Cyclone Nargis & Humanitarian Intervention

1. Cyclone Nargis& Humanitarian Intervention Jenny & Steve

2. Storyline • Introductory video • Cyclone Nargis & humanitarian intervention • R2P+ ?? • NGO: an alternative to R2P

3. Aung San SuuKyi @Oxford http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oGqlsS6Zseg&feature=related Source: BBC

4. From Yangoon to Naypyidaw: Problems along the story • Myanmar has been with violation of human rights, ethnic conflicts since its formation in 1948 • As of 2011, about 800,000 Muslim refugees coming from Myanmar, most of them reside in borders with Thailand and in South-east Myanmar (http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e4877d6.html) • Under President TheinSein, Myanmar has improved its freedom (overall) by at least 4 points (http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/FIW%202012%20Booklet--Final.pdf) • The release of Aung San SuuKyi • NLD managed to secure seats at the parliament

5. Cyclone Nargis-1 • According to Haacke: • Myanmar’s junta, no capacity to respond to the humanitarian disaster • Govt blocking international relief, rejecting the use of foreign military assets to deliver aids • Myanmar is the first country within SE Asia that has become a target for explicit discussion about applying R2P principle. • R2P: • Genocide • War crimes • Ethnic cleansing • Crimes against humanity

6. Cyclone Nargis-2 • UN Charter Art 39 • Dynamics of the post-cyclone situation and R2P? • Invocation of the R2P principle and the response to Nargis? • International reaction towards Nargis and armed conflict? • Implications and conclusions follow from the Myanmar case in relation to R2P more generally?

7. Cyclone Nargis-3 Myanmar’s malign neglect

8. Cyclone Nargis– Diplomatic solutions 1 • Visas to international staff working for the UN and humanitarian agencies and granting of access to more remote parts of the delta • Agreement to receive an emergency assessment team from the ASEAN • The hosting of EU Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid • WFP using ten helicopters to ferry supplies from warehouse facilities in Yangon directly to remote locations the delta • ASEAN Disaster Management and Emergency Response mechanism not fully ratified as of 2005, so help has been on bilateral basis • ASEAN + ERAT + Govt of Myanmar relief efforts

9. Cyclone Nargis – Diplomatic solution 2 • Singapore Foreign Minister, George Yeo: • “Many western countries feel that much more should be done and perhaps it should be forced to them, but I don’t see how this can be done, because if you try to do that, you make the situation worse and will only increase the suffering of the people in Myanmar” • ASEAN foreign ministerial meeting: open a way • 7th ASEAN Security Summit: • The responsibility of disaster-hit countries to quickly and effectively bring humanitarian relief • Countries concerned should provide entry for humanitarian relief • Consent and supervision from the affected countries

10. Cyclone Nargis and Ongoing Problems • Armed conflict • Outflow of refugees, ethnic group vsgovt • Eastern Myanmar: local govtvs Karen National Union  refugees in northwest Thailand • Myanmar: highest IDP rate in SE Asia • In 2006, there was a shared idea of Myanmar potentially being a stumbling block to the international peace • 1100 political prisoners (including Aung San SuuKyi), outflow of refugees (problems with Thailand), drugs, HIV-AIDS and diseases. • Objection from Russia, China, Congo and Qatar • China and Russia argue that Myanmar’s problem is far from disturbance to the international peace and stability

11. Cyclone Nargis and Ongoing Problems • Obstacles of applying RtoP to Myanmar • There is no genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity which disturb international peace and/or stability • There is no clear picture on problems related to refugees in North-west Thailand and Eastern Myanmar. • There is no significant number of victims to be classified as ethnic cleansing • Lack of access to eastern Myanmar • China and the UNSC • Ties between Beijing and Naypidaw • Russia has always been against the idea of intervention • Indonesia has been abstain since Jan 2007 draft resolution on Myanmar  ASEAN does not really agree on intervention

12. R2P-Plus? • Limited applicability of current global demand (particularly in addressing ‘natural catastrophe’) + suspicion that it could be a tool of Western neo-imperialists ---- R2P-Plus • Focuses on preventive aspect of R2P + Removes the capacity for aggression or armed interference (Omission of reactive element) • Responsive pillar (R2P) > Preventive pillar (R2P-Plus) • “benign preventive pillar”

13. Addressing the problem of Natural catastrophe – R2P-plus

14. ASEAN – Crisis management • Relative success of ASEAN in crisis management • ASEAN’s involvement in the 1979 Vietnam-Cambodian War • Indonesia’s request for a peacekeeping force led by ASEAN in the East Timor conflict in 1999 • Recent inroads made by ASEAN and the Chinese govt in persuading the Myanmar junta to allow humanitarian organizations greater access to the disaster-stricken areas following Cyclone Nargis

15. R2P-Plus for ASEAN: Prospects and Challenges • R2P-Plus fits strongly with strategic interests of ASEAN states and their traditional ASEAN way of interaction which revolves around diplomacy and minimal interference in each other’s domestic affairs • Non-coercive methods -> response to humanitarian problems + preserve core national interests of member states • R2P-Plus within ASEAN Security community ( to foster regional integration) • 5 strategic priorities for SC • Political development • Norms-setting • Confict prevention • Conflict resolution • post-conflict peace building

16. essential conditions of conflict prevention – 1. Early warning Capability • ASEAN ->utilize the ASEAN Peoples’ Assembly (APA) network • To establish a regional network of NGOs, think-tanks, academics -> prevent a crisis from escalating • Strategic partners : China, South Korea, Australia, India -> help to develop effective domestic early warning capability through technical assistance

17. 2. Preventive Toolbox • Could be composed of representative form gov. , academia, civil society and expertise • Monitoring role (Investigation of specific human rights situations that could potentially trigger crisis) • ASEAN envoys could be dispatched to mediate and monitor under ASEAN Troika • Goal : to resolve conflicts through regional cooperation if possible • Natural catastrophe – Disaster response mechanism ( ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment (ERAT), ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force, Advisory group, UN, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, Non-govt. organizations

18. 3. Generating Political Will • ASEAN and interested parties to convince states and affected state of the need to act • Strong leadership • Need to impress upon ASEAN states that ‘security of one’s neighbors impact its own’ • 3 most recent crisis in ASEAN • 1. The Saffron Revolution 2. Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar 3. Thai-Cambodian border dispute : how the national interests of individual states are intertwined with the region and being shaped by external forces - ‘regional neighbors will naturally intervene in the affected state’s affairs’ but the question is “how, when and to what ultimate end those regional interventions will occur” ‘

19. Characteristics of ASEAN and ASEAN Charter • ASEAN charter (2007) : preserve traditional and conservative norms and consensus • HLTF (High Level Task Force) • Composed only of 10 people from ASEAN member states • Only 9-10 months to draft ASEAN Charter • NGOS -> didn’t have access to the draft before it was presented to and signed by the leaders during the 13th summit in Singapore • Public : no opportunity to debate the document

20. Criticisms • Fails to put people at the center, much less empowered them • Lacks role of citizens and civil society organization in regional community building • Adopt “ASEAN WAY” : “rule-based organization and remain just that’s”

21. Consensual Decision Making • Article 20: • Decision-making in ASEAN shall be based on consultation and consensus (provide each member state with veto power) • Consensus is needed in order to make non-consensus decision and for these to be valid • No sanctions (not even have provisions for suspension of members)

22. ASEAN’s Traditional consensus approach • 1. Thai Prime Minister ThanksinShinawatra’s treat to walk out of ASEAN Summit in 2005 : If the violence in Southern Thailand was raised 2. Prime Minister of Myanmar’s opposition to the planned briefing, on the situation after the military junta’s crackdown against protesting Buddihist monks • Traditional norms of state sovereignty and non-interference - Promotion of R2P difficult

23. Regional Human Rights Body • Myanmar and Vietnam  opposed to the creation of a human rights body : Premium on State sovereignty and non-interference • Compromise : all members agreed to include a second paragraph under Article 14 • ‘operate in accordance the terms of reference to be determined at a later stage by the foreign ministers • High Level Panel (HLP) created in July 2008

24. What kind of regional human rights body should be created

25. NGO: an alternative to R2P? • Review on the situation in Myanmar • Human rights violation – no freedom of expression • Ongoing conflicts, stateless people & refugees • Poor public health facility • Governance, democracy and civil society problems • Economics and livelihoods • Education – only 1.3% of GDP for this sector

26. Why supporting NGOs?

27. NGOs in Myanmar – Coordination in the field • The importance of strong field-based governance structures with mechanisms to hold NGO LO staff to account is underestimated. Where he NGO LO has a responsibility to local NGOS, governance structures must include them • Recognising the perceived and actual influence of location, source of fudning, and language on effectiveness of NGO coordination • NGO coordination must regularly consult with and anticipate the rapidly changing demands of field-based stakeholders • While a good coordination is necessary … an NGO coordinator should have experience working with different stakeholders

28. NGOs in Myanmar – Coordination in the field • Without a commitment to the Principles of Partnership and a means to evaluate whether or not they are being met, lip service to endeavouring to build on local capacity remains just that • Facilitating LNGO participation in the mainstream coordination is not necessarily the only or the most effective way to support local response and/or improve coordination and collaboration • A mutual recognition of the role and relationship between NGO coordination mechanism, HAP and Sphere can result in the benefits of networking, peer-learning and peer-evaluation, and sound technical advice

29. What can we do with Myanmar and NGOs? • Increase funding levels • Improving local capacity • Opening up the humanitarian space • Improving reliable data • Changing western donor policies • Donor harmonization

30. Myanmar, UN and ASEAN • The three actors • Humanitarian aid should take precedence over political reform • ASEAN and UN should be at the forefront of humanitarian actions in Myanmar • Efforts to extend the TCG’s operations to other crises in Myanmar should be, and remain, completely apolitical

31. IF!! Intervetion does happen? • Supreme humanitarian emergency × • Last resort　× • Proportionality　？ • Positive humanitarian outcome　▲ • Humanitarian motives　▲・× • Humanitarian justification　？ • Legality　× • Selectivity　？

32. Main references • “Cyclones and Humanitarian Crises: Pushing the Limits of R2P in SE. Asia” by Caballero – Chang • “The ASEAN Charter and the Promotion of R2P in SE. Asia: Challenges and Constraints” by Noel M. Morada • “Myanmar, the Responsibility to Protect, and the Need for Practical Assistance” by JurgenHaacke • “Working Through Ambiguity: International NGOs in Myanmar” by Soubhik Ronnie Saha

33. Additional references • Information on Tripartite Core Group: ASEAN-Myanmar-UN • http://www.aseansec.org/publications/AR09.pdf • http://www.aseansec.org/CN-PR-22TCG-PR.pdf • http://unic.un.org/imucms/userfiles/yangon/file/19th_TCG_Press_Release.pdf • Information on Cyclone Nargis Chronology • http://www.siiaonline.org/?q=research/myanmar-cyclone-nargis-timeline • Breakdown of international actors’ interests • http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2008/brown_elizabeth.pdf • The Case Study 2008-2010: NGOs in Myanmar • http://www.icva.ch/doc00004598.pdf