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Denial of Service Resilience in Ad Hoc Networks. Imad Aad, Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Edward W. Knightly (EPFL & Rice) Appears in: MobiCom ’04 Presented by: David R. Choffnes. Outline. Ranting More Ranting Zombies Ranting. JellyFish Attacks. Requires a closed-loop protocol, like TCP
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Denial of Service Resilience in Ad Hoc Networks Imad Aad, Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Edward W. Knightly (EPFL & Rice) Appears in: MobiCom ’04 Presented by: David R. Choffnes
Outline • Ranting • More Ranting • Zombies • Ranting
JellyFish Attacks • Requires a closed-loop protocol, like TCP • But we’ve already discussed paper detailing how TCP doesn’t work well for ad hoc networks • How do protocol-compliant attacks work on cross-layer protocols? • Not specific to ad-hoc networks • E.g., periodic dropping • It would be nice to compare performance against wired networks in these cases • Can actually help the system when it is overloaded!
Methodology: Attacks without Solutions • Exploring impact of attacks without considering solutions lessens validity of results • Authors do not consider more interesting scenarios such as hybrid environments (more than one TCP implementation) • Even though nodes are protocol compliant, anomalous complete TCP collapse or significant reduction in performance is not hard to detect • Seems to rely too much on cross-layer independence
Misbehavior Diagnosis • PACK limitations • Power management not likely in highly mobile scenarios • Directional antennae not widely deployed yet, not necessarily true that they will be anytime • Diagnosis time: order of seconds • No results back up the claim • How does this change with different routing protocols?
Modeling and Simulation • Mean route lifetime: 10s • Why not look at a range of mean lifetimes corresponding to real scenarios? • Simulation environment • Open field of 1.2 square miles! • 200 nodes moving randomly! (Shaun of the Dead) • Maximum velocity of 10 m/s (Most people can’t run much faster than 3 m/s, esp. with a computer in hand, browsing the Web or using FTP) • Receive range of 250m is ridiculously unrealistic
More issues with Experiments • To what realistic scenario does the network traffic correspond? • Figure 16: large radio range inhibits fairness measurement, but the authors do not consider reducing the radio range • Only one routing protocol evaluated • How does JF impact AODV? • How about location-based routing protocols? • Cross-layer reliable delivery protocols?
Finally… • This is NOT the Internet • These are mobile scenarios, where all computers are relatively close to each other and in an open field • Malicious attacker cannot simply hide behind a bush • No doubt there are techniques to locate the JF attacker and physically remove her from the network