Download
1 / 45
E N D
On July 14, 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a federal decree “On Suspending the Russian Federation’s Participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and Related International Agreements.” Beyond the political fallout, Russia’s decree raises several questions about when a state can suspend its treaty obligations and the legal consequences that flow from such a suspension.
Russia has not articulated a legal basis for its unilateral suspension of the CFE Treaty other than to state generally that its suspension “is in conformity with international law.Most likely, Russia relies on the CFE text itself to authorize suspension. (CFE Article XIX)
Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. A State Party intending to withdraw shall give notice of its decision to do so to the Depositary and to all other States Parties. Such notice shall be given at least 150 days prior to the intended withdrawal from this Treaty. It shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the State Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty was signed in Paris On November 19, 1990, following the successful completion of 20 months of negotiations between the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
The Treaty consists of over 110 pages of text encompassing 23 Treaty articles, protocols, and two annexes.
It limits five categories of weapons between the NATO and Warsaw Pact (tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, helicopters, and attack aircraft).
The purpose of zones was to force the relocation of Soviet forces eastward from the inner-German border, and the flank. Additionally to prevent their concentration within the Soviet Union
Despite the tremendous changes that have occurred since 1990, the treaty remains in the best interest of Turkey; since it has, prevented arms racing, increased the level of transparency, reduced the possibility of both surprise attack and miscalculation, enhanced conventional deterrence.The most meaningfullpart of the Treaty is socalled“Flank Regulations”
AreaEuropean island territories, of the Republic of Bulgaria, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway, Romania, the part of the Republic of Turkey within the area of application (portion of southeastern Turkey is excluded from the treaty due to Turkish concerns about security issues relating to Syria and Iraq) and that part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics comprising the Leningrad, Odessa, Transcaucasia and North Caucasus Military Districts.
Flank limitationsDefined By the Article V of the treaty to prevent destabilizing concentrations of Soviet forces opposite Turkey and Norway.
Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Italso consists of the North Caucasus and Leningrad MilitaryDistricts of the Russian Federation and the southeastern portionof Ukraine. (4700 BT, 5900 ACV, 6000 ARTY)
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union the successor states agreed to limitations for each state at Tashkent on May 15, 1992. Additional adjustments were made upon the division of Czechoslovakia.
The Russian portion of the flank zone represents approximately one-third of Russian territory west of the Urals, an area more than five times the size of Germany, in which Russia can hold no more than 1300 Tank, 1380 ACVs, and 2400 Artillery Pieces including designated permanent storage sites (DPSS).
Russian forces in this area is 700 tanks, 580 ACVs and, 1,280 artillery piecesin activeunits for this area.
The treaty is designed to be implemented by stages with each country reducing by 25 per cent of its overall requirement the first year, 60 per cent in 1994, and 100 per cent by November 1995 with a period of four months (until March 1996) to verify residual levels.
This resulted for the Soviet Union to destroy roughly 14,500 pieces of TLE east of the Ural Mountains
All states parties with the exception of Armenia and Azerbaijan (due to the ongoing conflict in Nagorno Karabakh) reached their reduction goals in September 1993 and also for 1994. Overall, roughly 18,000 pieces of TLE have been destroyed in the former Warsaw Pact alone and approximately 6,000 of this was accomplished by the Russian Federation
Despite the optimism generated by the obvious pprogress,serious difficulties have arisen which may imperil finalimplementation of the CFE accord. The most serious of these isthe request by the Russian Federation and Ukraine to be relievedof the Article V limitation on the amount of TLE that can belocated in the flank areas of their country which consists of theLeningrad and North Caucasus Military Districts.
In 1993 Russian Federation proposed the suspension of Article V of the treaty as a means to solve the problem and further suggested that Russia would be willing to consider certain additional guarantees such as a prohibition onany increase in the military forces assigned to the LeningradMilitary District, no "over concentration" of forces in the NorthCaucasus, and a willingness to limit forces in the KaliningradRegion.
Any alteration to these documents such as those proposed by Russia can not occur until the review conference which will occur in spring 1996.
NATO’s Counter Arguments Russian troops in the NorthCaucasus could be "light" forces equipped with equipment that isnot limited by the CFE Treaty.Such a force would also seem moreappropriate to the terrain of the Caucasus as well as the threatsof internal instability. There is no flank limitation for their aircraft (eitherfixed or rotary wing) which can be rapidly moved from zone to zone.Russia could deploy additional ACVs and other tracked vehicles with their internal security forces as allowed in Article III and XII
The resulting agreement is based on an approach that was initially designed by NATO, and endorsed by all CFE States Parties in November 1995 at the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) in Vienna.
The Flank Agreement has three basic elements:* a map realignment, which reduces the geographic area covered by the treaty's flank limitations;* additional constraints on equipment in areas removed from the flank zone through the realignment; and * additional transparency measures for the revised flank zone and those areas removed from the flank zone.
The subsequent dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and NATO’s expansion to include several former Warsaw Pact states, however, threatened to undermine the CFE Treaty’s continuing relevance. To accommodate the shifting strategic environment, the parties met in Istanbul in 1999 and negotiated and concluded an “Adaptation Agreement” to amend the CFE Treaty.
Although Russia and a few other states have ratified it, the Adaptation Agreement has yet to come into force. NATO member states have delayed their ratifications pending Russian compliance with certain political commitments it made at Istanbul in concert with the Adaptation Agreement's conclusion (e.g., withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia and Moldova).
AdaptedTreaty is intended to build on the success of the original agreement by: • Realigning equipment limits on a state-by-state basis rather than zones designed for a Cold War environment; • Addressing specific needs that emerged in the 1990s, like Russia’s need for additional military flexibility in the Treaty’s “flank” region; • Expanding security by allowing additional European states to join CFE; and • Reinforcing and expanding Treaty provisions that affirm the right of sovereign states to decide whether or not to allow foreign forces on their territory.
Turkey supported the adapted Treaty as a positive step toward a stable and secure Europe. But, along with the great majority of Treaty parties, we have made clear we can only ratify the adapted CFE Treaty in the context of fulfillment by Russia of key political commitments it made at the Istanbul Summit, which created the conditions that allowed the Agreement on Adaptation to be signed. (Russia still remains military base in Gudauta/Georgia, and completed withdrawal of Russian military forces and ammunition stocks from Moldova, remain unfulfilled).
Russian President Vladimir Putin has argued that the current CFE Treaty does not address Russia’s security needs, and that all States Parties should immediately ratify the adapted Treaty. On December 12, 2007, Russia carried out its threatened “suspension” of implementation of the current Treaty, and subsequently did not provide its annual CFE data as the Treaty requires. The United States deeply regrets Russia’s “suspension,” which is not provided for under the terms of the Treaty, and not justified under customary international law.
The concept of the new article V of the Adapted Treaty was prepared bi-laterally with Russia (Ankara Agreement between general Dandin and Kuznetsov)
Gist of the Turkish Approach to the Adapted Treaty is: To keep the neighboring state parties in an agreed flank regime which is the sole meaningful part of the TreatyTo prevent destabilizing force accumulation either in Caucasus or in BalkansTo force the Russia to withdraw her forces from Armenia and Georgia or to limit her military presence there to the extent possible
Russia has been obeying the agreed flank limits since 2002There is no Russian troops in GeorgiaRussian Presence in Armenia has been reduced substantially
Most of the new NATO members has not obeyed the Adapted Treaty Limits yetCFE membership of the Baltic States has been being hampered by The USA The US is deploying force in Romania and BulgariaNATO is not willing to ratify the Adapted CFE and using Turkey in her reasoning (unfortunately)
ABM Treaty and the Anti-missile defense (missile shield) project US stated that ABM hinders her government's ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue-state missile attack.
- New arms race -New utopias and dangerous threat games- Effects on the other sub-regional arms control regulations- No more transparency for the States who has no intelligence asset- Cold war type suspicions and concerns- Categorical dependence to the US and NATO - No more hope for the stability in Caucasus- New affiliations on energy lines- Threatening force deployment in BalkansNew affiliations On Montreuxs
