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Heli Wang Jinyu He Joseph T. Mahoney Strategic Management Journal , 3 0 (12): 1265-1285

Firm-specific knowledge resources and competitive advantage: The roles of economic- and relationship-based employee governance mechanisms (2009). Heli Wang Jinyu He Joseph T. Mahoney Strategic Management Journal , 3 0 (12): 1265-1285

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Heli Wang Jinyu He Joseph T. Mahoney Strategic Management Journal , 3 0 (12): 1265-1285

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  1. Firm-specific knowledge resources and competitive advantage: The roles of economic- and relationship-based employee governance mechanisms (2009) Heli Wang Jinyu He Joseph T. Mahoney Strategic Management Journal, 30 (12): 1265-1285 Presented by Jiyoon Chung

  2. Overview • Introduction • Background and hypothesis development • Firm-specific resources and the potential for sustainable competitive advantage • Firm-specific knowledge resources and employee governance mechanisms Economic-based governance mechanism: employee stock ownership Relationship-based governance mechanism: firm-employee relationships • Employee governance and performance and advantage based on firm-specific knowledge • Data and methods • Results • Discussion and conclusions

  3. Introduction • The motivation of this article is based on the logic that a firm’s resource base and the effectiveness of its governance system jointly influence its economic performance (Gottschalg and Zollo, 2007; Kim and Mahoney, 2005; Makadok, 2003) • The study focuses on two general types of employee governance mechanisms that can help firms mitigate their employees’ reluctance to make firm-specific human capital investments • an economic-based governance mechanism • a relationship-based mechanism

  4. Background and hypothesis development • Resource-based view Firms are considered as bundles of heterogeneous resources that include tangible and intangible assets, operational processes, and products • Economic-based governance mechanism: employee stock ownership Property rights theory (need to mitigate underinvestment in firm-specific human capital) However, there are associated costs and downside risks Hypothesis 1: Everything else equal, a firm’s level of firm-specific knowledge resources is positively associated with its use of employee stock ownership as a governance mechanism. • Relationship-based governance mechanism: firm-employee relationships Hypothesis 2: Everything else equal, a firm’s level of firm-specific knowledge resources is positively associated with the extent to which it places emphasis on establishing good relationships with its key employees

  5. Background and hypothesis development • The inappropriate functioning of a firm’s governance system will hinder the flow of firm-specific knowledge resources toward full realization of economic rents Hypothesis 3a: Everything else equal, the relationship between the level of firm-specific knowledge resources and firm-level economic performance is positively moderated by employee stock ownership Hypothesis 3b: Everything else equal, the relationship between the level of firm-specific knowledge resources and firm-level economic performance is positively moderated by firm-employee relationships • Shirking or free-rider problem Hypothesis 4: The moderating role of employee stock ownership in the relationship between the level of firm-specific knowledge resources and firm-level economic performance will be weaker in larger firms

  6. Data and methods • Panel data contained 211 firms in manufacturing industries and 1329 firm-year observations between 1994 and 2002 • Measures Firm economic performance (Tobin’s Q) Firm-specificity of knowledge resources (FS) – number of self-citations made Firm-employee relationships – the ‘employee relations’ dimension of the KLD data Employee stock ownership – the EDGAR database • Control variables R&D intensity Patenting intensity Firm size, firm age, and financial slack

  7. Data and methods

  8. Data and methods

  9. Results

  10. Results Hypothesis 1 and 2 were corroborated

  11. Results Some support was found for Hypothesis 3a Hypothesis 3b and 4 were corroborated

  12. Data limitations • The ‘employee relations’ dimension of the KLD data relate to a much broader range of employees, including lower-level employees that are not directly involved in the deployment of firm-specific knowledge • Future research might use survey data to explore other types of unpatented knowledge

  13. Discussion and conclusions • Firms with greater firm-specific knowledge resources are more likely to adopt governance mechanisms appropriate for reducing key employees’ concerns about holdup by the firm • The increased use of these governance mechanisms strengthens the relationship between the level of firm-specific knowledge and a firm’s economic performance • Employee governance mechanisms are endogenous to the nature of firm knowledge resources

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