SOCRATES AND PLATO ON GOD AND THE DIVINE

1. SOCRATES AND PLATO ON GOD AND THE DIVINE

2. Herakleitos: the world of becoming, and consequences for knowledge • Parmenides: the world of being, and consequences for knowledge

3. The Socratic question • Plato through Socrates or Socrates through Plato? • Socrates of Athens c. 470-399 BC • Plato of Athens c. 428-347 BC

4. KEY DIALOGUES • Phaedo • Apology • Euthyphro • Republic • Timaeus

6. Socrates’ questions • Obsessed with the question of cause • In the Phaedo (97b-100a) Socrates tells his friends how he initially was interested in the writings of the physikoi • Compare Aristophanes’ representation of Socrates in the comedy Clouds of 423 BC

7. Anaxagoras of Klazomenai, died 428 BC Together were all things, infinite both in quantity and in smallness – for the small too was infinite. And when all things were together, none was patent by reason of smallness; for air and ether covered all things, being both infinite – for in all things these are the greatest both in quantity and size. Fr. 1

8. This being so, one should believe that in everything that is combining there are present many things of every sort and seeds of all things having all kinds of shapes and colours and savours. Fr. 4a But before they separated off, when all things were together, not even colour was patent; for this was prevented by the commixture of all things – of the wet and the dry and the bright and the dark and much earth present therein and seeds, infinite in quantity, in no way like one another. Fr. 4b

9. The ‘nous’ of Anaxagoras (fr. 12) Mind (nous) is something infinite and self-controlling (autokrates), and it has been mixed with no thing but is alone itself by itself. For if it were not by itself but had been mixed with some other thing, it would share in all things, if it had been mixed with any. For in everything there is present a share of everything . . . And the things commingled with it would have prevented it from controlling anything in the way in which it does when it is actually alone by itself.

10. For it is the finest (leptotaton) of all things and the purest, and it possesses all knowledge about everything, and it has the greatest strength. And mind controls all those things, both great and small, which possess soul (psukhē). And mind controlled the whole revolution, so that it revolved in the first place. And first it began to revolve in a small area, and it is revolving more widely, and it will revolve yet more widely.

11. And mind recognises all the things which are commingling and separating off and dissociating. And mind arranged everything – what was to be and what was and what now is and what will be – and also this revolution in which revolve the stars and the sun and the moon and the air and the ether which are separating off. . . All mind, both great and small, is alike. Nothing else is alike, but each single thing is and was patently those things of which it contains most.

12. Socrates’ autobiography in Phaedo • ‘I once heard someone reading from some book – of Anaxagoras, he claimed – and asserting that it is Intelligence (nous) that organizes (diakosmōn) things and is the reason (aitios) for everything. This explanation pleased me. Somehow it seemed right that Intelligence should be the reason for everything; and I reflected that if this is so, in the course of its arrangement Intelligence sets everything in order and arranges each individual thing in the way that is best for it. Therefore if anyone wished to discover the reason why any given thing came, continued, or ceased to be, he must find out how it was best for that thing to be, or to act or be acted upon in any way.’

13. Socrates’ assumptions about what Anaxagoras would explain: whether earth is flat or round; why it had to be with reference to what’s better, i.e. that it is better that it should be like this.

14. Socrates’ disappointment ‘As I read on I discovered a man who made no use of his Intelligence and assigned to it no responsibility for the order of the world, but adduced reasons like air and ether and water and many other oddities.’

15. ‘It seemed to me that he was about as inconsistent as if someone were to say: “The reason for everything Socrates does is intelligence”, and then, in trying to account for my several actions, said first that the reason why I’m sitting here now is that my body is composed of bones and sinews, and that the bones are rigid and separated at the joints, but the sinews are capable of contraction and relaxation, and form an envelope for the bones with the help of the flesh and skin, the latter holding all together; and since the bones move freely in their joints, the sinews by relaxing and contracting enable me somehow to bend my limbs; and that is the reason for my sitting here in a bent position.’

16. ‘Or again, if he tried to account in the same way for my conversing with you, adducing reasons such as sound and air and hearing and a thousand others, and never troubled to mention the real reasons (tashōsalēthōsaitias); which are that since Athens has thought it better to condemn me, therefore I for my part have thought it better to sit here, and more right to stay and submit to whatever penalty she orders – because, by the Dog! I fancy that these sinews and bones would have been in the neighbourhood of Megara or Boeotia long ago (impelled by a conviction of what is best) if I did not think that it was more just and honourable to submit to whatever penalty my country orders rather than take to my heels and run away.’

17. The Apology • Socrates is charged with: ‘corrupting the young and not having consideration for the gods which the city has consideration for, but for other new-fangled divine entities (daimoniakaina)’ 24b

18. Apology 21a-c • With respect to his reputation for wisdom, Socrates calls as witness in his defence ‘the god at Delphi’. • Khairephōn went to Delphi and asked ‘whether there was anyone wiser than myself’ • ‘the Pythian priestess replied that there was no one’ • This impels Socrates to undertake a life-long search

19. ‘I said to myself, “What is the god saying, and what is his hidden meaning? I am only too conscious that I have no claim to wisdom, great or small; so what can he mean by asserting that I am the wisest? He cannot be telling a lie; that would not be right (themis) for him.” After puzzling about it for some time, I set myself at last with considerable reluctance to check the truth of it in the following way.’

20. The life of philosophy as a life in service of the god ‘I want you to think of my adventures as a cycle of labours undertaken to establish the truth of the oracle once for all’ 22a ‘So I made myself spokesman for the oracle, and asked myself whether I would rather be as I was – neither wise with their wisdom nor ignorant with their ignorance – or possess both qualities as they did. I replied through myself to the oracle that it was best for me to be as I was.’ 22e

21. New divine entities: Apology 26-27 • Socrates refutes the second charge, by arguing that if he thinks that there are such things as daimonia, then he must also think that there are such things as theia. (Paradigm exploited: if you think that there are such things as mules, then you must think there are such things as horses; if you think there are such things as illegitimate children of gods, you must think there are such things as gods)

22. Socrates’ divine sign • His daimonion usually opposes him when he is taking a wrong course, but the daimonion was entirely silent the whole day of the trial. Apol. 40a-c

23. Asking awkward questions of experts: Euthyphro What is holiness (to hosion) and unholiness (to anosion)? (Socrates asks the seer [mantis] Euthyphro). Euthyphro (eventually): that which is agreeable to all the gods is holy, and what is not agreeable is unholy. Socrates: ‘Is the holy approved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is approved?’ (an attribute versus what it is)

24. The Republic • Subject of gods emerges from discussion of how justice and injustice might originate in a community • In the ‘first’ city (‘the city of pigs!’) the gods are not an issue: the citizens simply pray to gods with garlands on their heads after their feasts and enjoy one another’s company

25. The Republic • But in a city with more desires (a city with a fever!) warriors will be required to protect it and there will have to be trained and have the correct values inculcated in them from childhood • An important component will be the kinds of stories that are told to them, including those which involve the gods

26. Stories must represent the gods as they actually are • Homer and Hesiod told false stories and made bad verbal likenesses of the gods • The god is in truth good and must be so described; and nothing good is harmful; the god is supremely beautiful; so he would not alter his shape for to do so would be to assume a shape that is worse

27. The part of us that is akin to the divine • Tripartite soul: reason (to logistikon), spirit (thumos), appetites • The reasoning part is the part akin to the divine • ‘This most sovereign part of our soul raises us up away from the earth and toward what is akin to us in heaven’ (Timaeus 90a)

28. Phaedo 67a-b • Body is a hindrance to the activity of the reasoning soul. Philosophy as activity of purification of the soul from body. ‘By keeping ourselves uncontaminated by the follies of the body, we shall probably reach the company of others like ourselves and gain direct knowledge of all that is pure and uncontaminated – that is, presumably, of truth (to alēthes).’

29. ‘For one who is not pure himself to attain to the realm of purity would no doubt be a breach of the divine order (mēouthemitonēi).’

30. Empedokles of Akragas, c. 495 – c. 435 BC • Four ‘roots’ (rhizōmata): EARTH WATER FIRE AIR • Two entities: LOVE (philia / philotēs) – apart from them STRIFE (neikos) – among them

31. Happy (olbios) is he who has gained wealth of divine thoughts, wretched he whose beliefs about the gods are dark. Fr. 132 If ever for the sake of some creature of a day (ephēmerios), immortal Muse, it pleased you that my cares should pass through your mind, now, as I pray, stand by me again, Kalliopē, as I reveal a good account (agathos logos) about the blessed gods. Fr. 131

32. But whereas those who are very evil when in power have no trust, you, as the assurances from our Muse enjoin, must learn, once you have sifted the argument in your breast. Fr. 4 <the divine> cannot be approached by the eyes of men or grasped by their hands, by which the greatest path to persuasion leads to the minds of men. Fr. 133

33. Hear first the four roots of all things: bright Zeus, life-bringing Hera, Aidoneus, and Nestis, who waters with her tears the mortal fountains. Fr. 6

34. Empedokles’ incarnations For already have I once been a boy and a girl and a bush and a bird and a silent fish in the sea. Fr. 117 In the end they are seers and hymn-writers and doctors and princes among earth-dwelling men; and then they arise as gods, highest in honour. Fr. 146 At the same hearth and table as the other immortals, Relieved of mortal pains, tireless. Fr. 147

35. Cosmic applications: Plato Timaeus • The world of our experience is a world that has come into being: must be corporeal, visible, and tangible • Constructed out of the four elements fire, water, air, and earth (but these materials are not the ultimate constituents) • A divine artisan (dēmiourgos)

36. Timaeus: premises ad argument • Being differs from becoming • All becoming has a cause • When a craftsman makes something come into being by looking to an eternal paradigm the outcome is necessarily fine, when he looks to a created paradigm, the outcome is necessarily not fine

37. The cosmos is a case of becoming, because it is perceptible • The cosmos has a cause • The cosmos was caused by a craftsman looking to an eternal model (because it is beautiful and its maker was good) • World’s status as a likeness of the eternal model

38. The (god) who put this world together was good and what is good is without envy; so he wished all things to be as like himself as possible. • Finding the visible world in disordered movement, he reduced it to order • Impossible for the best to produce anything but the finest • Since he realised anything with mind (nous) is superior to anything without it, he placed mind in soul and soul in body, and so ensured that the whole would be naturally the best

39. ‘And so the most likely account (logos) must say that this world (kosmos) came to be in very truth, through the god’s providence (pronoia), a living being with soul and intelligence (zōonempsukhonennoun).’

40. The god made this visible world resemble the most completely perfect of intelligible things (ta nooumena). • Spherical shape, and uniform circular motion, suited to its nature ‘He produced, then, for all these reasons, a blessed god (eudaimōntheos).’

41. In this world, modelled on its original, there are four kinds of living creature: • Gods in heaven • Birds in the air • Animals that live in water • Animals that go on dry land

42. Stars as living and eternal beings • Earth is our foster mother, devised to be the maker of night and day • Other gods: conformity with tradition • But all are objects of senses in some way