, PPPs in 2000s, completing liberalization of financial capital markets

3. Financialisation: new, pervasive phenomenon, transforming society and production, with long term implications In the making, some elements are evident and lessons to be learnt Need for public support – defining legislation, promoting further privatization and financial capital markets development as key to “find the money”

4. There is no money?

5. Where is the money? 2011 – liquidity managed on financial capital markets globally: $122,8 trillion 2011 – global GDP: $65 trillion $42 trillion managed directly by individuals on behalf of 11 million “rich people” $11-12 trillion in tax heavens

6. Financialisation: what is it? Deep transformation of the economy and society with implications in the long term Drive: research for new and larger asset classes Key element: buying and selling money, risk, and associated products guarantees higher returns than trading goods and services for capital accumulation Implications: the choice on where the capital is invested exposes daily life of citizens to financial capital markets – more aspects of life are mediated through financial capital markets, and not simply through markets

7. EU energy policies: what infrastructure? Energy security high on EU agenda November 2010: Energy 2020 A strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure energy Energy infrastructure priorities for 2020 and beyond September 2011: “It is evident that the EU cannot reach the EU policy objectives without adequately addressing the external dimension”

9. “A coherent, dynamic and pro-active external energy policy is vital to enable the EU and its Member States to establish a lead position in energy geopolitics, to effectively promote both EU and national energy interests beyond EU borders, and to contribute to the competitiveness of the European industry” Conclusion of the EC Communication on Engaging with Partners beyond our borders

10. The energy grab... Europe fossil fuels imports: 80% of oil and 60% of gas consumed in the EU market – gas as key “transition fuel” EIB – EBRD: expanding the mandate in the Mediterranean region (TA, legislation reform, PPPs) EIB – 2.5 billion euro per year to invest in the region Turkey, North Africa: key “energy hubs” towards Europe (gas, oil, renewables) EIB in Mediterranean: since 2000, ¼ lending in energy sector

11. ...and market grab Export oriented infrastructure – for EU energy “security”? Transmed pipeline expansion (Tunisia – Italy) – 2007 - EIB loan 185 million Euro Medgaz gas pipeline (Algeria – Spain): EIB loan 500 million euro “win-win projects for the Mediterranean” LNG terminals in Egypt – Regassification plants in Italy, Spain, Northern Europe More EIB energy investments through financial intermediaries

12. Building a market: in who's interest? Plan for “EU-Southern Mediterranenan energy partnership” Among EU objectives: “mobilise regional level action in developing countries, particularly in Africa, to reform legal and regulatory frameworks with a view to creating market based conditions that attract private sector investments and enhance regional power trade” Including energy in the exisiting trade and investment liberalization framework – what coherence with EU horizontal objectives - poverty eradication & human rights?

13. Connecting Europe Facility “The leverage of the EU internal energy market should be better used to facilitate large scale infrastructure projects linking the EU network to third countries, particularly ones with political, commercial or legal uncertainties” EC Communication, 2011

14. Europe 2020 project bond Initiative (PBI)/ Project Bond Credit Enhancement (PBCE) October 2011 – Europe 2020 project bond initiative like “risk sharing” instrument to attract capital from institutional investors for the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) – 2 trillion euro for infrastructure in Europe by 2050 June 2012 – pilot phase launched by EIB, 230 million euro from EC + 750 million euro from EIB, to mobilize 4,3 billion euro by 2014 through private and institutional investors EIB – new instruments covering 20% or 200 million euro

15. Objective: reduce the financial risk of projects economically and financially non viable, and guarantee a profit to private investors (public money for credit enhancement or improving debt situation of company and project) support infrastructure as an asset class – basis for the building of new financial markets based on infrastructure, that own them and finance them from the beginning (new generation of PPP)

16. New elements: until 2009 financial risk covered through monolines insurances – and collateral financial products – now transferred to the citizens with public guarantee of EIB and national financial institutions (see Italian case) initial rating AAA – for the infrastructure project and for the consortium initial liquidity for the consortium from financial capital markets on the promise that project will repay itself once operating (support to PPPs)

17. ...in case it does not happen? When the project is not repaying itself, the public guarantee transforms the debt from private into public Massive public intervention in support to the expansion of financial capital markets Paradox – might reduce the future economic and social freedom of citizens in case public debt will generate through fallimentary, useless mega projects Why taking on this risk – leaving the profit on financial capital markets?

18. What infrastructure? Some of the projects included in the public consultation closed on October 6th 2012: - Nabucco West - European section of South Stream - Mediterranean Gas storage - Trans Adriatic Pipeline - Ionic Adriatic Pipeline - LNG regassification vessel (Krk, HR) - Adriatica pipeline - Interconnector Greece- Italy (IGI) - Nabucco pipeline

19. - Trans Mediterranean Gas pipeline - East Mediterranean Pipeline - New IP with Italy to connect Corsica - OLT offshore LNG Toscana - Off-shore LNG regasification terminal – Falconara Marittima - Gioia Tauro LNG projects - LNG Terminal- Porto Empedocle (Sicilia) - Storages: 3 UGS San Potito &Cotignalo (SPC), Plazzo Moroni(PM), Cellino –New pools (CL)

20. - Gas Storage Grottole/ Ferrandina - Galsi – New pipeline from Algeria to Italy (Tuscany via Sicilia) - Floating LNG Terminal in Malta and km gas inter connection between Malta and Italy (Sicily) with a Not indicated new interconnection Malta to Italy - Helios Interconnection - From Greece to Germany (via Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria) - Italy – Albania merchant line - Europagrid Adriatic - Italy Croatia Interconnector

21. Other implications Structured finance, use of financial intermediaries facilitate capital flows out of resource rich countries (including illicit flows, money laundering , etc) Increased use of financial intermediaries to finance infrastructure by IFIs – no instruments in place to control HHRR, environmental, social impacts of EU investments Financialisation makes feasible high risk/ high cost extractive projects (deep water, shale gas)- delay to transition from fossil fuels EU “energy security” and financialisation – in who's interest?

22. GRAZIE! http://www.recommon.org