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Week 6

Week 6. Relative Autonomy 1923-1939. The Treaty of Versailles ( June 28th 1919).

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Week 6

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  1. Week 6 Relative Autonomy 1923-1939

  2. The Treaty of Versailles (June 28th 1919) Supposedto ensure a lasting peace by punishing Germany and setting up a League of Nations to solve diplomatic problems. Instead it left a legacy of political and geographical difficulties which have often been blamed, sometime solely, for starting the WWII.

  3. The International Context & Dynamics • Thestrugglebetweenrevisionists (Germany, Italy, Japan) & defenders of SQ (Britain, France andthe US) ; isolatedcommunist SU as swinger • Ramifications of the Great Depression of 1929. • Europe had beenloosingitscentralpositionin theworld& abilitytoimposeits ‘pax’ on theperipherialcountries. • Peripherialcountries (likeTurkey) gainingsubstaintialdegree of ‘ relativeautonomy’.

  4. TheRelativeInternal & ExternalAutonomy • Whenthepoliticallevel is relativelyautonomous of theeconomy, thestatewillbecomemoreautonomous in decision-making. • Internal:Autonomous of thesocialclasses in thecountry. • External: Ineffectiveness of thegreatpowersleavingmaneuveringspaceformid-powerslikeTurkey.

  5. International Context as Blessingfor New Turkey • Gainedrelativeautonomy • Importantgeostrategiclocationforbothcamps. • After 1917, itshistoricfoeRussiaceasedto be a threat.

  6. TheDomesticEnviromentand Dynamics

  7. TheEconomy • Thelandownersandtradersarethe dominant class. • Excessivedepedence on foreigncapitalduetothescarcity of localcapital. • Trytoreconcileeconomicinterests of bothexternal/internaltruefriendsandTurkey. • Objectedforeigncapitaloperatingundertheprotection of capitulations. • Eliminating presence of non-Muslimsfromeconomyandsubsidizing ‘Turks’. • Law on Professionsand Services ReservedforTurkishCitizens in Turkey (1932) – Turkification in economy. • Morestatisteconomicpoliciesandstate-ledenterprisesbased on ISS following 1929.

  8. Politics (1923-1930) : 3 ProblemstoSolve • Elimination of thealternativeleadership/thecoalitions • Supressionof theKurdishrevolts. • WesternizingReforms

  9. Elimination of the alternative leadership/the coalitions- Politics • Followingthecaliphatewasabolished in 1924, theIslamistswereeliminated. • UtilizingtheSheik Said uprising (1925) andthe 1926 attempt on the life of Ataturk, thecommunistsandKurdsweredealth. • Great speech of 1927 demonstrated his undisputableleadership.

  10. Gentlemen, I don't think it is necessary any further to compare the principles underlying the Lausanne Peace Treaty with other proposals for peace. This treaty, is a document declaring that all efforts, prepared over centuries, and thought to have been accomplished through the SEVRES Treaty to crush the Turkish nation have been in vain. It is a diplomatic victory unheard of in the Ottoman history! 1927 M Kemal Atatürk The Great Speech

  11. 2) Supression of Kurdishrevolts

  12. WesternizingReforms – Politics • Theabolution of thecaliphate (1924) • Thenewcivilcode (1926) • ThePenalCode (1927) • TheAdoption of the Latin Alphabet (1928) • Theremoval of thephase ‘ thereligion of thestate is Islam’ fromtheconstitution.

  13. Whoand/or how areTurksgoingto be ? (A.Kadıoğlu,1995) • Turkishnationalism as a modernist/elitistmovement in thelate 19th/early 20th centurytoconstructTurkishnational-identity (B.Oran,1987 ; A.Akman,2004) • ‘Turkishness’ did not baseitself on blood as in Germany, but a culture-basedterritorial model (i.e.Turkish Vatan) as in France (Ernest Renan Model).

  14. Tefik Rüştü Aras Kitabının kapağını ekle

  15. TheForeignPolicy : 3 views • DoestheTurkishrevolutionbelongtothe Third-Word or is it Western-oriented ? • Is it anti-imperialistor not ? • Is it expansionist ?

  16. Borders of Turkey set by the Treaty of Lausanne(24 July 1923)

  17. ForeignPolicy in the East/South: KurdishQuestion • Ensuringterritorialintegrity, particularlycontrolovertheKurdishtribes • PreventingTurkey’sprincipaldomesticquestionfromhavinginternationalrepercussions.

  18. A number of agreementsandprotocolstoensure East/South Frontiers • Iran (1926, 1932) • France (as trusteeforSyria) (1926) • Britain (as trusteeforIraq) (1926) • SadabadPactwith Iran, Iraq, and Afganistan. (1937)

  19. FP in the West: SMP in btwBalance vs. Alliance • Dangerfor SMP toenteralliancewithmajorpower(s): becomingsatelitte • Reliance on thebalance of poweramong 3 groups: 1) Britain and France (sq) 2)Germany andItaly (revisionist) 3) the USSR (swinger)

  20. General FP Approachtothose 3 groups • Resolvingoutstandingproblems ( Mosoul, Greece, LoNmembership) • Remaindistantfromthe 2nd andwardoffthetreatsemanatingfromItalyanditspolicy of MareNostrum , despitetheirmajortradeshare. • No threatfromthe USSR. Couterweighttoothergroups.

  21. SMP Turkey :Frombalancingtoaligning ?-1 • Until mid-1930s low-prioty of FP • Main concernwassolveproblemsleftbyLausanne ( Mosul, straitsregime,etc.) andKurdishquestion. • Followingtherise of Hitler’s Germany andMoussolini’sItaly, T’ssearchforbalance • Balkan Pact (1934) • Montreux StraitConvention (1936)

  22. Mosul Question A territorial dispute in the early 20th century between Turkey and the UK(later Iraq) over the possession of the former Ottoman Vilayet of Mosul. The new Turkish Republic considered Mosul one of the crucial issues determined in the National Pact. Britain managed to bring the issue into the international arena, scaling it down to a frontier problem between Turkey and Iraq. The LoNCouncil appointed an investigative commission that recommended that Iraq should retain Mosul, and Turkey reluctantly assented to the decision by signing the Frontier Treaty with the Iraqi government in 1926. Iraq agreed to give a 10 % royalty on Mosul's oil deposits to Turkey for 25 years.

  23. TheStraitQuestion: Towards Montreux-1 In 1923 the Treaty of Lausanne had demilitarised the Dardanelles and opened the Straits to unrestricted civilian and military traffic, under the supervision of the International Straits Commission of the League of Nations.

  24. The Strait Question: Towards Montreux-2 • By the late 1930s, the strategic situation in the Mediterranean had altered with the rise of Fascist Italy. • Fear that Italy would seek to exploit access to the Straits to expand its power into Anatolia and the Black Sea region. • The key weaknesses of the present regime were: 1) Machineryfor collective guarantees were too slow and ineffective 2) No contingency for a general threat of war 3) No provision for Turkey to defend itself.

  25. The Strait Question: Towards Montreux-3 Australia, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Japan, Romania, the Soviet Union, Turkey, the UK and Yugoslavia agreed to attend negotiations at Montreux in Switzerland, which began on 22 June 1936.

  26. Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits • The key principle of freedom of passage and navigation is stated in articles 1 and 2. Article 1 provides that "The High Contracting Parties recognise and affirm the principle of freedom of passage and navigation by sea in the Straits". Article 2 states that "In time of peace, merchant vessels shall enjoy complete freedom of passage and navigation in the Straits, by day and by night, under any flag with any kind of cargo." • Authorisingthe full resumption of Turkish military control over the Straits and the refortification of the Dardanelles. Turkey was authorised to close the Straits to all foreign warships in wartime or when it was threatened by aggression; additionally, authorisedto refuse transit from merchant ships belonging to countries at war with Turkey. • A number of highly specific restrictions were imposed on what type of warships are allowed passage. Non-Black Sea state warships in the Straits must be under 15,000 tons. • No more than nine non-Black Sea state warships, with a total aggregate tonnage of no more than 30,000 tons, may pass at any one time, and they are permitted to stay in the Black Sea for no longer than twenty-one days.

  27. The terms were largely a reflection of the international situation in the mid-1930s. ServedTurkish and Soviet interests, enabling Turkey to regain military control of the Straits and assuring Soviet dominance of the Black Sea. Although it restricted the Soviets' ability to send naval forces into the Mediterranean sea – thereby satisfying British concerns about Soviet intrusion into what was considered a British sphere of influence – it also ensured that outside powers could not exploit the Straits to threaten the SU.

  28. SMP Turkey :Frombalancingtoaligning?-2 • Enteringintoalliancewith Britain and France (Oct.1939) – Departurefromneutrality ? • Drawingcloseto Britain and France & gettingthe USSR tojoin. (Tripartiatealliance) • USSR-Germany Non-agressionPact (August 1939) • Resolution of Hatay questionwith France.

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