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The “Game” of Global Thermonuclear War (cf. Dr. Strangelove (1963) and WarGames (1983))

The “Game” of Global Thermonuclear War (cf. Dr. Strangelove (1963) and WarGames (1983)). It was US policy – and US strategic military planners believed the USSR knew this – to not be the first to “go nuclear” during a time of US/USSR tension.

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The “Game” of Global Thermonuclear War (cf. Dr. Strangelove (1963) and WarGames (1983))

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  1. The “Game” of Global Thermonuclear War(cf. Dr. Strangelove (1963) and WarGames (1983)) It was US policy – and US strategic military planners believed the USSR knew this – to not be the first to “go nuclear” during a time of US/USSR tension.

  2. The “Game” of Global Thermonuclear War(cf. Dr. Strangelove (1963) and WarGames (1983)) The two payoff scales are unrelated. They could be in different units (megadeaths versus $billions). We will not compare one party’s payoff to the other’s at any point.

  3. The “Game” of Global Thermonuclear War(cf. Dr. Strangelove (1963) and WarGames (1983)) { launch / not retaliate } is preferred by the USSR to { not launch } { not launch } is preferred by the US to { launch / not retaliate }

  4. The “Game” of Global Thermonuclear War(cf. Dr. Strangelove (1963) and WarGames (1983)) USSR: “The Chinese moving in” is worse than “a conventional (non-nuclear) resolution of the dispute”

  5. The “Game” of Global Thermonuclear War(cf. Dr. Strangelove (1963) and WarGames (1983)) Fear of Radioactive Fallout supplanted by fear of Nuclear Winter US: “Better Red than Dead!”

  6. The “Game” of Global Thermonuclear War(cf. Dr. Strangelove (1963) and WarGames (1983)) The USSR asks itself what the US would do in the face of a launch: The answer is obvious: not retaliate! ( -12 > -18 )

  7. The “Game” of Global Thermonuclear War(cf. Dr. Strangelove (1963) and WarGames (1983)) Given the predicted US response, what should the USSR do? Obviously, launch! ( +10 > 0 )

  8. The “Game” of Global Thermonuclear War(cf. Dr. Strangelove (1963) and WarGames (1983)) The US, unhappy with the analysis, asks itself what might happen if the “not retaliate” option didn’t exist?

  9. The “Game” of Global Thermonuclear War(cf. Dr. Strangelove (1963) and WarGames (1983)) The US, unhappy with the analysis, asks itself what might happen if the “not retaliate” option didn’t exist?

  10. The “Game” of Global Thermonuclear War(cf. Dr. Strangelove (1963) and WarGames (1983)) The USSR asks itself what the US would do in the face of a launch: There’s only one choice: retaliate!

  11. The “Game” of Global Thermonuclear War(cf. Dr. Strangelove (1963) and WarGames (1983)) Given the predicted US response, what should the USSR do? Obviously, not launch! ( 0 > -20 )

  12. The Doomsday Device(MAD: Mutual Assured Destruction) Predicting that, if the USSR knows that MAD is implemented, they will choose to “not launch”, the US prefers implementing MAD ( 0 > -12 )

  13. The Doomsday Device(MAD: Mutual Assured Destruction) And this kept the world safe from nuclear war until the USSR collapsed

  14. Important Point #1 In a single-person decision problem, the decision-maker always prefers keeping all options open as long as possible. Here (and in many other multi-actor decision problems), making binding precommitments (cutting off some options early) can yield superior results!

  15. Important Point #2 In a single-person decision problem, the decision-maker always prefers having personally-better potential outcomes to poorer ones. Here (and in many other multi-actor decision problems), making some outcomes worse can lead to superior results!

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