American Society of Quality September 20, 2005

1. American Society of QualitySeptember 20, 2005 Presented by Linda Smith USNRC Region IV

2. Nuclear Regulatory Commission • 104 Nuclear Power Reactors • 36 Non-Power Reactors • 47 Uranium Recovery Sites • 9 Major Fuel Cycle Facilities • Approximately 4,500 Materials Licensees

3. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Goals • Safety • Security • Openness • Effectiveness • Management • http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1614/v3/sr1614v3.pdf

4. NRC/Stakeholders • Value of Communication • Safety is a Shared Objective • Predictable Effective Regulation • Learning Oversight

5. Reactor Oversight • Integration of Inspection, Assessment, and Enforcement

6. DAVIS-BESSE LESSONS LEARNED

7. DAVIS-BESSE LESSONS LEARNED

8. DAVIS-BESSE LESSONS LEARNED • Why was Davis-Besse Head Degradation allowed to occur? • http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/vessel-head-degradation.html

9. DAVIS-BESSE LESSONS LEARNED FOR PI&R • EDO Commissioned a Task Force to identify and recommend areas of improvement • The report contained 51 recommendations • Four recommendations applied to PI&R

10. DAVIS-BESSE LESSONS LEARNED • Forty percent of risk significant events involve problem identification and resolution (PI&R) weaknesses (Accident Sequence Precursor data). • Facilities that have gone through extended shutdowns almost always have had PI&R problems

11. LESSONS LEARNED FOR PI&R – Recommendation 1 • Broaden inspection with the goal of assessing safety implications of : • Long-standing, unresolved problems • Corrective actions phased in over several years or refueling outages • Deferred modifications

12. LESSONS LEARNED FOR PI&R – Recommendation 2 • Assess issues similar to those experienced at Davis Besse • Improve guidance for screening to determine which problems will be reviewed

13. LESSONS LEARNED FOR PI&R – Recommendation 3 • Provide guidance for pursuing issues and problems identified during resident inspector plant status reviews

14. LESSONS LEARNED FOR PI&R – Recommendation 4 • Provide guidance to provide for the longer-term follow-up of issues that have not progressed to a finding

15. LESSONS LEARNED FOR PI&R – Big Picture • Objective was to upgrade NRC oversight so that we recognize and draw attention to longstanding equipment degradation

16. LESSONS LEARNED FOR PI&R – Big Picture • A Narrowly Focused Corrective Action Program did not serve us well at Davis Besse • Broke-fix is not enough

17. REACTOR OVERSIGHT ASSESSMENT PROGRAM • NRC's Operating Reactor Assessment Program • http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/manual-chapter/mc0305.pdf

19. REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS • Indicators Plus Inspection Results Comprehensively Cover Cornerstones • http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight/program-documents.html

20. REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS Risk Ranking Colors GREEN - very low - low to moderate WHITE YELLOW - substantial RED - high

21. REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS Strategic Performance Areas Safety Cornerstones Baseline Inspection Results Performance Indicator Results Significance Threshold Significance Threshold Action Matrix Regulatory Response

22. Quiz When Is the Assessment Process Over? Answer: Never

23. NRC ASSESSMENT PROGRAM - KEY OVERSIGHT TOOL • Objective Review of Industry Performance • Action Matrix Determines NRC Response: • Supplemental Inspection • Management meetings • Orders for plant shutdown

24. REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS - ASSESSMENT • Continuous • Quarterly • Middle of Cycle • End of Cycle • End of Cycle Summary Meeting • Agency Action Review Meeting

26. Cross-Cutting Aspects (Bedrock - Safety Culture) • Manual Chapter 0305 "Operating Reactor Assessment Program" • Problem Identification and Resolution • Human Performance • Safety Conscious Work Environment

27. Human Performance • Human Performance Evaluation Process: A Resource for Reviewing the Identification and Resolution of Human Performance Problems (NUREG CR6751) • http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/contract/cr6751/

28. Safety Culture • Safety Culture Group Developing Metrics • http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/regulatory/enforcement/safety-culture.html

29. Crosscutting Issue Assessment • Issue Binning • Pattern Assessment • Cornerstone Evaluation • Number Of Findings • Licensee Actions

30. Is It Substantive? • Are there more than 3 similar issues? • Is the underlying concern (common performance characteristic) present in multiple cornerstones? • Were the licensee’s actions insufficient and or incomplete? • If you answer yes to all of the above then you have a substantive crosscutting issue.

31. Substantive Crosscutting Issue Review • If a substantive cross-cutting issue has been raised in at least two consecutive assessment letters NRC may request - • Licensee to provide a response at the next annual public meeting • Licensee to provide a written response to the substantive cross-cutting issues raised in the assessment letters, • Separate meeting to be held with the licensee.

32. Substantive Cross-Cutting Issues • The assessment letter should: • Identify the number of examples in various cornerstones and describe their cross-cutting aspects • Describe the NRC’s plan to monitor the issue • Defining criteria for clearing the cross-cutting issue

33. REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS - ASSESSMENT • Action Matrix Column • Substantive Cross-Cutting Issues

34. SUMMARY • We are looking for - • Longstanding equipment issues • Latent failures • Recurring equipment failures • Risk-significant equipment failures • Cracks in the Safety Culture bedrock

35. NRC/Stakeholders • Value of Communication • Safety is a Shared Objective • Predictable Effective Regulation • Learning Oversight