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Outline. In-Class Experiment on the Provision of Public Good Test of Free-Rider Hypothesis I: Marwell and Ames (1979) Test of Free-Rider Hypothesis II: Marwell and Ames (1980) Test of Free-Rider Hypothesis III: Issac and Walker (1988). Public Good Experiments.
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Outline • In-Class Experiment on the Provision of Public Good • Test of Free-Rider Hypothesis I: Marwell and Ames (1979) • Test of Free-Rider Hypothesis II: Marwell and Ames (1980) • Test of Free-Rider Hypothesis III: Issac and Walker (1988)
Public Good Experiments • Individual endowment is and n individuals in a group • Invest in Private and Public exchanges: • i’s returns from Private and Public exchanges are: • Individual’s utility function:
Basic Insight • If , then as n increases Vi = MPCR (marginal per capital return) drops. • So it is unclear whether group size effect is due to changes in Vi =MPCR or changes in group size n.
Three Possible Treatments • The effect of altering MPCR but holding n constant • The effect of altering n but adjusting G(.) function so that MPCR remains constant • The combination effect in which altering n also altering MPCR.
Experimental Procedure • Participants faced two consecutive series of ten decision trials. • In one series, MPCR was 0.3 and in another MPCR was 0.75. Order was switched to counterbalance. • 12 experimental sessions.
Basic Results:% of Strong Free Riders Data from second series A person is called a strong free rider if her contribution to public good is less than 1/3 of her tokens
Basic Results: % of Tokens Contributed Data from second series
End-Period Results Data from second series
Key Observations • Observation 1: Lowering the MPCR from 0.75 to 0.3 appears to increase significantly the incidence of free-rider behavior. • Observation 2: There are weak, if any, effects of changes in group size from four to ten (holding MPCR constant)